Dazmir Jojua

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IN ABKHAZIA

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Annotation

The chief factor of the war of the years of 1992-1993 - involvement of Russia and determination of the results due to the above mentioned participation is spotlighted in the present work. On the basis of the special study the views and opinions of the modern Russian - Abkhazian historiography and political journalism on the key problems of the war of 1992-1993 are denied.

The aim of the present work is to objectively describe the essential moments of the war of the years of 1992-1993 and show the typical face of Russia as an invader, an imperialist and hegemon.

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INTRODUCTION

On the background of the permanent aggression and hybride wars launched by Russia against the neighbouring states, the topic of its participation in the war of Abkhazia of 1992-1993 is getting more and more current and actual. The study of the issue makes obvious the fact, that Russian and Abkhazian historiography and political jounalism permanetely try to revise and falsify the tragic pages of the newest history of Georgia and precisely participation and involvement of Russia in the war, deciding the fate of the war and brought Georgia on the edge of the Nation catastrophe.

The schemes of the Abkhazian war and stamps were deeply imprinted into the informational policy of the Kremlin and separatists, as well as in the works of different authors and publications\(^1\). The aim of all this production is to muffle the political and diplomatic involvement of Russia in the war. That time political and military elite of the Kremlin play the role of mediators and neutral force and guarantors of fulfilling of the agreements and contracts, but in reality they were masked under the hired soldiers and “uncontrolled” bands.

All this is the total deception aiming to muffle the main factors of the war of 1992-1993 and describe it as “the Patriotic War of the Abkhazia people against the Georgian agression”. Besides, they strive to deny the military participation of Russia and thus, rehabilitate their anti-Georgian policy. In the long run, the target of the expansion of such approach is splitting of Abkhazia from Georgia, its occupation and grounding of the military annexation ideology.

Within the frame of the geopolitical and geostrategical re-

sults of the August war, the prospect of returning of Abkhazia is problematic for us. It is the bitter and tragic reality. That’s why it is necessary to restore the objective picture of the military participation of Russia in the war. It is determined by the strategic environment and transformation paradigm of the Abkhazian conflict. The existing situation and the scale of our loss, realization of the territorial crisis puts into the agenda the necessity of an adequate analysis of participation of Russia in the 1992-1993 war. The contents and format of the analysis is to be full, logic, disinterested, free from the rules of play of conflictology and half-truth being sacrificed to the normalization of the relations with Russia. In short, 22-23 years after the war we must know, why Russia participated in the war, how it happened and what are the results.

The aim of the present work is the analysis of the participation process of Russia in the Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, the function of which is to make the military-strategic, reconnaissance, political and diplomatic parameters of involvement of Russia in the war - subject of study and discussion. The political, geopolitical, geostrategic results are emphasized in the work and not only its chronical process. Besides, understanding of the militaristic, imperial and hegemonistic policy of Russia and destruction of its participation in the conflicts and its direct and indirect mechanisms, as well as comprehension of the conflictogenic potential of Russia is of a paramount importance for the conceptual and doctrinal basis of planning of the future relations with that latter.
THE ROLE OF RUSSIA IN CREATING THE PRE-CONDITIONS IN THE ABKHAZIAN WAR

The analysis of the historical genesis and evolution of each stage of the “Abkhazian Crisis” leads us to the unilateral conclusion – that the main source of crisis was Russia and the artery feeding it was the Russian Imperial strategy.

Starting from the 19th century of the 60-ies and activation of the arrangements for splitting the cultural integrity of Georgian-Abkahazian and the russification of that latter from the 80-ies, splitting zone of Gagra from the Governorate of Kutaisi in 1903-1904, permanent efforts of separating of Abkhazia from the canonic jurisdiction of the Georgian church, the imperial military policy of General Denikin and anti-Bolshevik government of Kuban in 1918-1919; anti-Georgian arrangements of the Soviet regime in the Sphere of the status of Abkhazia in 1921-1931; Anti-Georgian cultural – language policy of the 50-80-ies of the 20th century; “Plan of Sitin” (1922); “project of the “resort republic” (1945-1947); “Doctrine of Suslov” (1961); “Gatherings” of inspired by the reactive slogans of splitting of Abkhazia from Georgia in 1957, 1967, 1977-1978 and 1989 – here are the stages of “crisis of Abkhazia” or to speak metaphorically the “gatherings” for gambling organized by Russia.²

Russia always had an ardent desire of dictating its will and the rules of imperial game to Georgia; this aspiration does not lie only on the surface of the political position of B. Eltsin and activites of the general officers of P.Grachov, but is deeply buried in the imperial features of the nature of Russian Statehood; to be more exact imperialism and militarism are determined by the inner nature of Russian Empire and thus, has the inmanent character. From this aspect, the geopsychological factor is worth paying attention: Russian elite and the significant segment of the social opinion in the 90-ies of the 20th century

and even now, do not regard Georgia as an independent and full-fledged State, with its legitimate status and the special regional interests in the Caucasus. Russia cannot reconcile with this historical and geopolitical reality not only from the political strategy aspect, but from the psychological point of view as well. All this gave the strong social support to the anti-Georgia militaristic policy of the Kremlin and by the way, inspired the great flow of the volunteer combatants hired during the Abkhazian war.

The essential moment of Russia’s participation in 1992-1993 Russian war is clear: at the turn of the 80-90-ies of the 20th century activation of the national - liberating movement in Georgia, transformation of the social situation and political order towards the Stately independence orientation conditioned the regular aggravation of the “Abkhazia Crisis” being inspired by the imperial centre to the level, that the preamble and causes of growing of the conflict into the war were obvious.

On the one hand, the tendency of merging of the struggle for restoration of the national independence with the Western orientation of Georgia became obvious and on the other hand the illegal separatist movement of Abkhazia for splitting from Georgia merged with the Russia’s regional interests and policy of the Kremlin for obtaining its dominion in the South Caucasus.

Collision of these two tendencies turned especially acute in 1991-1992 and at the background of the inevitable disintegration of the Soviet Empire determined the following three factors: The lines of the development of the crisis of the political process in Abkhazia, position of the Georgian political elite in regard with Russia and negative attitude of the Russian authorities (teams of Gorbachev and Eltsin) towards the legitimate steps of Georgia (Elections of the 28th of October of 1990 and growing of the national movement into the State Power subject; Referendum of the 31st of March of 1991 and Declaration of the 9th of April on the restoration of the Stately
independence; Presidential elections of the 26th of May of 1991; Standing of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s power on the platform of the full independence and refusal on participating in the so-called “Novo-Ogariovo Process”; Positive neutrality during the Moscow putsch and so on).

The opinion, that Russia did not have preliminary elaborated reactive plans in Abkhazia, as well as imperialistic aspirations, secret targets and the fact, that it had to transform its politics due to Georgian activities and deeds is a total nonsense. On the contrary, facts, separate examples, general direction of the Kremlin policy proves opposite: and it is, encouragement of Ardzinba’s grouping to escalate the conflict, and afterwards strengthening of the military potential of that latter during the war and military involvement.

In conditions of the national-liberating movement of Georgia and the course of the sovereignization of the communist authorities of the country (on the 9th of March of 1990 the Supreme council of the Georgian SSR passed a Declaration on “the Sovereignty of Georgia” and a Resolution on the “Guarantees of Defense of the Stately Sovereignty of Georgia” and the attitude of the Kremlin acquired the signs of the military–political strategy. It was the direct orientation towards the usage of the conflict inspiration tactics and the factor of the military force.

At a certain stage the function of the pressure was given to the “strategy of intimidation”. That strategy contained the preventive elements of the psychological impact on Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his national government, in order to intimidate them with the certain acts in case of declaring the Stately independence and thus maintain paralyzation of the anti-imperial policy. One has only to recall Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s and Mikhail Gorbachov’s telephone conversations, when that latter was warning the President of Georgia about the complications in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali in case of choosing the course of independence. The Kremlin thought, that the strategic poten-
tial of intimidation would appear a repressive background for Georgia. The psychological pressure had to be performed on the permanent basis and be universal; that latter had to create permanent strain and the condition of balancing on the conflict threshold (namely, that policy was called by Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1991 the course of the “total destabilization”).

The war between Russia and Georgia was inevitable due to the fulfilling of the idea of independence and performing of the policy of Sovereignty by Georgia and consequently, that war would be avoidable if Georgia would refuse to pursue that idea and deny the performance of the adequate policy. The main factor is the factor of the inevitability of the war and not the place and time of its prosecution; it did not matter, whether it would take place in Tbilisi on the 22nd December of 1991, in Tskhinvali on the 6th of January of 1991 or on the 14th of August of 1992 in Sokhumi.

In the same period the tactic element of the intimidation policy and integral strategic anti-Georgian project was demonstration of the power. On the territory of Abkhazia through the additional stationing of the military units the Kremlin created the situation for breaking the fragile balance and bringing into action the methods of escalation for stimulating the negative political changes.

On the 22-23rd of February of 1991, without asking a permission from the Central Power of Georgia, according to the directive given by the minister of Inner Affairs B.Pugo the 250 men division with the full military equipment was brought into the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. Due to the fact, that the arrangement was made without the agreement with the Central Power of Georgia and in addition it was in breach with the legislation of the USSR (as there was not a single case of not only mass but even sporadic disorderly conduct of the society), it has to be assessed as de facto intervention.
and act aimed to the destabilization of the situation in the region. With that act the status of Stately Sovereignty of Georgia and superiority of the territorial - legal jurisdiction in Abkhazia were ignored.

Besides, it is obvious, that the step of the Kremlin was motivated by the provocative operative tasks. The division of the internal military forces was stationed in one of the health resorts located in the village of Babushera of the Gulripsh district. On the 20th of December of 1990 according to the law of the National Guard, from the second part of January of 1991 in Georgia started the recruiting process and formation of the military units. Among the divisions formed in Abkhazia, one and namely the Gulripsh Batallion of the National Guard was stationed in one of the objects located on the Sea Coast of the village of Babushera, which was only in several hundred meters from the place of location of the Internal military forces. Thus, we may suppose, that the act of the Kremlin, besides the above mentioned function aimed at organizing the military provocation and inspiring of the local military strain through imitation of the restriction of functioning of the National Guard of the Gulripsh Battalio.

“The incident of Babushera” was a typical phenomenon for the strategy of realization of the imperialistic interests of the Kremlin. That strategy, as we have already mentioned above was directed towards the artificial destabilization of the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, provoking of the military crisis and dislocating of the escalation from the political line to the military line.

Activation of the secret service and disruptive activities of the Kremlin was the consisting part of the same strategy. Seeding of the agent net of the special service into the military system of Georgia was of a paramount importance. The military councilors of the national guard of Georgia “Shavnabada” were Colonel of the State Intelligence Department - Al. Postishev
and Major “Sasha”. The latter was the officer of the Intelligence Department of the group of the Russian Military forces in the Trans Caucasus. During the Gagra battles (October 1992) he used to give the members of the Georgian Guards regiment such sort of military tasks and sent them to the places from which only few of them returned\(^4\).

Later, Major “Sasha” became executive of the Chief of the regiment – A. Barbakadze. The fact that during the Tamish operation (July 1992), Barbakadze’s subdivision failed to defend the space between the Tamish bridge and farm and the landing force of the adversary managed to form a foothold there\(^5\), was the so-called “merit” of “Sasha”.

On April 17 of 1991 on the territory of Tbilisi military settlement, was held Major Postroiuk an officer of the special regiment of the military district of the Trans Caucasus. At the time of arrest he was trying to persuade the soldier of the national guard to help them. As a result of interrogation it became clear that special subdivision was formed from the Russian-speaking staff of the State Security Committee, for studying and investigating the processes having place there and data capturing of the needed information\(^6\). Work of the special regiment of the military district of the Trans Caucasus on the territory of Georgia with the aim of forming a conspiracy net of the secret service, gathering of the intelligence deliverables and handing it to the Imperial centre became especially active from Spring of 1991. The secret source informed the Minister of State Security of Georgia O.Khatiashviil, that one of the residencies was formed in the village Krasnoe of the Marneuli district, by Major of Chief of the special department of the Marneuli Russian military base, Major Of. Fursov\(^7\).

\(^4\) Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze, reference, p. 2.
\(^7\) Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze, reference 6.05.91, p. 1-2.
In February of the year of 1991 by the instruction of the State Secret Committee of the Soviet Union, at the level of the Trans Caucasus for the coordination of the Intelligence service - operative activities in the 4th sector of the special regiment of the military district of the Trans Caucasus, was formed the Intelligence service subdivision under the command of Colonel Tsurika. The nuclear consisting of 7-8 officers was in Tbilisi and its branches were in Baku and Yerevan. The subdivision consisted of Intelligence service and Operative-technical structural divisions. The tasks of the subdivision in Georgia was the following: Gathering of the operative information on the main directions of the political course of Z. Gamsakhurdia’s Government (for fulfilling this task it was necessary to search for the reliable sources in the Supreme Council, State Security Committee, organs of Militia, National Guard, oppositional parties); as well as gathering of the information on the plans and probable activities of the opposition; Restoration of the contacts with the “old” agents and formation of the “New” agents. The whole complex of the arrangements being made within the regional policy of the imperial centre of the years of 1991-1992 served that aim. According to the results those arrangements can be divided into the three groups:

The first group contains the political-legislative acts being passed by V. Ardzinba on suggestion of the Kremlin through violating the elementary norms of the legal consciousness. Essentially, it was the Constitutional conflict with the Central Power of Georgia (the so-called “war of the laws”), which created the juridical basis for the future war.

The second group contained the political steps (financial, political, psychological) being undertaken by Ardzinba’s environment through forming the pro-imperial party-political net in the Autonomous Republic and widening of the social-political base of the separatism (“Slavic House”, Armenian “Krunk”, and separate “charity” groups and “cultural” societies; in March of

1992 on the ground of coalition of those units with “Aidgilara” was created anti-Georgian and pro-Moscow block “Soiuz”; Intense contacts with the “Confederation of the Highlanders of the Caucasus” being formed by the KGB grew into the factual military alliance. The Kremlin brought into the game the North Caucasian player and planted the bomb of destruction of the Iberian-Caucasian consciousness and ruining the idea of the integral Caucasus). Thus, created the political the basis for the future war.

The third group contained the preliminary elaborated provocative acts impeding normalization of the situation, the further widening of the primary effect obtained through due to the efforts of the National Power of Georgia (especially, after the compromise was achieved and the election law passed in Summer of the year of 1991). In accordance with the directives from the imperial centre, the Sokhumi separatist grouping supported the irresponsible activities of the destructive forces and purposively did not undertake steps towards restricting of the activities of the groups deepening the process of confrontation. That kind of policy caused the opposition in the Autonomous republic created the atmosphere of mistrust and ethnic conflicts and hindered the mechanisms of agreement, cooperation and stability. On the basis of all the above mentioned facts, alliance of the different circles of the Kremlin and Abkhazian separatists provided the societal basis for the oncoming war.

All the three above mentioned directions of the destructive policy of the imperial centre was interrelated and interdependent. In the whole, their function is obvious – it is creation of anarchy in Abkhazia, disturbing of the initially fragile balance existing between Tbilisi and Sokhumi, formation of the real precondition of growing into the war (in the secession war of the Abkhazia ethnocracy against the Central Power of Georgia).

Failure of the Moscow Putsch of August of 1991 and replac-
ing the Gorbachov team with the Eltsin team neither changed the attitude of Empire towards Georgia, nor threw the “Abkhazian card” into the dust-bin of history, but on the contrary, the new formation Russian elite established even stronger the anti-Georgian alliance with the Abkhazian ethnocracy, refined and made more task-oriented the conflictogenic technologies of initiating of the war. It is the core of the matter: when on the top level the radical transformation of the State hierarchy takes place, but the imperial policy and accompanying it technological strategies don’t change (but, vice versa they obtains even more radical impulses), it means that imperialism, expansionism and interventionism are the inseparable law of the Russian policy.

On the one hand, the Putsch of August (coup d’etat) (overthrow of President Gorbachov by the group of putschists, taking power by the “State Committee of the Special Situations” and announcement of the State of emergency) was the anti-Constitutional State overturn. On the other hand, the acts of Belovezh Agreement on the 8th of December of 1991 and Declaration of Alma-Ata on the 21st of December of 1991 on the cease of existence of the USSR were logical and lawful. But, in relation to Georgia that transitory geopolitical process was not significant, as it was the circulation having place in the nomenclature of the highest hierarchy of the Empire, replacing of the “Gorbachov centre” with the “Eltsin centre”, “replacing of the Novo-Ogariovo Process” and “project of the “Alliance of the Sovereign States (SSA) with the “Belovezh Process” and “project of the “Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Georgia stood on the platform of the complete independence: it assessed equally negatively the “Novo-Ogariovo Process” and “Belovezh Process” and refused to join the neo imperialistic creation of the Kremlin – CIS.

The position of that time West is worth attention. The western establishment of that period, in conditions of the split of the Soviet Union and bipolar structure of the world, was not inter-
ested in dezintegration of the integral space and splitting of the integral model of security (as the following events showed it was the strategic mistake of administrations of G. Bush – Senior and B. Clinton). Besides, West assessed the inner nature of transformation having place in Moscow very peculiarly: it estimated it as a dichotomy of the totalitarianism and democracy and viewed that approached integrally, as one whole of the internal and foreign policy of the Kremlin. In the internal policy Russia of B. Eltsin really had a certain degree of democracy (though it remained a non-liberal country), but the foreign policy and especially towards the post-Soviet countries it maintained the role of the conductor of the imperial course and power politics. West failed to see the signs of that correlation, neither assessed the expansive strategy of the Kremlin adequately and nor withstood even formally the inner destabilization of the Post-Soviet countries and the destructive policy of the Kremlin directed towards the control of the conflict belt along the perimeter of the Russian border. It was the reason of the neutrality to say the least, in the Abkhazian war from the side of the West.

The course of Georgia due to its geocivilization choice and non-participation in the CIS block formed under the patronage of Russia radically strained the relations between Moscow and Tbilisi in all the spheres. The Kremlin shifted into the stage of planning of the imperial projects and organization of the controlled escalation in Abkhazia. It is rather significant, that a new wave of Russia’s activity coincided in time with the above mentioned course of Georgia; on the 15th of September of 1991 the Supreme Council of Georgia passed a Declaration on announcing of the Soviet Army located on the territory of the Republic of Georgia an occupational military force. Simultaneously, by the order of President of Georgia, the Government of Georgia had to start the negotiations with the corresponding structures of the imperial venture on the deoccupation time and procedures, as well as on the topic of returning into pos-
session of Georgia the objects and property of Russia located in the military district of the Trans Caucasus being located on the territory of our country. A Week earlier before passing of those acts, on the 9th of September was formed the Ministry of Defense of Georgia.

Thus, Georgia univocally determined the priorities of the independent military policy, structures of the sovereign military ruling (in face of Ministry of the National Defense and its system-related organs), as well as the package of the political agreements and legal norms, on the basis of which the deoccupation of the country had to be made irrespective who would be in the Kremlin – Gorbachov or Eltsin.

On the 21st of December of 1991 in Alma-Ata was held the Summit of the Leaders Allied Republics. The Summit had to decide the matter of joining of the different Post-Soviet Republics to the Russia-Ukraine-Belorussia Belovezh Agreement made on the 8th of December of 1991 (on the disintegration of the Soviet Union and formation of CIS). This issue was decided by the special “Declaration”, not signed by Georgia the representatives of which had the status of observers. Exactly, on the following day the State overturn started in Tbilisi.

The reactive and interventionalist policy of Eltsin in conditions of “democratic Russia” became more radical and unpredictable, as it obtained a new dimension – the reoccupation-reanexation of the South Caucasus. The central thesis of that fundamental regional project was the restoration of the control over Georgia and the main military gear of its realization was the launching of the war in Abkhazia. Starting of the war in Abkhazia, its artificial protraction and provision of beneficial outcome with meddling into the war, was one of the main circles in the events conditioning the restoration of the close zone of Russian hegemony in the South Caucasus. Other circles of the chain were the war in Kharabagh, conflict in the Tskhinvali region, overthrow of A. Elchibei authority in Azer-
baijan and organization of the overturn of the National Government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia.

From the present position taking into consideration the existing material, decoded data, different memoir information and the inner logic of that time events arises no doubt, that:

a) The putschist movement of September –October of the year of 1991, as well as the anti-Constitutional State overthrow of the 22nd of December - 6th of January of 1992 was performed with the political-diplomatic, financial and military support of the Russian Federation;

b) The secret, informal committee being specially formed in the administration of President Eltsin headed by the Vice-Premier and State Minister G. Burbulis managed and coordinated the Russian sources, forces and structures organizing the overthrow.

c) The outcome of the Tbilisi Stately overthrow were beneficial for Russia and a new regional policy of the Kremlin, which was the following: overturn of the National Government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, dissolution of the legitimate Supreme Council and dispersion of the operating Constitution; formation of the illegitimate and unpopular regime, first (On the 2nd of January of 1992), the Military Council and then (On the 10th of March of 1992,) the State Council headed by E. Shevardnadze, who returned from Russia; restoration in the Government of the Party nomenclature of the Soviet epoch; creation in Georgia of the controlled (but, from time to time uncontrolled) chaotic atmosphere political crisis, civil confrontation;

d) Abkhazian separatists had the direct contacts with the “Committee of Burbulis”, Russian Generalship and special service circles. Separately from E. Shevardnadze’s anti-national “Moscow center” V. Ardzinba’s grouping on suggestion of the Kremlin and the directive
pressure of that latter played its separatist games. It was provision of the political, legal and military-administrative basis for illegitimate separation of Abkhazia from Georgia, making growth of the Abkhazian crisis into the war inevitable.

On the 29th of December of 1991 Presidium of the Higher Council of Abkhazia enacted a Regulation according to which the military divisions stationed on the territory of the Autonomous Republic (army, internal troops, border troops and facilities of the military naval forces) fell within the jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Higher Council (i.e. V. Ardzinba), but their technique, armament and possession of the army institutions (facilities) were declared to be the property of Abkhazia. This was the gross violation of the integrity of the Constitutional system of Georgia by the separatist grouping and laws of the Supreme Council of Georgia from the 15th of September of 1991. The illegitimate efforts of accumulating of the mobilization resources and controlling of the military system independently from the Central Power were fixed. The adopted Act was the evidence of formation of the Russian military units and their stationing on the integral territory of Georgia.

On the 29th December of the same year by the second Act V. Ardzinba formed under his guidance “The temporary military council”, the function of which was “Coordination of the activities military and militia divisions being stationed on the territory of Abkhazia”. Head of the Council was V. Ardzinba, commanders of the Russian military units being stationed in Abkhazia – Colonel B. Miervelov, (commander of the N3 697

10. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was officially completed on December 25 of 1991, with the resign of President M. Gorbachev.
11. Regional Conflicts..., p. 61.
of the military unit) and Mayor A. Klimov (Commander of the Military Unit N 5482) became the members of the council.

“The temporary military council” was in fact, the structure of separatist military control not subdued to the Central Power of Georgia, a sort of symbol for military-political Sovereignty of Abkhazia and Abkhazian-Russian military alliance. At the same time, as the following events revealed that organ of the future military system of the separatist regime played the part of the primordial image of the coordinating system of the separatist regime and the so-called Ministry of Defense.

It is obvious, that that the precise step of the military grouping of the separatists could not be undertaken without the sanction and support from Russia. It goes without saying, that the commanders of the Russian military divisions had never occupied the places in the “council” without the directives from the Russian Headquarters, or the regional military main office.

With the formation of the “temporary military council” the separatists sent an direct message to the authorities of Georgia implying that they did not exclude the armed confrontation (the zero reaction from the paralyzed after the military overturn or Putsch official Tbilisi is another problem).

On March 31 of 1992 the circle of V. Ardzinba in the Presidium of the Higher Council passed a Resolution on “the Arrangements concerning compliance with law on General military obligation”.12 It was followed by the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic (April 30) on the “recruiting of the citizens born in 1965-1974 into the real military service.”13 On the basis of that unlawful activity, in the non-Georgian part of the population of the Autonomous Republic due to the intense work of the military-mobilizing departments was formed “The internal household regiment”. In fact, it was a monoethnic guard – independent from the central military structures of Georgia, a military unit subdued to

the Head of the Higher Council of Abkhazia. It is remarkable, that the Russian subdivisions stationed on the territory of Abkhazia immediately started supplying the Abkhazian regiment with the military technique and weapon. It happened, when the Russian divisions stationed in other parts of Georgia resisted the same analogous, though lawful deed for the Ministry of defense of Georgia; they named as a motive non-existence of an Agreement on the above mentioned matter with Georgia (It is well-known, that the Agreement was signed on May 15 1992 in Tashkent).

In Summer of 1992 the political strain reached the Apogee. On the basis of regrouping of the ethnic communities and social-political forces qualitatively new political order was formed. The degree of conflictogenity and escalation reached the highest level. The policy of V. Ardzinba being encouraged from Russia and directed towards the usurpation of the Power of the Autonomous Republic and formation of an anti-Georgian, neototalitarian regime was introducing the situation into the dead end. On June 5 of 1992 in Sokhumi the extended meeting of the political organizations of the separatist orientation was called. At the meeting was announced, the so-called creation of the “National Committee of Saving Abkhazia”. Worth attention is the “Declaration of the National Committee of Saving of Abkhazia” adopted at the meeting, with its anti-Georgian pathetic and proclamatory to forceful way out from the critical situation (i.e. via a war). Videlicet, in the Declaration is marked, that “…in case of formation of the anti-Constitutional parallel structures and the illegal military formations, it is necessary to undertake the following steps: nation-wide mobilization; sending the analogous request on national-wide mobilization to the Parliament of the Confederation of the Highlanders of the Caucasus; immediate adoption of the Stately Independence Act of Abkhazia…”

It is not difficult to infer, who is implied in the “declaration” in the “non-Constitutional parallel structures” and in “illegal military formations”. Here are meant the anti-Separatist representational structures - Parliamentary group “Democratic Abkhazia”, “Council of National Union” and the defense regiment in the subordinate to the Georgian State – the motorized battalion of the Internal military forces of Sokhumi. “Declaration directly and openly demands announcement of “Independence” and launches the war for defense of that “independence”. This is how the Abkhazians took the rout of the factual military maneuver tactics and with the help of Russia created basis for the war.

We have already mentioned above the regional geopolitical strategy of Russia. The main element of the above-named project was the Geostategic plan elaborated by the administration of Boris Eltsin. The purpose of that latter was providing of the long-term military presence of the various strategic points on the territory of Georgia through creating of the net – military base, special militarized centers, peaceful missions. Speculation of the Kremlin was the following – organization of the new geostrategic architecture in the South Caucasus, exercise of the territorial expansion against Georgia via the war in Abkhazia and involvement of the country into the outer buffer belt of the Imperial geospace (together with Azerbaijan and Moldova). Wasn’t the entrance of the Russian Peacemaking Mission into Georgia in accordance with the Agreement after the war in Abkhazia on May 14 of 1994 the strategic points destined for the security and limited armament zones for its jurisdiction?

Before the war the influence of Russia on the political factors of the “Abkhazian crisis” and the configuration of forces was characterized with a certain peculiarity. In the Kremlin (at least in that part of the Kremlin elite, which represented President Eltsin’s surroundings and ruling group) was decided, that at that stage the proAbkhazian course did not correspond to the imperial interest of growing the crisis into the war. Thus, the
course was held for the tactics of encouraging the both sides to launch a war. In June-July of 1992 the Kremlin chose the tactics of guaranteeing the both sides - the Georgian and Abkhazian and started working in the parallel regime.

On June 18 of 1992, from the military-engineering division of the Russian Army stationed in the district of “Maiak” in Sokhumi with the purpose of armament of the so-called Abkhazian guard was given out great amounts of automatic weapon, machine-guns and other military techniques.\(^{15}\)

On June 24 of 1992 at the meeting of E. Shevardnadze and B. Eltsin in Dagomis besides the principles of regulating the Georgian – Ossetian conflict, the whole complex of relations between Georgia and Russia was discussed. In the “Communiqué” was said: “The organs of legal order of Georgia and Russia will suppress and terminate on the territory under their jurisdiction activities of the illegal military, half military and arbitrarily formed divisions and groups.”\(^{16}\) Official Tbilisi called “the illegitimate military and half military detachments” the devoted to the President Zviad Gamsakhurdia National Guard functioning on the territory of West Georgia and other military groups. The majority of them moved to Abkhazia. The monotonic guard and armed groups of “Aidgilara” were also considered to be the “illegal detachments».

On June 24 of 1992, the very day of singing the “Dagomis Communiqué” by the order of V. Ardzinba that guard as if “protecting the public order” occupied the building so of the

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15. Personal archive of Colonel G. MAisuradze, reference 30. 06. 92,p.9.
16. The problem of return of E. Shevardnadze to Georgia and Establishment of his regime was finally decided on March 2 of 1992 within the frames of secret negotiations being held in Moscow (Shevardnadze-Shaposhnikov, Shevardnadze – Primakov, Shevardnadze – Lukin, and Shevardnadze – Kitovani). In exchange for the guarantees Shevardnadze had to fulfill two stipulations – becoming the member of CIS and restoration of the status of the Russian Army in Georgia.
Supreme Council and Council of Ministers, took control of the central highway of Sokhumi, streets and squares. The coincidence was not accidental.

It is not a secret, that at the Dagomis meeting E. Shevardnadze received a sanction from B. Eltsin on conducting military operation in Abkhazia guaranteeing Russia’s neutrality.

On July 18 of 1992 in Sochi, at the State villa of “Bocharov Ruchei” Boris Eltsin held a secret non official meeting with V. Ardzinbda and other representatives of the Abkhazian elite.” In five days after the meeting on July 23, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia passed series of illegal legislative acts of the separatist character: resolution on the changes to be made in the regulations (which was the offense against the principles of the Constitutionalism and the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic, as it stated, as a quorum for changes to be made in the Constitution not the qualified majority, but simple majority of votes); It was the Resolution on cessation of operation of the Constitution of the year of 1978 and till adoption of the new Constitution on operating the Constitution of the SSR of Abkhazia of the year of 1925 (It implied cessation of the State - Legal relations with Georgia; In the Resolution simultaneously with the restoring of the Constitution of the year of 1925 was marked, that “the operating system of the legislative, executive and court power was to be maintained.” (I.e. on the basis of the Constitution of 1978 -D.J.).

As it known, reglamentation of the legislative, executive and court system in the backbone of every constitution, the nuclear of it. So, what? The Constitution of the year of 1978 was officially removed and the Constitution of the year of 1925 was to be operated, but in reality in operation was still the Constitution of 1978, but without the status of the Autonomous Republic. The stillborn Constitution of April 1 of 1925, which was not even published and had never been operated, was needed

by the separatists only because of one article – the sovereignty of Abkhazia); laws on the change of the name and symbolic of the Autonomous Republic; Law on the transit taxes (Which considered to be the possession of Abkhazia the territory of the Republic, its air and sea space; one of the items of the 4th article – “legal and physical persons of Republic of Georgia and Krasnodar District are exempt from transit taxes” – regarded Georgia, as legally outer territory and it was equaled with the Krasnodar District belonging to Russian Federation).

Thus, after the confidential meeting with the President of Russia and in accordance with the received directives and guarantees, on July 23 of 1992 the separatist groupings revolutionized the regional political overthrow and declared the desire of anti-Constitutional split of Abkhazia from Georgia or the illegal cessation.

It is how the separatist elite supported by Russia and specifically V. Ardzinba led the situtation to the military opposition. Self-Confession of V. Ardzinbdia made at the beginning of August while conversing with Professor S. Chrvonnaia is symptomatic is this respect:” We are ready for this, we can place under arms.

“We are ready and in a half an hour are able to call up for military service the whole population. Our armory is full of Russian weapon and at any moment we can get two times, three times more. We established contacts with the Kazaks. Soon a war will break out here and not only the Caucasus, but the whole Russia will be involved.”

The political participation of Russia shut out the possibility of reviving of the trust in Abkhazia between the tow sides and swithing on of the mechanism of the coordination, compromise and cooperation in the critical situation (at leat the compulsory cooeprtaion). Even the more, Russia had a wide-scale influence on Tbilisi and Sokhumi and it could easily restore the stability through forcing the both sides to sit at the table of negotiations.

and return even to the lawmaking discussion ("The war of legislations"). But the Kremlin did not make it; it did not exploit the methods of diplomatic pressure and other political channels. It even did not make an effort to create the environment of alternative offerings and de-escalation for the opposed sides.

Involvment of Russia and tactics of double guarantee ruined the integrity of the political process and destroyed the basis for the de-escalation of the conflict. Russia preferred to pretend not to interfere and support the peaceful solution and wait to the break of the war and the moment to get involved.

The starting point of the regular armed intervention of Russia became August 14 of 1992: It was the day, when the tactic grouping consisting of the subdivision of the Internal forces, formations of the Ministry of Defense and the militarized guard of the Railway Department moved to the territory of Abkhazia. The basis for the restationing was the resolution adopted on August 10 of 1992 on introduction of the special rules of the railway transportation means and the special plan being prepared by the operative department of the Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense (with the code name “Makhvili” (“Edge”) V. Ardzinba was warned about the operation of the 14th of August. At the village Okhurei of the Ochmachire District the group of Abkhazian boeviks (gunmen) opened fire to the armed convoy of the limited contingent, followed by the first casualties. Near the village Agudzera of Gulpish District a serious battle had place (the so-called “special regiment of the Internal Military Forces of Abkhazia” opened fire to the Georgian column and blew up on armored vehicle in the vicinity of the Airport Babushera and “the red bridge” located near Sokhumi, It was the start of the “War in Abkhazia” of 1992-1993, or essential the regular Russo-Georgian war.

Movements of the army contingent on the territory of the Autonomous Republic having palce on official mdecision of the authorities of Georgia, was not an intervention or occupational act. The armed forces of the State were moving within the integral territorial-Stately space and sovereign jurisdiction. From the formal-juridical and military-normative aspect this act can be qualified as movement of armed forces and restationing having place on the basis of the supremacy of the State territory. An-
other issue is the relation of the act of August 14 to the factors of values, humanity and conflict, as well as to the cultural motives of historical cohabitation of Georgian and Abkhazians. Those factors and motivations in certain, special situations acquire the degree of conditionality, especially when national interests and paradigm of the territorial integrity suggests the necessity of power politics.

On August 14 the official Tbilisi made a bad decision, not to pay attention to the decision made by the Kremlin and sepratsit groupings. We mean the legislative norms and the elementary rules on which stands the order of Constitution. From the aspect of positive legislation the act of 14\textsuperscript{th} of August can be assessed as a certain sort of inner Stately reprisal, as a certain type of a military sanction. It was the extreme and compulsory measure being undertaken by the Central Government of Georgia in reply to the illegal action (non-constitutional Resolution made in July 23) of the authorities of the Autonomous Republic and with the purpose of avoiding the outcome of that act (cession and threatening the territorial integrity of the country).

Reduced explanation of the causes for the military operation of the 14\textsuperscript{th} of August made within the subjective frames is abosultely unecaptable (as well as the causes for launching the war in 1992-1993). The essence of the subjective opinion is the fact, that the reason for starting the war is named the personal mistakes of the politicians and military commanders. And their unrealized actions and non-pragmatic steps. For example, E. Shevardnadze’s refusal to arrive in to Sokhumi for the face-to-face negotiations with V. Ardzinba and the self-initiative of the Minister of Defense T. Kitovani are named as the reasons. Laying the blame of the reasons for launching the war upon the Georgia political elite does not stand any criticism. Unfortunately, the authors of the like versions do not realize, that willing or not are trapped into the conceptual net of the hiding of the crucial role of Russia. Laying all the blame on E. Shevardnadze and T. Kitovani is approved with the fact, that
Russia waives the main responsibility for the genesis of the war and even the more—factually neutralizes the imperial factors of the origin of the war.

On August 15 of 1992 the Georgian sea-born assault military forces landed in the village Gandiati of Gagra zone. It established control in the Gantiadi-Leselidze zone and State board on the River Psou. Afterwards, after the four-day battles with the Abkhazian military formations the Georgian sea-born assault forces moved to Gagra and occupied the main part of the District of Gagra including a very important Gagra range.

During 14-17 of August the Georgian divisions were stopped at the river Kelasuri and entered Sokhumi only on August 18. During that period the grouping of V. Ardzinba and the organs of the separatist authorities moved to Gudauta; as for the military formations they stationed on the river Gumista and formed a Gumista (western) front. Later, the second strategic line of opposition was formed in the Ochamchire district, the so-called Eastern front.

Concerning the war of 1992-1993 we have a quite solid book and analytical production. The war in its complexity (starting with the military operations and ending with the analysis of the “military diplomacy”), as well as its thematically and chronological aspects. We will be dealing with one specific problem and it is the participation of Russia in the war, its fundamental impact on the dynamics of the military operations, evolution of the military-strategic situation and determination of the war outcome and on the general process of the Georgian-Russian military political relations. Our research besides the impartiality and objectivity is based on the functional approach: The main thing is to explain involvement of Russia from the negative role it played in the outcome of the war of 1992 - 1993.

Thus, analyses are focused on the structural factors of meddling of Russia, factual data, about their decisive role in determin...
mining the consequences of the war. And about the definition of involvement of Russia (gression, indirect intervention and hybrid war. The military-strategic and political aspects are reviewed as one integral part.

For the beginning of the war on the territory of Abkhazia were stationed two mechanized divisions of the Ministry of defense, squadron of the military air forces (air force division 529), the special missile division N 643, the divisions of the beach defense of the district of the red war of the of the town of Sokhumi and the town of Ochamchire, military divisions N 5482 and 3697, the so-called department N 901, the military-seismic laboratory of Esher, as well as the subdivision of the communication and logistic services and groups of support. All those divisions were united in a special corpus – “the group of Russian Army in Abkhazia”. Its headquarters in decision the separate matters and problems were less and less dependent on the Tbilisi Commandment of the Russian Army group in the Trans Caucasus and communicated with the Ministry of Defense of Russia directly and the chief commandment of the different specialization army through the operative line. On the basis of the directives being received from Moscow, the headquarters of Russian army group in Abkhazia, worked out the plan of action for the case, the usage of the Russian army would be necessary for restoring and protecting social order. General Chindarov said in one of the interviews being given at that period:” We are not taking part in the military operations, but existing of the groups of the Russian army is necessary and correct. Why? Because, it is the restricting and restraining factor for the sharp politicians the Georgian side in the first place.”

The Commandment of the group of the Russian army in Abkhazia became the mechanism of separatist formation and management of the divisions of the Highlanders of the Caucasus, the centre for the operative and tactic planning. The military units stationed on the territory of Abkhazia supported V. Ardzinba’s grouping. The administrations of the districts of Krasnodar and Stavropol also shifted to the regime of the like solidarity, mobilization, economic and military-technical support. The acted under the false label of the President B. Eltsin’s “Economic Aid” declared on the 29th of March of 1992. From time to time the analogous steps were undertaken by the district and local management levels of Russia. On the 20th of August of 1992 the meeting of the leaders of the North Caucasian Republics, Rostov District, and Stavropol and Krasnodar regions was held in the town of Armavir. The “Armavir meeting” required the direct and complex involvement of Russia in to the conflict having started on the 14th of August, which was recorded in the appeal of the participants to President Eltsin.”

From the existing situation and war format, configuration of the military forces and civil opposition and taking into consideration of the factual potential of weakened Georgia, due to the above mentioned factors. The military strategy of Russia did no cover the direct, large-scale intervention with the complex military forces and operative-tactic groupings. The chronic stately and social-economic crisis having place in Georgia, factual ruin of the inner national agreement and social integration, non protection of the norms defense and security policy, the hardest moral and psychological climate and the degree of fighting abilities. The structural difficulties of the military constructin (dominant tendency of the paramilitarism, complicating the transformation of the “brotherhoods” “individual battalions and half military formations into the regular and disciplined mechanism). The plethora of all those factors condi-

22. Nadareishvili T. Plot against Georgia, Tbilisi, 2000, p. 56.
tioned a priori the weakness of Georgia and military-strategic imbalance in comparison with the opposite forces. Thus, the realization of the Russian interests was not in need of large-scale intervention. The restrained and optimized regime turned to be enough which due to the limitation and discretion, was not observable on the surface and had the non formal and non official character. Russia simultaneously always had the divisions of the operative invasion and tactic groups; it also used the tactics of paratroopers. Ths strategy of the Kremlin took into consideration multivariant amd complex scenario of exploitation of the military forces, among them the plans of mass air invasions on the strategic objects located on the territory of Tbilisi and the territory of Georgia. It is widely known, that for example the telephone conversation of vice-president of Russia A. Rutskoi with E. Shevardnadze during which he repeatedly threatened him to bomb the capital of Georgia.

On the very first day of the outbreak of the war on August 14 the military groupings of Abkhazia envaded Gudauta and entered the territory where the 643 air defense military system of Russia was stationed and took possession of 984 machine-rifles, 270 guns, 18 machine-guns, 600 sygnal rockets, more than 500 granades, and more than half a million of different caliber shells. They robbed all the buildings of the garrison town and captured the vehicle technique, and all the possessions of the goods and food warehouses, as well as chemical and engineering service goods. As it was became clear later, that “invasion” and “capturing” was an action being preliminary settled with the commandment of the Russian military divisions. Consultant of V. Ardzinba, in the matters of special services of Russia M. Demianov confirmed, that military armament of the 643 zenith-rocket division, military-engineering technique and automobile park was given to the Abkhazians and this handing over was masked under the “invasion” and “capturing”.

According to the data given by the same M. Demianov, one of the centres of purchasing of the weapons and transportation for the Abkhaia formations as the headquarters of the Onega marine fleet. The Abkhazian used to purchase the arms in Priozerie through former commander of the Onega fleet of the marine forces of Russia – I.Kolesnikov. The purchased weapon and special extra - power explosive material was transported with the”Sovtrannovent” cars made in Saint-Petersburg24.

The commandment of the 529 division of the air-forces of Russia also took part in formatkon of the military arsenal of the separatists. The head of the technical supply of the Bombo-ra military airport - lieutenant-colonel A. Dolgopolov handed to the Abkhazian side 6 military cars for the troops ( the so-called “BMP”) equipped with the full military complex, 6 machine-guns, 367 grenades “f -1” and more than 50 000 different caliber shells.25

On August 16 of 1992. From the Azerbaijani town Ganja to Gudauta were repositioned the 1 500 men parachute regiment N 345 of the airborne forces and transported 122 troop-carrying vehicles, 13 anti – aircraft vehicles and 18 mm automotive artillery equipment.26 The official version of stationing of the regiment in Georgia was defense of the objects of the Ministry of Defense of Russia located in the conflict zone of Abkhazia and evacuation of the Russian citizens from the resorts. But in reality stationing of the regiment N345 was purposeful. Firstly, N901 landing battalion was already there and it had an official order to defend the military objects and net of the resorts ( and it really was defending those objects); secondly, regiment N901 was a structure of a special purpose and strategic importance and videlicet the battalion N345 together with the special groups of KGB – “Grom” and “Zenith” participated in launching the war in Afghanistan on

25. Nadareishvili T. Plot..., p.56.
December of 1979 - it was occupying of the residence of President H. Amin and a especial operation of his physical liquidation.

Stationing of the above mentioned regiments in Georgia and especially in the conflict zone being controlled by the separatists is remarkable from the interventionalism and pro-Abkhazian aspect of participation in the war.

One battalion of the regiment N 345 was stationed in the Bombora airport, the second on the territory of the zenith-rocket regiemnt and the two hundred people division on the territory of the military –seismic laboratory N24 of Qvemo (lower) Es Hera.

As for the support of the military air - forces pf the separatist by Russia, squadron of the avia regiment N529 station on the territory of the Bombora airport defended Gudauta-Akhali Atoni zone. In a forthright after starting the war, on September 1 of 1992 the Cy 25 type of military planes of the regiment of air - forces N 186 joined others. Afterwards, they were used for bombing of the positions of Georgian units with the half ton bombs and a number of rocket shells. From November of 1992 the bomber squadron of the first military air-forces of the Moscow District under the commandment of Colonel Kovalenko participated in the war on the side of the separatists27.

That unit was stationed in Gudauta till 1993 and it was preventatively attacking the positions of the Georgian army. The air war tactics performed by the squadron is worth a special interest; Russian sources also point to that fact and it makes obvious extremely unconventional and anti-humanistic nature of the Russian military forces: The bombers of the type “SU 25” avoided the front line, to minimize the risk coming from the Georgian zenith artillery and shelled the unmanaged missiles from the far trajectory28. It goes without saying, that in such

cases were destroyed the peaceful population and civil objects and not the army positions and other military points.

In February of 1993 the landing -operational group was transported to reconnaissance information and train of the Abkhazian formations. By the order of the Chief of the Gudauta Russian military base, general A. Chandirov, the process of the military training of the Abkhazians was commanded by M. Skrinnikov. In March of 1993 the squadron of Colonel Kovaleenko was returned to the permanent place of stationing to the Moscow District and instead of the squadron “Su 25” type squadron circle from the Krasnodar Region was used to support the main air forces functioning in Abkhazia under the command of Colonel Riabinov. Notorious Major V. Shipko was the member of that group.

The main air force unit in the anti - Georgia war was the squadron of “Su25” type bombers under the command of Major A. Koshkin. It was the unit of the North Caucasus Military District air forces (videlicet, of the fourth air force army), which was moved from Mozdok to Gudauta in January of 1993. As Major Koshkin remarks, the regrouping and Bombora stationing operation was commanded by the commanders of the North Caucasus Military District - General Mikhailov and deputy commander in chief of the landing forces of Russia - general Soroka.

Namely, that squadron was functioning in Abkhazia in January-September of 1993 and was on the air warfare with Georgia: it was bombing the front positions of the Georgian army and the zones of reserve stationing, points of strategic significance and communications, as well as the districts of dwelling of peaceful population and objects of the civil infrastructure.

At the initial stage of the was the armed forces of Russia

31. Ibid.
formed two operative districts: The first to station were the air defense complexes “BUK”, guaranteeing the air defense of Gudauta-Axali Atoni zone, as well as of V. Ardzinba’s residence, points of concentration of separatists and security other strategic objects; the second to station were the mobile zenith rocket complexes of “OCA” on the Eshera-Gumista line, the main function of which were zenith defence of the separatist formation of the Gumista front and blocking of the advance of the Georgian formations to the Eshera backbone.

The operative group of the Russian air Forces was commanded by the Executive of the fourth army of the Russian military-Air Forces - General Tinditnikov.

On August 29 of 1992 the tactic grouping of the Georgian divisions (600 soldiers, 3 tanks, and 6 armored vehicles) crossed the river Gumista and broke through the defense line of the enemy. They occupied village Achandara and several strategic heights on the Eshera backbone and an attack was launched to the of Axali Atoni-Gudauta direction. But, the attack of the Georgian military forces was blocked because of the Bombo-ra air-group attacks and resistance of the battalion of regiment N345 located in the laboratory of Eshera. It was followed with a lot of ration of fatality and videlicet: 40 dead, 150 wounded, 3 tanks and 4 armored vehicle destroyed. After the operation the Abkhazians managed to stabilize the defense line on the river Gumista and open there a front.

On August 29 had place the first direct shelling between Georgia and Russia - a two-way military format clash, without the Abkhazians and Confederates. The main outcome of the clash was stabilization of the main operational pivot point of the war of the years 1992-1993 – stationed on the river Gumista and it was managed to achieve only with the help of the Russian militaries.

A lot of conventional documents concern aggression, as the delict deeds directed towards the fundamental values, princi-
oples and norms of the functioning of the international system, but the international-legal definition of the notion of Aggression is specially emphasized in the Resolution of the General Assembly of UNDP of the year of 1974. The Resolution accentuates the main 5 marks of those criminal deeds:

1. Armed attack of one State into the territory of another; or the military occupation, even temporary, as the result of the above mentioned attack or invasion; or annexation with the use of the force’

2. Bombing of the territory of another State by one State and exploiting of any forms of weapon;

3. Blockage of ports and seashore- lines;

4. Attack of one State on another State’s land, air and sea forces;

5. Sending by the State on its behalf into the territory of another State of the armed groupings, irregular forces and/or volunteer divisions;

In spite of the fact, that participation in the Abkhazian war of the Russian regular army divisions was not officially recognized (factually it was, but was not recorded formally and legally) and we cannot apply the first point of the definition of aggression to the deeds of Russia (from the normative aspect), that deed fully meets the rest four points. Thus, in the war of the years of 1992 - 1993 Russia was the aggressor country fighting against Georgia, and the proof of it is the following: blockage of the military operations of Georgia with the help of the land troops; Bombing of the positions of the Georgian army by the military –air and military-sea forces; Bombing of the districts populated with the ethnical Georgians; Blockade of the Black-Sea coast and Ochamchire-Gagra harbor; Staffing of the irregular forces and volunteer divisions and sending them into the conflict zone; managing of that process, financial and transport-technical provision etc.

Thus, the military intervention of Russia into the war of the
years of 1992-1993 against Georgia had the form and spirit of aggression. Therefore, our national historiography and in general for our social consciousness specification of the main directions of the aggression, allocation of the priorities, showing of the military-strategic and political – economical diplomatic dynamics of the aggressive blows performed against Georgia. In short, strategic attribution, systematization and classification of military intervention of Russia are badly needed.

From the strategic – attribution aspect we have to mark, that the military intervention into the post Soviet space is the common imperial tool of the Kremlin and at the same time, the component of the expansionist regional policy in the South Caucasus.

As for the systematization-classification of the Russian aggression, here we can single out several typological forms, which later form the conception of the hybrid war.

Structurally participation of Russia contains the following components:

1) As it has been mentioned above, participation of the regular divisions of the armed forces of Russia in the war; these are – a special mission subdivision of Pskov, paratroopers N 345, zenith-rocket regiment N 643, landing force battalion N901, air-group consisting of the squadrons of the regiments N 529 and N186, military ships of the Black Sea fleet. These are at least six large military units of army and fleet of Russia, the participation of which in the military operations conducted in the 27-30 km operational depth was proved.

2) Irregular provision with the armament, technique and other materials of the Abkhazian separatists and the military groupings, being in alliance with that latter, as well as with the means of military transportation and military communications. It is well-known, that from that aspect the Moscow corporation “Caucasus” was especially active, as well as its active collaborator General-Major P.Leshchuk. That latter was in touch with
the Russian army and upper circles of the military-manufacturing complex and one of the chief of the departments of the Ministry of Inner Affairs – General-Major A. Chulkov (The former minister of Internal affairs of the Abkhazian ASSR). P. Leshchuk connected V. Ardzinba with the Russian Generality in the military staff hotel located in the “Leninskie Gori”, in Moscow.32.

3) Mobilization, staffing and deploying into the conflict zone of the irregular volunteer groups being hired on the territory of Russian Federation by means of concentration points, military-educational camps and weapon depots. In the building of the Internal affairs of the town of Sochi functioned the representation of the Internal Affairs of Abkhazia under the command of Miron Agrba and the so-called representation of administration of Abkhazia under the command of Nodar Shamba. These structures were mainly busy with the recruiting of the mercenaries or hired guns.33

4) Supplying of the Russian –Abkhazian –Confederate coalition forces with the means of support area;

5) Providing with the direct aid of the separatist regime in formation of the institutional system and ethno centrist military dictatorship on the territories beyond the control of Georgia and in the zones of concentration of the separatist forces (Gudauta- Gagra districts and Tkhvarcheli zone) and direct support of the above mentioned dictatorship by means of guaranteeing of the security aspect;

6) Economic and Financial aid of the separatist regime mostly of the military character and not of the social-humanitarian one; (Order of President B. Eltsin on making of the trade – economic agreement of the Stavropol and Krasnodar Regions

32. Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze. For whom is beneficial the fratricidal war in Abkhazia, p. 1-2.
with the Abkhazia; Credit lines of the “Agrobank”, bank “Revival”, the exchange market of the National Bank of Russia, Moscow Central Stock Exchange etc).

7) Providing of the Separatists with the Intelligence Service, starting with the strategic information and ending with the air cosmic schemes of stationing of the Georgian army; It has to be marked, that as soon as the war started followed the structural reorganization of the Bureau of the town of Sochi of the Ministry of Security of Russia, creation of the foreign reconnaissance territorial department and increase of its personnel by adding 40 staffing positions. In the central office of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service “Georgian Department” was formed. The whole complex of the military-expert aid to the Separatists. From this aspect is especially important provision of the army regiments with the strategic management and operative and tactic planning of the military operations by the Russian Generalship (V. Kolsenikov, A.Chindarov, I.Sigutkin, G.Kondratiev, A.Kvashnin) and Officer Corps (Colonel Sidorenko, Colonel Akulinchev, Colonel Bondarenko, Major Koldin, Major Semiulin, Captain Nikolaev and others);

8) Psychological war of the Top Authorities of Russia against the authorizes of Georgia, permanently threatening them with the air attack on Tbilisi and others places, blockage of the significant military operations of the Georgian army (in organizing of the psychological pressure especially active were Vice-President A. Rutskoi, Speaker of the Parliament R. Khabulatob and Minister for the Special Affairs – S. Shoigu);

9) Propagandist and informational-analytical support of the Separatists in Russia, Post-Soviet Space and several masked informational space of that time world. Mediocratic help provided to the Gudauta grouping by Russia and false informational sphere formed by means of that support negatively influenced the geoinformational factors of the Abkhazian war.

10) Diplomatic-Political support of the Separatists regime. For this purpose the double standard threefold diplomatic format was craftily used by the Kremlin. That format contained three channels of political regulation – Russian-Georgian, Russian – Abkhazian and Georgian – Abkhazian. I.e. the Russian diplomacy manipulated with non-homogeneity of the dialogue platform and negotiations with the parties, as well as among them. The strategy of the Russian “Military Diplomacy” was the mixture of intimidation and cunning hypocrisy; It forced Georgia through political pressure and offering of the false mediatory guarantees to make agreements of capitulatory character and used the inadequate tactics of encouragement of the separatists to break the agreement and refining of Russia’s personal mission. It was the diplomatic policy of Russia that created the diplomatic-agreement basis for Georgia to lose the war.

We think, that theses and other signs of Russian aggressing in the systematic wholeness and from the typological determination aspect create the matrix of the hybrid war. It goes without saying, that hybrid wars are the special phenomenon, but their separate elements, with a certain amount and configuration were met in the past and the same can applied to the policy being conducted by Russia in the Post Soviet space in the 90-ies of the previous century and videlicet to the war of the years of 1992-1993; Russia chose Abkhazia for acting against Georgia; as for Abkhazia Russia chose there as the “support Group” the grouping of V; Ardzinba; Afterwards, through using the Constitutional conflict of the Separatist grouping with the Central Power of Georgia, formed the controlled chaotic atmosphere, a certain “clever anarchy”; After creating the situation of growing the crisis into the military skirmish, thereof preparing of the military situation; Russia based its actions on the forms of the direct military intervention – the military, economic, diplomatic and informational direct and indirect forms of the aid rendered to the Separatists.
Videlicet, that synthesis, in one and the same war, in one and the same operational space with simultaneous usage of the regular regiments and hired forces, with the diplomatic and informational-propagandist battle being carried out together with the military operations, combining the irregular-asymmetric forms with the regular tactic forms, mixing and mingling of the conventional and non-conventional methods – exactly that multilayer synthesis provide the grounding to claim, that the war of the years of 1992-1993 and participation of Russia in that war be assessed as the hybrid war conducted by the Kremlin against Georgia.

On September 3 of 1992 in Moscow was signed the agreement on the conflict solving about the territorial integrity of Georgia. In the Article 9 of the Agreement was marked: “the armed forces of the Russian Federation temporarily stationing on the territory of Republic of Georgia and in Abkhazia as well, safeguard neutrality and are not participating in the conflict.” According to the article 11 it is forbidden to infiltrate the hired groupings from the territories of the Republics of the North Caucasus.”35 The conventional conditions of the Agreement were violated by the Kremlin on September 3.

On September 22 of 1992 the battle vehicle of the troopers stationed in Qvemo (Lower) Eshera shelled the positions of the Georgian units.36 The Russian subdivisions undertaking the attack after the cease of fire subdued to their control strategically significant object – Sokhumi petroleum base and flour mill.

On September 25 of 1992 the Supreme Council of Russian Federation passed the resolution on the “situation having palce in the North Caucasus in regard with the Akhazian events.”37 That eight point document was the direct approval for involvement of Russia in the Abkhazian war. The resolution had a dis-

tinct anti-Georgian and pro-Abkhazian nature being corresponding to the aggressive, imperial course of the Kremlin and the annexation strategy of being involved in the war.

In the first point of the Resolution the Supreme Council of Russia demanded to “withdraw the Georgian army formations from the territory of Abkhazia”, and in the fourth point it demanded to “use the military formations of Russia as peaceful forces”, i.d. direct involvement into the war under the mask of the peacemaking mission.

In other words, all that was aimed to the full support of the separatist regime of Abkhazia in the war against Georgia. According to the Resolution passed on September 25 the imperial elite of the Kremlin, generalship and the whole “war party” passed the legislative mechanism of meddling into the conflict of Abkhazia and launching of the anti-Georgian hybrid war.

The enemy used their opportunity when the Georgian party’s attention was distracted due to the September 3 Agreement and decided to attack the Gagra zone, occupy it and deblock the strategic clot of Gudauta-Axali Afoni.

On September 1 of 1992 the Russian-Abkahzian-Confederate regiments started the mass attack in the direction of Gagra. The fact, that before the attack the Russian peacemakers being stationed there according to the Agreement from September 3 left the observational control points and returned to the place of their stationing. On the evening of October 1 the enemy occupied village Kolkhida, and on October 2 - Gagra.

After leaving Gagra, from the formations moving to the North General G.Kharkharashvili tried to form an integral military group, but due to the existing chaos and dezorganization he failed to do it. On October 6 the enemy occupied Leselidze and Gantiadi and crossed the Georgian –Russian border.

In the military operation of Gagra together with the Abkahzian and Confederate formations ( “Abkhazian Battalion” of Sh. Basaev) the regular divisions of the Russian army took an
active part; Videlicet, the zenith – rocket regiment N 643 and squadron of the parachute landing regiment N 345 consisting of 100 men. They helped the attacking Abkhazian-Confederate formations with the manpower and fighting equipment.

The group of the Russian Black Sea fleet ships ("Bezukoriznenni", "Kil – 25", "Don", "Golovin", "BTH – 38", "BM" – 66") helped the Separatists from the Sea Aquatorium and shelled the so-called enemy. The operational tasks of the group were blocking the landing of the troops coming to help the Georgian military groupings fighting in the Gagra zone ("White Eagle", Mkhiderioni" and divisions of the Police), as well as the navy overlap of the concentration points of the Separatists.

Commander of the ship group, Captain of the first rank V. Fomin marked in his report: “On October 1 according to the plan the educational demonstration trainings for the officers of the headquarters were conducted with the aim of checking of the fighting abilities of Gudauta aviation and armored vehicles. The next day, on October 2 at 17:00 the first Deputy Minister of defense General-Colonel G.G. Kondratiev gave the following tasks to the military ships:

1. In any circumstances not to allow to land the navy troops of Georgia to the Bichvinta district. If necessary they were allowed to use the weapon.

2. To defend the Gudauta airport. The other sources confirm that General – Colonel Kondratiev at night of October 2 from 11 p.m. to 12 a.m. was on board of the Bezukoriznenni” and personally place in operational readiness of the ship.

Representational analyzes of the sources and summarizing of the informational block give us the possibility of asserting, that the general commandment of the military operation of Gagra was managed by the Headquarters of the Russian armed forces.

38. Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 208.
40. Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 218.
forces and the direct commandment was conducted by the first Deputy – Minister of Defense – General-Colonel G. Kondratiev.

Loss of Gagra played an extremely negative part in the dynamics of the war from the strategic and operational aspect. The enclave position of the enemy grouping was broken and the Separatists got a chance of establishing the direct communication with their supporter Russia. Due to that fact, the Russian-Abkhazian-Confederate Coalition was formed from the geographical-Topographical point of view and from the integral-non-discretional aspect of the theatre of military operations.

On November 3 of 1992 the Georgian regiments successfully countered an attack of the Russian-Abkhazian military forces in the labor sector of the Gumista front. In order to compensate the failure Russia activated tactics of the “Distant War.” The intense bombing of the operative space controlled by Sokhumi and the Central Georgian power was launched from the air and with the help of the volley fire reactive artillery. All this was delivered by the Russian aviation and the intervention zones created by the Russian army (Bombora, Qvemo (Lower) Eshera, “Maiak”, Ochamchire base).

On November 5 two battle-planes of the Su-25 type organized an air-assault Reid to the Georgian regiment stationed on the river Gumista. The same happened on November 15 and 18; On November 18 Russian airs –forces bombed the vicinity of Sokhumi (Kelasuri).

From the beginning of December the Headquarters of General G. Kharkharashvili planned the assault operation to the Eastern front, in Abkhazian and Armenian Atara and afterwards from the South – Western flank on the town of Tkhvarcheli.

On December 3 the united grouping of the “personal regiment” of the Minister of Defense and the 5th battalion of the brigade N23 occupied the above mentioned villages, but on De-
December 10 Russian air-forces bombed the bridge on the river Kodori and the vicinity of that latter, resulting in the numerous victims and termination of the attack.⁴¹

On December 2-9 squadrons of the Russian air-regiment N529 repeatedly bombed the residential districts of the town of Sokhumi. Bombing of the Sokhumi market was followed by the death of the 13 peaceful citizens. On December 11 during the air attack 11 peaceful citizens of the village Alkhaldaba of the Ochamchire District were killed, more than 60 were wounded.

During the air attacks on the Georgian regiment positions and compact dwelling zones of the Georgian population of Sokhumi and Ochamchire Districts Russia inconsiderately violated a number of international acts and among them the articles of the Genève Convention from August 12 of 1949 on the prohibition of usage of the point headed shells and cluster-weapon dispensers in the course of war.

At the end of November of 1992 the Georgian and Russian military institutions signed the Agreement on the stationing of the Russian subdivisions in the conflict zone of Abkhazia?⁴² The Agreement maintained changing of the positions of the stationing of the Russian armed units in the operational zones; they have to leave Sokhumi and its vicinity and the Esher military laboratory. But the Kremlin violated the Agreement and increased the staff of the troopers with the separate squadrons. It is worth mentioning, that as a motive for the violation of the Agreement was named the false institutional disobedience played out by the Commandment of the Trans Caucasian military District and the headquarters of the Russian army group stationed in Abkhazia.

In December of 1992, by the order of deputy Commander –in –Chief of the paratroopers of Russia, General-Major Sigutkin, 450 soldier special battalion, together with the military

technique, such as 30 units of fighting vehicles for the foot-soldiers, 6 units of MI_type helicopters, 8 units of self-propelled antiaircraft system landed on the airdrome of Babushera. On December 22 – 25 from Sochi and Adler to Gudauta was sent 12 wagon loaded with the armored vehicles (Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze, Participation of the Armed Forces of Russia in the Georgian-Russian Conflict, 1993, f. 2).

Since that time the Commandment of the Russian Army and the Officer Corps have been factually turned into the group of the advisers and a special military mission of the Separatist regime; The Kremlin used the Separatist regime to turn Abkhazia into the military-political protectorate.

For the first stage of the war of 1992 – 1993 and inspired of the fall of Gagra, the armed forces of Georgia and Georgian civil authorities of Abkhazia controlled the major part of the Autonomous Republic including the town of Sokhumi. The operative structure of the theatre for the military actions was acceptable for Georgia: the Gudauta-Akhali –Afony groupings of the enemy were demarcated by the operative zone of the Sokumi-Gulripsh Georgian groupings; Tkhvarcheli grouping was in blockade, but the non-blockade condition of the Gudauta-Akhali Afony grouping was stipulated with the participation of Russia in the warfare and the direct communication of the Separatists with the help of the Gagra-Leselidze sector with the territory of the Russian Federation;

The blockade chain was interlocked by the Gumista front line; The Sokhumi-Gulripsh grouping of the Georgian forces delimited from each other two centers of the two historical sub region of Abkhazia and military concentration of Separatists – Bzip – Gudauta and Abjua- Tkhvarcheli.

On January and March of 1993 The Russian-Abkhazian-Confederate Coalition tried to liquidate the Blockade chain and burst open the line of front at Gumista and occupy Sokhumi.
On January 2 of 1993 Russian-Abkhazian forces stationed at Gumista fired Sokhumi residential blocks from the “Grad” type missile launchers, for spreading panic and fear among the soldiers and peaceful population. On January 4-5, the enemy assaulted at night the Achandara district of the Gumista front. The attacking groups managed to force the river Gumista and form a foothold on the left bank of the river. But, after the counterattack of the Georgian artillery and divisions of the brigade N5 the enemy was destroyed. The enemy lost almost 90 soldiers and 5 armored vehicles.43

On February of 1993 Parliament of Georgia passed a special Resolution on the “military units of Russia stationed on the territory of Abkhazia.” 44 Existence of the Russian military forces on the territory of Abkhazia was considered inadmissible and E. Shevardnadze was commissioned to start negotiations with President Eltsin on withdrawal of the Russian army.

On February 18 of 1993 the delegation of Russia came with the official visit to Tbilisi. Within the frames of the visit the Chairman of the lower chamber of Parliament of Russia (council of nations) R. Abdulatipov and Vice-Premier of the Russian Government S. Shakhrai met with the representative delegation of the authorities of Georgia (V. Rcheulishvili, S.Kavsadze and R. Gotsiridze). In the communiqué45 passed after the negotiations were documented several non constructive moments concerning the Abkhazia conflict, but under the guise of the general phraseology of normalization and development of peaceful cooperation between Russian and Georgian States.

More than one diplomatic mine found the way into the communiqué due to the elementary disregard and ignoring of the protocol requirements by the Georgian delegation. Videli-cet: was recorded readiness of arranging another summit meeting under the aegis of the Coordinating Council of the North

43. Jojua D. Fall of Sokhumi..., p. 87.
44. Regional Conflicts..., p. 85.
Caucasus on September 3 of 1993 within the ill-fated Moscow Agreement, which in fact meant restoring of that format followed by the Gagra tragedy; “Renewal of the Negotiations according to the Agreement of September 3 was emphasized.”

Was voiced the opinion on spreading of the mandate of the Peaceful Forces on the defense of the border between Russia and Georgia being in force on the basis of the Dagomis Agreement.

By the Resolution made on March 4 of 1993 the Parliament of Georgia refuted the communiqué from February.46 But the diplomatic confrontation did not end there and the Kremlin launched a repeated conventional attack against the integrity and territorial sovereignty of Georgia: On March 6 of 1993 the Supreme Council of the Presidium of Russia included in the list of issues being discussed within the agenda of the session and it was the so-called act on the “recognition of the Republic of the South Ossetia”.47

The large scale onset of the Russian-Abkhazian-Confederate Coalition to the Gumista front was launched on March 14-17 of 1993. The attack was started by the air-forces of Russia and heavy artillery of the Separatists and Sokhumi and front positions of the Georgian army were bombed. It was followed by the land advance of the Abkhazians, Confederates and Russian “Slav-bat” and mass attack of the regular air and sea forces of Russia.

A Special Operations Militia squadron of Riga (the so-called “Omon of Riga” (special purpose police unit) under command of Major M. Linnik, actively participated in the battles. After the Vilnius events of January 1991 it was moved to Russia and periodically used in the so-called “hot spots”. The aim of the squadron was to land via the mountain to the Achadara bridge, occupy it and continue the onset from the left wing in the direction of the town of Sokhumi.48

47. Regional Conflicts…p. 86.
After the bloodshed battles the enemy managed to break the tactic line of the Georgian units on the central segment of the Gumista front and penetrated into the territory occupied by the brigade N23. Two squadrons of the military air - forces of Russia systematically provide with the air support the land onset of the military forces of Russian-Abkhazian-Confederate Coalition. We’ll cite a passage from the book of the commander of the Russian squadron Major Al. Koshkin:” The Abkhazians were preparing the regular break of the front line (Assault of the March 15-16 of 1993 – D.J.). We operated mostly at night and in the bad weather conditions... we took the aim of everything ordered by the headquarters... and in Sokhumi as well, where according to our Intelligence service was located the headquarters of the Georgian army... together with the other type bombs and shells we used the reconnaissance flare, as we know from the Afghanistan experience, that if you work on the aim at night the lighting is necessary...”49 At the very same time the Air-Forces of Russia bombed from the town of Poti the column of the armored vehicles moving from 30 km. from Sokhumi, killing almost 200 Georgian soldiers and destroying tens of battle vehicles of troopers. The headquarters of the second army corps and Kelasuri weapon storage was also bombed.50 But, exactly there it was encircled by the Georgian army and found itself in a “saucepan” being created by the professional, operative mass shooting. Losses of the enemy were great, as more than 2000 soldiers died, and a lot of military technique was destroyed. The counter attack of the Georgian army to the Gumista front ended on March 17 in returning of the status quo it had before March 14.

Thus, in the battles of January and March of 1993 the Georgian armed forces by means of wise and strong defense, disorganization of the attacking groupings of the enemy, counterattacking the centre and flanks of the Gumista front by the

49. Koshkin A. The above mentioned work.
50. Ibid.
artillery thus frustrating the efforts of the enemy to occupy Sokhumi and achieve the strategic advantage.

On the other hand, the inconvertibility of the aggressive policy of Russia was obvious, as well as its desire of being involved in the war and expanding the operational zones.

In its Appeal to the “UNDP, European Parliament, Parliaments of the world States the Supreme Council of Russia” made on March 17 of the year of 1993 the parliament of Georgia assessed the deeds of Russia, as “the aggressive policy conducted towards the Sovereign State, the aim of which is splitting Abkhazia from Georgia and violation of the territorial supremacy of Georgia.”

On March 17 of 1993 the Supreme legislative organ of Moscow – The Council of Deputies accepted the appeal to the Supreme Council of Russia on imposing sanctions against Georgia.

On March 19 of 1993 in the north sector of the Gumista front the Georgian zenith artillery shot down the battle-plane of the air-forces of Russia – “SU – 27” (board N11), navigated by Major V. Shipko commissioned from the Rostov District air-base to Gudauta.

All this left no doubt, that Russia participated in the war and the Russia official informational sources started statement of that fact. One of the main newspapers “Izvestia” published the list of the armament and weapon given to the Separatists: 7 tanks, 20 armored vehicles, 12 artillery units, among them “Uragan” and “Grad” type missile launchers.

The essential part of intervention of Russia was providing with the special service and military investigation assistance of the Separatist regime. It means development of the agent apparatus, formation of the “Fifth Column” groupings from the Russian and Armenian population located in the rear area of

51. The Problem of Abkhazia…1, p. 144.
52. Abkhazian Labyrinth …., p. 209.
53. Nadareishvili T. Plot…p. 52.
the Georgian military forces, as well as creation of the mobile net for sabotage and espionage.

On March 31 of 1993 in the town of Sokhumi during conducting the intelligence investigation was captured Lieutenant of the Russian army Al. Sitnikov, who was specially commissioned to Abkhazia from the military regiment stationed in the Moscow District.

On April 1 of 1993 the Commander of the radio station of the Russian military regiment (N2011) Senior Sergeant Al. Lunev was captured. It appeared that Lunev on March 17-22 through the Russian military regiment radio station informed the Abkhazian formations about the dispositions of the Georgian regiments on the front line and about their armament, as well as about the operational conditions in Sokhumi.\(^{55}\)

On March 23 of 1993 the confidential meeting of V. Ardzinba with President B. Eltsin took place. At the very same day the so-called “Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia” (in reality the Abkhazian fraction of the former legislative organ of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia) sent an appeal to the Supreme Council of Russia expressing its desire of “entering of Abkhazia into the composition of the Russian Federation or being accepted under the protection of Russia”. It is remarkable, that the Parliament of Russia did not cancel that secession document, but on April 30 of the year of 1993 gave President Eltsin the Resolution to start the negotiations with the official Tbilisi about the topic of the Appeal.\(^{56}\)

On April 1 of 1993 in the Resolution being passed by the Parliament of Georgia was said:” On the part of the territory of Georgia located in Abkhazia, which is controlled by the Gudauta grouping with the support of the Russian army the policy of ethnic cleansing is being conducted, which took the form of the

\(^{55}\) Nadareishvili T. Plot…p. 54.

\(^{56}\) Gazette of the Congress of the People’s Deputies of Russian Federation and Supreme Council of Russian Federation, N20, 1993, p. 1215.
genocide of the Georgian and other nationality citizens.”\textsuperscript{57}

On that very day the Parliament of Georgia passed the “Appeal to the United Nations Organization, the Advisors of Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Organizations of Human Rights”. That appeal not only confirms the previous information, but gives much stricter appraisal to the events having place in Abkhazia and participation in those events of the Russian Federation. The Appeal reads:” On the part of the territory of Georgia located in Abkhazia, which is controlled by the Gudauta grouping with the support of the Russian army the policy of ethnic cleansing is being conducted, which took the form of the genocide of the Georgian and other nationality citizens. Systematic mass killing, shooting and unbelievable oppression forces the Georgian population to leave their dwelling places.

On April 27 of 1993 the Parliament of Georgia passed the regular resolution on the withdrawal of the Russian military regiments from the conflict zone of Abkhazia. The dispositional Resolution was based on the following three moments: 1) violation by Russia of the Moscow Agreement made on September 3 of 1992; 2) Genocide and the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population on the territory controlled by the Russian army and Abkhazian Separatists; 3) Active participation of the contingent of the Russian army in the warfare against Georgia.\textsuperscript{58}

The Parliament of Georgia considers this kind of policy, as continuation of the aggression directed towards our State, the aim of which is violation of territorial integrity of Georgia and infringement on our independence.

The entire responsibility for the above mentioned policy lies on the shoulders if Russia, which for its imperialist reasons supports the Separatist grouping of Gudauta (the problem of Abkha-

\textsuperscript{57} The problem of Abkhazia in the Official Documents, part 1, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{58} Regional Conflict..., p. 87.
zia in the official documents part I, page 152). The Parliament of Georgia appealed to the International Organizations to carry out the active measures for suppression of aggression directed towards Georgia on the territories controlled by the armed forces of Russia and Separatists for defending the Georgian population.

On May 14 of 1993 in Moscow was signed the trilateral Agreement on cease fire and solving of the conflict in Abkhazia via peaceful methods.

The Agreement, which according to the aims of the Kremlin, weakened the attention and the military vigilance of the Georgian side by the preliminarily planned diplomatic course, which was followed by the tragic strategic results. One of them was lifting of the blockade of Tkhvarcheli and deblocking of the strategic clot of the Tkhvarcheli grouping. The entirely unjustified consent being maintained by the Agreement made on May 14, had place within the so-called Humanitarian corridor on the basis of the full trust towards the Russian mediatory mission.

On May 17 of 1993 by the agreement of the Authorities of Georgia, the Ministry of Special affairs of Russia conducted an operation of “Humanitarian” aid: the assault and transport ships carried from Sochi to Sokhumi 30 transport trailer of “Kamaz” type. That column from Sokhumi arrived in Tkhvarcheli unhampered and without any delay and monitoring. For the Blocked Tkhvarcheli together with the necessary provision and medicine a great number of bullets, battle material and manpower were transported to the needs of the so-called Eastern front of Abkhazia.

On June 16, besides the “Humanitarian” act in May-June of 1993 the Separatists with the help of the air-forces of Russia increased their military forces on the “Eastern Front”. The central base of training and equipping fully of the volunteer- gunmen was in a special mission military camp located in Sabiken (50 km.-s from Maikop). Moving of the manpower from the North Caucasus via air carriers and helicopters became systematical.

Moving was carried out by means of the two parallel air
lines – from Teberda using the Dali- Tkhvarcheli line and from Gudauta via the South slopes of the Main Backbone of the Caucasus to Tkhvarcheli.

Jerry Laber the executive director of “Helsinki Watch” (of one of the subdivisions of the “Human Rights Watch”) is unambiguously and clearly points to the fact of the recruiting and periodic moving to the conflict zone of the half-military formations hired by Russia in a special letter sent to President Eltsin on November 1 of 1993. The document reads, that “Helsinki Watch” recorded the facts on recruiting in Russia of the hired manpower for Abkhazia for serving in the half military formations and their attacks and assaults to the civil objects… half military formations used the Russian weapon and heavy technique against the civil population. Helsinki Watch declares, that acts of Russia cannot be considered the mission of the good will any more.

According to the data of the Georgian Intelligence Service Structures “On the Eastern Front” the grouping of the enemy comprised 3000-3300 soldiers; among them were 600 soldiers moved to the concentration points of the military regiments of the Separatists (Atara, Kutouli, Jgerdash, Labrash, Chlou, Mokvi, Merkula and others).

In the net of the military groups prevailing were the groups and subgroups consisting of the Russian nationality regular officers serving within the frames of the Separatist groupings.

For Example, “Dolphin”, “Edelveis”, “Scorpio”, “Dragon”, ”Katrin”, detachment of the Cossacks and others. They played a crucial part in the army structure of the Tkhvarcheli grouping and accomplished important diversionary operations and operative-tactic mission.

The typical example of the direct participation of Russia in the warfare having place on the “Eastern Front” are the operations conducted by the special group “dolphin”. We will give

59. “Helsinki Watch” to the Russian Authorities www. valberta.ca/hhihejro/NG 96 95 11 45 166.html
60. Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 124.
to these problems a thorough analysis using the operative materials being searched and published by the journal “Arsenal”.61

The materials consist of the orders from the book and journal for the military actions (orders, decisions and reports), making it informationally resistant, doubtless and valid source.

The special group “Dolphin” was formed by the order of General-Colonel N. Matveev on the base of the special battalion “Dnestr” - belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of the so-called Dnestr Region of the Republic of Moldova” controlled by Russia. The special group consisted of Major I.Pimenov (Commander and Inspector-Instructor), Major A. Terentiev, Major A. Butko, Captain N. Danilin, Lieutenants E. Rijikov, A. Tsurkin, I.Kulakov and R. Kalungarian.

As it is marked in the order N12 by Major Pimenov, the group was formed and arrived in Gudauta on May 10 of 1993, then it was moved to Tkhvarcheli (May 15) for “successful fulfilling of the military tasks and providing Republic of Abkhazia with the International support.”

The military functions of the special group “Dolphin” are more precisely revealed in one official document – V. Ardzinba’s thank you letter to the above mentioned General N. Matveev, in which the leader of the separatists names the “merits” of the special group: “carrying out of the diversionary work in the in the rear of the Fascist Georgian army; Capturing of the especially dangerous recidivist on the territory of Tkhvarheli garrison; Receiving of the staff members of the State Committee of the special situations on the high professional level; Disinformation of the enemy and its disorientation, enabling us to make a successful advance on the total line of the front.”62

A full picture of the actions of the special group, from the elementary operative and tactic proportion aspect gives and obvious strategic indicator of participation in the war; Only one

8 man group in the operational space of the “Eastern Front” in the rear of the Georgian units carried out 12 combat and diversionary operations, destroyed 34 soldiers, exploded the bridge and radio-relay station, captured several units of the military technique and damaged a plane, at the same time through the preliminary planned disorientating action created the operative situation to confuse the Georgian party and start of the mass attack of the total front of the enemy.

In the bases of the analyses of the operative material we can give specific facts on several operations organized by the group “Dolphin: On May 16 of 1993 everybody through that the Georgian landing troops made a lodgment. By request of the Abkhazian party the “Dolphin” combed Tkhvarcheli area and its vicinity.

On May 20-24 of 1993 the armored vehicles of the Georgian army gathered on the height of 70, 9 and shelled the Abkhazian formation stationed in the village Beslakhuba. In response the “Dolphin” carried out a special operation – and after the preliminary investigation destroyed the manpower of the attacking group and technique.

On May 25-28 of 1993 the joint groups of the “Dolphin” and “Bat” investigated the automobile and railway bridges in the village Adziubja for the purpose of later exploding them.

On June 7 of 1993 the members of the “Dolphin” carried out a special operation in the village Poqvesh against the firing-points of the Georgians. As a result, two Georgian soldiers were killed; one machine-gun and two automatic rifles were removed.

On June 10 of 1993 the joint groups of the “Dolphin” and “Bat” destroyed the Georgian radio-rally station.

On June 20 of 1993 the group “Dolphin” set an ambush and shelled a Georgian tank in the vicinity of the village Pirveli Okhurei, but the tank managed to hide; it was the reason of changing the route of the guided missile; as a result of the explosion 2 Georgian soldiers died and 4 were wounded.

On June 22 of 1993 the group shelled a vacuum bomb to
the military-field diner located in the village Bedia. 4 Georgian soldiers were killed.

On June 25 of 1993 the joint groups of the “Dolphin: and “Bat” from the area of the village Adziubja shelled the heat-flare to the Georgian military – passenger plane landing in the Babushera airport. The heat-flare hit the right engine and the plane caught fire. The pilots managed to land, but it was damaged and beyond of repair.

On June 25 of 1993 the joint groups of the “Dolphin” and “Bat” headed the Dali Gorge and destroyed one pillar of the high frequency electrical line.

On July 1 of 1993 the group ‘Dolphin” participated in the large-scale operation of liberating one of the villages.

Beginning with that period the Russian strategy of conducting the hybrid war against Georgia underwent a certain evolution, not to say the real transformation and moves to the final stage. For the Kremlin the function of the current war was an ultimate failure of Georgia, split of its territorial integrity and occupation of Abkhazia.

The fact, that for Russia the war in Abkhazia had long became the instrument for carrying out of the imperial and hegemonistic geopolitical project policy, became obvious, the leaders of the Kremlin changed the format of strategic planning a bit: For Summer of 1993 the operative-strategic conditions showed a clear need for the Russian-Abkhazian alliance of changing the strategy of the military operations. Videlicet, it was obvious, that without the large-scale intervention of Russia and using the one-way tactics it was impossible to occupy Sokhumi, not to say anything about the fact, that at that time the military technique arsenal of the Georgian party was in hands of the Sokhumi-Gulripsh grouping. The enemy was facing the dilemma: either the large-scale aggression of Russia, or changing of the tactic landmarks in the conditions of the hybrid war. The Kremlin chose another way. A new strategy maintained the combined tactic format; it was
simultaneous attack on all the sections of the both fronts, using the preliminary elaborated disorienting military maneuvers, the aim of which was shifting of the attention of the Georgian party on that main blow. In other words, the main purposes of starting the advance on the Eastern front were not achieving success on that front, but outmaneuver the enemy on the Gumista front due to disorienting the Georgian party.

Within the frames of that strategy, the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Russia elaborated a special, secret plan for occupying Sokhumi consisting of the four parts: “1. Taking of the Ochamchire highway by the Tkhvarcheli grouping; 2. Landing of the assault forces at Tamish and unification of that latter with the Tkhvarcheli grouping; 3. Simultaneous attack from Gumista for taking the strategic heights; 4. Finally, encircling of Sokhumi and taking it.”

We have to emphasize the fact, that: the plan was entirely elaborated in the operative department of the General Staff of Russia, as for its practical realization during the military operations it was fulfilled with the help of the General Staff of Russia and military-expert special groups of officers. The local Abkhazian commanders (the so-called Commander-in-Chief V. Ardzinba, the so-called Minister of Defense S. Sosnaliev, and the so-called Head of the General Staff S. Dbar) were responsible only for the selection and planning of the local tactical variants.

On July 1 of 1993 the General Staff of the Russian Army prepared and provided the army stationed in Abkhazia with the aerospace maps of the military operation zones.

On July 2 near the Village Tamish the Russian-Abkhazian landing troops containing 300 soldiers disembarked from the Ships of the Russian Navy Forces, they were armed with one tank, armored vehicle and “Grad” type missile apparatus. The regular military units of Russia and among them the operational group under the command of V. Sorokin made the nuclear of the landing

63. Essays..., p. 360.
64. Abkhazia Labyrinth, p. 209.
troops. It is well-known, that in the planning of the landing troops participated Colonel of Russian Military Intelligence\textsuperscript{65}.

Georgian formations stationed at Tamish and Labra (separate groups of Brigade N24, subdivisions of Q. Cholokhashvili regiment, “Avaza” (Panther) and “Tetri Artsivi” (White Eagle), due to the unexpected situation did no manage to block the landing operation. After forming a foothold at Tamish the landing troops managed to join the Tkhvarcheli grouping and with the united forces started to block and control the Ochamchire-Sokhumi Highway sections.

The function of Tamish operation was distracting of attention. On the same July 2 formations of the enemy started mass attack to the central and right sectors of the Gumista front. They managed to force the river, break through the front line and occupy the villages to the North of Sokhumi – Kaman, Akhalsheni and Guma. On July 9 the Russian–Abkhazian forces occupied the village Shroma and gained control over the Akhbiuk strategic heights.\textsuperscript{66}

In the operation of occupation of Shroma - “Omon” (Special purpose police unit) - (Major Melnikov and air-landing battalion (Lieutenant–colonel Nikulnikov) actively participated in the battle. Namely, that latter occupied positions on the mountain heights\textsuperscript{67}.

The Georgian units due to the faultless especially of the heavy artillery of the Brigades N11 and N24 and heroic battle and coordinated operative-tactic arrangements managed to destroy the operation of the landing troops of Tamish; only a small part of the landing troops succeeded in breaking through the encirclement and join with the Tkhvarcheli grouping.

The events of the beginning of July changed the strategic sit-

\textsuperscript{65} (“GRU” – RMI) - Krasovski (Personal Archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze, reference, p. 5.).
\textsuperscript{66} Jojua D. Fall of Sokhumi, p. 91.
uation negatively for Georgia. On the Gumista front the enemy gained the strategic advantage, factually breaking the front in the middle, separatists gained control over the Akhbiuk heights and over the strategically significant Shroma - Sokhumi highway. On the Eastern front through occupying certain villages of Ochamchire District, the formations of the enemy formed an operative zone near the central highway. From that zone it was far much easy to lock a long tract of strategic communication of Ochamchire –Sokhumi - from the village Labra to the river Kodori Bridge.

On July 21 the air-forces of Russia and Navy bombed Sokhumi and the railway station of the village Dranda. On July 23 the Russian –Abkhazian units of the Tkhvarcheli grouping attacked Tamish and Labra. On July 24 the air-forces of Russia and artillery bombed the dwelling buildings of Sokhumi citizens (especially a new district and Queen Tamar street (the former Chanba Street).

On July 27 of 1993 and Agreement on “Cease fire in Abkhazia and mechanisms of control on that latter” was signed in Sochi. The Agreement maintained the traditional first base complex of conflict resolution – cease fire, diverging of the warring sides, demilitarization of Sokhumi and other zones, restoration of functioning of the prewar state structures, formation of controlling mechanisms of managing the peaceful process and monitoring - the first was “regulation of the unified trilateral commission” and a group of observers, military mission of UNDP observers.

One moment if worth attention within the context of our research. For guaranteeing the regime of non usage of force against each other the parties included one special point (point V) of the following contents: The parties consider necessary inviting and exploiting of the peaceful forces in the conflict zone… It is maintained that in case of agreement of the parties the size and composition of the peaceful forces was to be deter-

68. Regional Conflicts ..., p. 111-112.
minded after the consultation with the Secretary General of UN and Council of Security.”

The international practice of conducting the peaceful operations, the international mission for restoring or supporting of peace and among them the so-called “classical formula” of UN forbids involving into such kind of operations of the participant party of the conflict. This was the reason of sending an appeal to the Secretary General of UN B. Ghali by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Russian and Georgia for approving the participation of the Russian military contingent in the guarantee part of the Sochi Agreement; In the appeal the request to give permission to the Russian regiments N 901 and N 345 “as an exception” to fulfill the functions of the peaceful forces contingent was recorded. It goes without saying, that it was the forcible documented self-confession of Russia on participation in the war.

As a form of the peaceful act, the Agreement of Sochi was in fact an ordinary facilitatory format agreement. But from the real political aspect and that time Georgian State capitulatory course and Russia’s cunning “military diplomacy” it was the action directed towards the war outcome; Even the more: the Agreement made on July 27 was the part of the operative plan of occupying Sokhumi through interrelation of the two ambivalent factors - unconditional fulfillment by the Georgian party and “conditional” nonfulfillment by the Russian-Separatist party, thus the Agreement on loss of war by the Georgians and Occupation of Abkhazia by Russia.

What gives us the base for saying this? What is the truth under this statement?

On July 2-9 of 1993 the attack of the Russian –Abkhazian- Confederates, unfortunately, realized the 3 points out of 4-point plan of taking Sokhumi elaborated at the General Staff of Russia. Only the 4th point - occupation of Sokhumi remained to be fulfilled. The Sokhumi-Gulripsh grouping of the military forces

69. Regional Conflicts…, p. 111.
of Georgia and this strategic-technique arsenal was on the way to fulfilling of the 4th point of that plan. Consequently, split of that grouping was badly needed, as well as withdrawal of its most part and its military technique from Abkhazia, blocking of the Sokhumi defense operative lines. The Agreement of July 27 was made for that purpose.

In the middle of August of 1993 via the intelligence channels, the department for counterespionage of the Informational–Intelligence Service of Georgia obtained the secret document from the Kremlin – the plan under the code name of “Caucasian war.”  

The plan considered an entire complex of the regional military-strategic actions of Russia in the Caucasus: According to the Sochi Agreement advance on the factually disarmed Sokhumi, forcing of stalemated E. Shevardnadze to agree to bring the great amount of the Russian military contingent into Abkhazia. In the beginning that contingent was to control the strategic communications of the western part of Georgia, then it had to move to Azerbaijan and lastly to the South Caucasus having, where having the reliable rear it had to start the military operations in Chechnya.

Thus, the main strategic aim of Russia was reoccupation-re-annexation of the Caucasus and restoration of the close exclusive impact regional geospace in the Caucasus. In the Abkhazia war loss of Georgia and occupation of Sokhumi was considered the chief instrument on the way of realization of that aim. In planning of reoccupation of the Caucasus, at that given stage and format of stationing of the strategic forces, the main emphasis was made on the general advance on Sokhumi. The fact, is that from the position of the theatre of war or the configuration of forces from the sphere created by the indirect intervention into Abkhazian matters and false guarantees of diplomacy of Russia occupation of Sokhumi was considered the instrument for fulfilling the large-scale regional geostrategic project.

In August of 1993, approximately on September 10 the au-

authorities of Georgia completed fulfilling of the military points of the Sochi Agreement: The Georgian sectors of the Gumista and Ochamchire fronts were closed, the basic military structures of the defense of Abkhazia - brigades N 23 and M24 of the army corps N 2 were dismissed and disarmed, other Georgian units and subdivisions were moved from Abkhazia to Poti, Samtredia and Kutaisi, Armored vehicles and heavy armament (tanks, armored vehicles, battle cars of the troopers, artillery system, zenith equipment) were fully moved to Georgia (Mainly with the help of hiring of the Russian military-transportation) (SIC!); Only 2 Georgian observing points were left in the several kilometer stretch of the Gumista front, as for the demilitarized zone of the Eastern front were stationed the Russian. The Russian officers having the status of observers were taking off the triggers from the machine-guns of the tanks and artillery system, putting them into the sacks and taking in the unknown direction.

Thus, it was the ruin of the Sokhumi (and entire Abkhazia) defense system and dismantling of the military infrastructure. The opposed party before the eyes of the Russian “peaceful” mission and with the support of that latter, not only was going to fail to fulfill the Sochi Agreement, but was purposefully preparing for the violation of the Agreement and the decisive attack.

On September 12 of 1993 in Gudauta, at the General Staff of the so-called Commander-in –Chief a military meeting was held which passed the final operative plan and stated September 16 as the date of starting of the advance. The last directives were given to the Russian Army units stationed in Abkhazia, how and in which direction to attack the Georgian subdivisions and in which zones to help the preliminarily stationed Abkhazian groupings. The main emphasis was given to the transit lines of the demilitarized zones and sectors, having the operative function of advance corridors (for the Abkhazian party) and blocking lines (for the Georgian party) organized by the Russian units.

In the process of elaborating, approving and determining of
the operative plan of advance on Sokhumi by the General Staff of the Russian Army - General – Colonel M. Kolesnikov is obvious. During the assault on Sokhumi he reported to the Parliament of Russia in his speech, made on September 19, that in 2-3 days the ton of Sokhumi would fall.

We have another significant operative data associating Vice-President A. Rutskoi with the military operation of taking Sokhumi; On September 19 of 1993 the captured M. Demianov (V. Ardzinba’s counselor in the matters of the Russian special service) in his testimony given to the interrogation said, that “the assault on Sokhumi was accomplished by the order of A. Rutskoi.”

At dawn, on September 19 of 1993, at 4 a.m. the Eastern front formations of the enemy undertook an unexpected advance in the Ochamchire district from the Arakichi-Atara zone in the direction of Adziujba. On September 16, for the 1 p.m. from the demarcation line in Gumista an advance was started in the direction of Sokhumi. The war was renewed, due to the open and crafty violation of the Sochi Agreement by the Abkhazian party and its protector-ally Russia.

On September 16-30 of 1993 the peripeteia of the battles and its operative-tactic context is widely known. Neither on the Gumista front, nor in the Babushera airport sector and Eastern front, the deceived and disoriented Georgian party could not manage to restore the military technical structure existing before the Agreement. Even the more: they were not able to form a more or less stable operative defense zones and tactic sectors.

On September 17 with the help of active support of the special units of the Russian army the formations of the enemy crossed the river Gumista, took control over the both bridges

74. Jojua D. Fall of Sokhumi, p. 111-169.
and occupied the South-Western part of the village Achada-ra. On the evening of September 19 the Russian –Confederate forces occupied the village Achadara and via the highway bridge transported numerous military techniques to the front line. On the evening of September 20 the battles took place at the entrance of the town. On September 25 the enemy took the so-called old settlement and on September 26 fell a new district and the railway station.

On the morning of September 27 the mass attack of the enemy began upon the central part of Sokhumi. In the same evening after occupying the building of the Council of Ministers On September 28 the main attack forces of the Russian –Abkhazian-Confederates coalition broke though the Georgian picket standing to the East of the Kelasuri bridge and entered the Gulripsh district. On September 29 fell the Sokhumi airport of Babushera and the enemy reached the river Kodori. On September 29-30 the formations of the enemy on the Eastern front factually without any resistance, one by one occupied Ochamchire, Gali and reached the administrative border of Gali and Zugdidi districts located on the river Enguri.

As we have already mentioned, on September 16-30 of 1993 in the final military operations of the war zenith-artillery, landing paratroopers and air force regiment and units of the Russian Federation took an active part. The military ships of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia played a crucial role in encircling Sokhumi. On September 16-17 the military ships of Russia entered the Sokhumi-Gulripsh Aquatorium and blocked the Georgian communications through permanent bombing of the positions of the Georgian army and Babushera airport.

Besides, on September 22 the squadron of the Russian ships brought up at the estuary of the river Kodori for landing the troops to the South flank of the Georgian units. Only the effective actions of defense system against the coastal guards (its operative line covered the area of 20-23 kilometers) did not allow the
Russian Navy to land the Troops in rear of the Ochamchire front.

Mass involvement of the Russian regular military forces into the Abkhazian war is an obvious reality and this problem is no longer an object of manipulatory veiling in the traditional Russian discourse. It is canonized in the modern scientific and educational space of Russia. E.g. In school manuals on “Social Study” published before the 2008 August war is written, that “Georgia lost in the battle with Separatism. It could not manage to prolong its military stay in Abkhazia. The Georgian Army entered on the territory of Abkhazia in 1992 after fierce battles in a year forcedly left Sokhumi. Abkhazians strengthened with the Russian artillerists, troopers and pilots undertook the crucial attack and drove out the Georgian Army beyond the borders of Abkhazia. Abkhazia declared itself an independent Republic…”

This is noteworthy and remarkable, that admission of the direct participation of Russia in the Abkhazian war of the Russian –Georgian conflict of the years of 1992-1993 is not only the object of the Russian public opinion and mass consciousness, but a part of the social cognition and professional consciousness (historical, politological, military-historical), especially from the self-admission and forceful self-reflection aspects.

As for the participation of the Russian irregular military formations, this factor also made a serials influence on the process of the military operations and development of events. The main thing of that chain was the fact, that in coordination with the Russian regular army units the non-formal military structures determined the outcome of the war and created the background for Georgia’s failure.

The irregular component of the Russian-Abkhazian-Confederate coalition common army structure (i.e. the integrity of the units of combatant formations being financed by credit lines of the state and private organizations and recruited on the territory of Russia by the special service and political-admin-

istrative organizations and repositioned to Abkhazia), played a crucial role in defining the outcome of the war, not only qualitatively, but from the operative-tactic provision aspect of the military operations.

The intervention net of the Russian irregular forces or subjects of the hybrid wars was especially used at the final stage of the war, during the general advance on Sokhumi. The major part of the combatants participating in that operation was hired by the apparatus of the Commander of the “Russian National Legion” N. Lisenko with the financial support of the Moscow firm “ Continent”.

It is remarkable, that in the system of operative grouping of advance on Sokhumi the Abkhazian formations played the function of the reserve maneuver subdivision. During the advance on the central part of Sokhumi and namely the assault on the House of Government the crucial part belonged to the tactic grouping consisting of the Russian –Armenian-Confederate subdivisions.

Besides the Special grouping of the Russian regular army Khbardinian, Armenian and Russian-Cossack formations under the command of I.Kononov (Chieftain of the second brigade of the Cossacks), N. Gusko (Chieftain of the first brigade of the Cossacks) and O.Petrov (commander of the separate division) were also included in the grouping. As it turned out, the above mentioned formations of Cossacks (together with the united regiment of the “Confederation of the Caucasian Highlanders”) as far back as after the Sochi Agreement were left in Abkhazia on the territory controlled by the Separatists. They acted in the regime of renewal of the war. The protocol of interrogation of one of the captured Russian officer V. Zabotin is the proof of it. V. Zabotin said, that (and later that testimony was confirmed by Captain Nikolaev), that “Agreement made on July 27, which meant withdrawal of all the formations and volunteers of Confederates remained only on the paper”). In spite of the Agreement separate divisions under the command of Oleg Petrov...
remained on their positions, as well as the first brigade of the Cossacks under the command of Chieftain Nikolai Gusko and united regiment and battalion of the Confederates.”

The following fractions from the Russian irregular net included in the assault grouping were known: “Eshera” battalion group (Commander - Major R. Semiulin), brigade of the battalion “Rosia” (Commander - Major V. Metelev), 50-men brigade of the grouping “Russian Legion” (Commander - General - Major I. Lunev, with the nickname “Rusak”), brigade of the formation “Slavbat” (Commander - Major G. Kolodin, with the nickname “Koloda”).

When the Russian journalists A.Chelnikov (“Izvestia”) and V. Chertinov (“Smena”) name particular gunmen, who killed the peaceful, Georgian population of Sokhumi with an extraordinary cruelty and brutality. Among them are the former soldiers, who escaped from the disciplinary battalions of Russia, sniper Mari Kozina, with the nickname “Ludoedka”, Oleg Tanitski and others.

A. Chelnokov gives us the operative picture of the decisive attack and marks: “The leading force during the attack was the Cossacks. After them came battalions of Abkhazians, Chechens, Ossetians, Adigheians, altogether 10 battalions...in the centre of town on Rustaveli street chieftain of Cossacks Nikoloz Gusko Commanded the onset.”

Captain of air-forces of Russia M. Bondarenko guided the direction of the landing troops. Colonel of the air-born troops of Russia A. Sidorenko commanded the advance grouping amd coordinated the general operative coordintaion of the assault.

The military-sea grouping under the command of Admiral Kasatanov consisting of nine military ships belonging to the Black Sea Navy of Russia took part in the operation. Evacuation of the refugees from the Sokhumi port was the main argument for that mission. In reality squadron of Kasatanov participated

77. Ibid.
78. Crucified Georgia, Saint-Petersburg, 1995, p. 111-120.
in the operation of taking Sokhumi and helped blocking of the Black Sea Aquatorium of Sokhumi-Ochamchire (he also tried to land the sea-born forces into the rear of the Georgian units). In the above mentioned letter of “Helsinki Watch” unambiguously talks about it; It read: “The authorities of the Ukraine expressed their protest to the Russian party, when that latter sent its nine military ships under the commandment of Admiral Igor Kasatanov to the Sokhumi controlled by the Georgian forces. The Ukraine expressed its disturbance in regard to the fact that the Black Sea Navy ships staffed with the Ukrainian crews were to be used in the Georgian –Abkhazian conflict district with the unknown purposes and orders made from Moscow.”

Unceremonious Violation of the Sochi Agreement by the Abkhazian party forced the authorities of Russia to react to that fact. As Russia was the formal mediator and guarantee of non-renewal of the war! But the response of the Kremlin was (Silence of B. Eltsin, Statement made by A; Kozirev, briefings made by B. Pastukhov on September 19, 21, 24 etc.), was superficial, full of demagogical declarations and what is the main without any traditionally accepted sanctions and repressalia towards the violator of the Agreement. Violation of the Sochi Agreement by the Abkhazian party and responsibility of only one party in renewal of the military actions was definitely recorded in the appeal sent towards the Georgian authorities by the Russian sector of “united Commission on the Conflict Resolution” consisting of S. Shoigu, V. Shuikov and B. Pastukhov. Besides, b. Pastukhov declared: “The blame on violation of the Sochi Agreement is fully on the conscience of the Abkhazian party…A agree with this opinion, as the witness of the events…”

For the Kremlin it was not a secret, that the only way for freezing the military actions and restoring of the truce regime was

79. “Helsinki watch” - to the Authorities of Russia www[valberta.ca/hhihejro/NG 93 95 /1145166.html
80. Vladislav Ardzinba deceived all of us. . heltsincerter.ru/digest/release/den-za-dnem-1oktybya-1
blockage of onset on Sokhumi. Russia chose the way of avoiding the confession of reality and as it is widely accepted in diplomacy abstinence from “recognition, that a spade is spade.”

On September 19 Prime-Minister V. Chernomirdin signed the order of the Russian Government “On the arrangements made in regard to the violation of Sochi Agreement by the Abkhazian party”, where was marked: “In case of the further violation the Sochi Agreement by the Abkhazian party to take actions maintained by the international legislation and videlicet, to stop delivery of electric power to Abkhazia” (SIC).\textsuperscript{82}

It was a manifestation of a mixture of political cynicism, demagogy and amoral deeds. The guarantee State in regard to the party violating the Agreement (the military advances of which “further” did not contain any signs of the Agreement) instead of abstinence from the strategic actions (there are only three types of them – threat of punishment, depriving of the values or compulsory shift to the punishment regime) it settled for the threat of stopping of the delivery of electric power and other secondary superficial sanctions.

At the final stage of the war in Abkhazia, within the complex of arrangements preliminary planned against Georgia, the main part was played by the diplomatic activity of Russia. We mean the “crisis diplomacy”, which was conducted simultaneously with the military actions and under the influence of that latter, or to be more precise the “military diplomacy” of Eltsin’s regime. The political direction of that diplomacy was the unconditional victory over Georgia and creation of the conventional background.

On September 16 meeting of E. Shevardnadze with the special representative of Russia - B. Pastukhov was result less. Pastukhov’s abstract statement about the violation of the Sochi Agreement by the Abkhazian party changed nothing in conditions of the fronts. The same can be said about the official 81. At that time the bloodshed battles were being conducted in all the sectors of the both fronts.

82. Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 134.
statement of the Government of Russia made on September 16 and the meeting of V.Ardzinba with the Minister of Defense of Russia P.Grachov held on September 17. It appeared that General Grachov had no influence on the leader of the Separatists (and all this happened on the background of the sanction order passed by the Government of Russia the day before) and failed to persuade him to return to the cease fire regime through halting of the assault. It is obvious, that all that diplomatic steps were directed towards hiding of the real aims of Russia and creating an illusion, that Russia wanted to stop the advance of the Abkhazian party. But, in reality Russia was a participant of that advance and controlled the operative situation.

The military diplomacy of Russia (the so-called mission of General Grachov) was deprived of all the traditionalism, the rules for that procedures accepted for that kind of situation and the necessary symmetry. Their main aim was to tactically encircle E. Shevardnaze and his environment and to bargain with the Georgian party being encircled. Needless to say, about the mechanisms of the prevention of the critical situation, desire of restoring of the 16 September status quo, abstention of the Abkhazian party or of the both - Georgian and Abkhazian parties. All this could not have been real arising out of the Russian “military diplomacy” imperial position. At night of September 16-17 in Adler behind the closed doors was held E. Shevardnadze’s and P.Grachov’s meeting. Grachov bluntly told him, that for discharging of the critical situation it was necessary to bring into the conflict zone of the grouping of the Russian army. Simultaneously a negotiation was taking place in Moscow between Shevardnadze’s military advisor General L. Sharashenidze and Head of the Operational Department of the General Staff General-Colonel S. Galkin. The question was the restoration of the military presence of the Russian in Georgia and statement of the military status of the bases. But during the dialogue, besides, the mentioned problem the Russian party posed the issue of stationing of the additional air-born divisions (Pskov and Tula divisions) with
the further prospect of repositioning of one of them to Azerbaijan. On September 17 the parties agreed on the statement project “on the status of the Russian army in Georgia.” The second question remained open: Apparently, the Georgian party refused to position the two divisions and General Sharashenidze also refused to comply with the claim of the Russian generalship at the September 17 meeting, similarly as Shevardnadze said nay to the Grachov’s claim at night meeting of September 16 -18 in Adler.

The “Military diplomacy” of Russia became active form the very moment the Abkhazian party renewed the war and it acted in double pressure and thematic tactic lines: The critical situation being created due to the united advance on Sokhumi was used by Russia for bargaining with desperate Georgia on the two strategic interests: For simultaneous provision of the geostrategic interest of legitimization of the military bases stationed on the territory of Georgia and additional interest of stationing of the military components. Connection of the Russian-Georgian military-political negotiations with the bringing in the air-born troop and connection of that latter with the factor of the general advance excludes the possibility of making different conclusions.

It must be said, that after the first meeting in Adler P.Grachov made a hopeful statement in regard with the mediatory guarantees of Russia. But, that statement was refuted on the very same day September 17 in the Supreme Council and General Staff of Russia. Even the more: the Head of the General Staff M. Kolesnikov, as we have already mentioned, stated that, Sokhumi would fall in three days. Taking into account the reactionary protest of the Parliament and General Staff, on the background for the closed meeting with V. Ardzinba in Gudatua, P. Grachov changed his position in several hours: On September 18 at the Press conference he “generalized” the question of renewal of the war. Instead of repressalia of the Sochi Agreement violator the Minister of Defence of Russia declared, that “neither

Georgian, nor the Abkhazian parties long for peace.”

This declaration made by P. Grachov together with the cunning positioning of the Russian elite (we have only to recall the missions of B. Pastukhov and S. Shoigu in Sokhumi) clearly show one more additional line of the diplomatic strategy of the Kremlin: If from the military aspect Russia gave a helping hand to the Separatists in military matters, from the political-diplomatic point of view it chose an ambivalent game of the double standard creating the illusion, that it wanted to stop the war and desired peace, stability, but the fighting parties did not give it any chance.

On September 21 in Adler was held the second meeting of E. Shevardnadze and P. Grachov. From the Georgian party the meeting was attended by the Minister of Defense G. Khrkharashvili, Head of the informational-intelligence service I. Batiashvili, A. Kavkasidse, and from the Russian party – B. Pastukhov and representatives of the General Staff.84

During the negotiations the Georgian party called from Russia to fulfill the guaranteeing obligations taken by Russian by the Sochi Agreement - i.e. blocking of the assault of the Abkhazian party of at least to keep the military neutrality.

But the regime of Eltsin revealed its imperialistic insidious nature. We’ll be objective, to say, that it was the moment when imperialistic nature was revealed in its concentric form and with all the resources accumulated all in one.

On September 21 Negotiations held in Adler Grachov took principled stand when said, that “the problem of Abkhazia will be settled and for this purpose only two full-fledged divisions are needed.”85

While posing his position, the Minister of Defense of Russia presented the project of the document for the corresponding Agreement (in case of fulfilling of this Agreement) with the Russian terms and a plan-map for implementation. In the project for the Agreement were stipulated the conditions of bring-

ing into Georgia (including Abkhazia) of the two Russian divisions with approximately 30 thousand military contingents, as for the map it described the places of transporting and stationing of the divisions among them in the direction of Azerbaijan.

The “project of Grachov”, needs special analyses. It clearly shows the fact, that Russia did not consider the as the form of fulfilling of its mediatory obligations the already existing package of duties and videlicet, the sanctioned intervention according to the Agreement. The legal nature of the Sochi Agreement provided not only sanctioning of such intervention, but the obligatory legitimating of that latter. I.e. the dispositional part of the Sochi Agreement obliges Russia to undertake the compulsory measures of refraining intervention and at the same time, it prepared the legitimate basis for that kind of intervention. For fulfilling all said above in Abkhazia Russia had all the necessary resources in face of the operative grouping of the Russian Army.

For stopping the advance on Sokhumi the Kremlin made new terms: stationing of the two special divisions and one brigade in Georgia on the basis of the separate agreement and also in Azerbaijan via our country (to make Georgia the initiator of the Russian intervention in the neighboring country or at least the tactic). It meant occupation of certain part of the territory of Georgia and presumably the prospect of annexation. In exchange for this Georgia at the best would receive conservation of the war on the Gumista and Ochamchire fronts with the indefinite period and not the full-fledged and full-scale resolution of conflict or at least creation of the platform for it. It is remarkable, that Russia turned to the measures of safety: everybody who were in Sokhumi at that time remember the long column of buses (Ikaruses) arrived in the airport of Babushera in order to transport the personal staff of the division being brought into Sokhumi, everybody remember S. Shoigu and B. Pastukhov to be commanders of that operation.

From the inner plot and likeness of the contents is it clear, that the “Project of Grachov” was the operative part of the Rus-
sian plan of the “Caucasian War” (we have mentioned above), but the consent of the Georgian Government being in the desperate situation due to the Sokhumi assault on provision of the Agreement basics was regarded as a mechanism of its realization. It goes without saying. But is not excluded, that the above mentioned project to be the long-term strategic element of Russian planning: one of the tactic or operational part of the geostrategic plan having made in autumn of 1991 in the Kremlin. The plan pursued restoration of the influence of Russia in the Caucasus and of the closed geospace of control. In the State and Military hierarchy of Russia long-term military existence of Russia in the South Caucasus was considered of a paramount importance in the State and Military Hierarchy of Russia. Military existence was thought not as the united, unified, military-territorial organization of the Soviet time “Trans Caucasian Military District”, but as diversified net, Enclave having the geostrategic status (military bases, special militarized centers, the so-called peaceful missions etc.). After the fall of Sokhumi the afterwards “Peaceful Mission” and the special divisions of “Grachov’s Project” were regarded as the parts of that net.

It is logical to think, that the “Caucasian war” and “Grachov’s Project” were the components of the plan of the year of 1991. In case, it is not true and the “Grachov’s Project” is to be examined in a more specific dimension – as the document of the direct “military diplomacy” of Russia to the existing situation, even then its organic connection with the secret plan of the “Caucasian War” is obvious.

At the meeting in Adler it was difficult to find more or less acceptable compromise with the Russian-Separatists block and the Georgian party neglected the “Grachov’s Project” and as a result the negotiations were called off.

In September of 1993 the fall of Sokhumi was followed by the temporary interruption of the jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty of the central power of Georgia on Abkhazia, occupation of the whole Abkhazia by Russia under the mask of the so-called peaceful operation, genocide and the purposeful policy of the ethnic cleansing of the ancient Georgian region, liquidation of the majority of the Georgian demography, large-scale humanitarian catastrophe, disintegration of the order of the Georgian territorial-space and Georgian State structure, split of the Georgian – Abkhazian cultural integrity, creation of the base for the Russianization of Abkhazia and its Russian ethnical, military and economic colonization.

By the way, in an open letter sent by a group of intelligentsia (N. Krimov, O. Tabakov, M. Zakharov, O. Efremov, L. Libediskaia and others) to President Eltsin on November 30 of 1993 is said about the genocide and ethnical cleansing. Here are the excerpts from the latter:” The process of mass massacre of the peaceful Georgian population had place in Abkhazia... the tragic list of destroyed forty years ago by the Fascists Oradur, Liditse, Khatin population is being continued with the names of the Abkhazian villages and districts... Investigation of the facts of mass destruction of the peaceful population of Abkhazia and punishment of the war criminals is crucial.”

Results of the years of 1992-1993 are in full coincidence in the first place with the Russian imperial idea based on the violence and lie and hegemonic regional geostrategy of Russia. Arising out of that geostrategy Russia conducted the so-called peaceful process in the years of 1993-2008, making provision of stagnation of

the conflict, inactivity of the regulatory mechanisms and preservation of the long-term situation of non-regulation.

After the full-scale military intervention of Russia in Georgia and the Russian–Georgian war of the August of the year of 2008, through blatant violation of the fundamental norms of International Legislation and ignoring of the civilized principles of the International Order, Russia recognized the so-called independence of Republic of Abkhazia on the basis of the also so-called Agreement made with the Marionette grouping of Sokhumi and occupied territory of Abkhazia and its factual military annexation.

The delict of 2008 being continued till the present days clearly showed the planning and conducting of the hybrid war of the years of 1992-1993.

The war of 1992-1993 radically changed the historical territorial order of Georgia - destroyed the structural integrity of our territory. The war significantly changed the last 20 year history of Georgia and greatly influenced inner evolution of the Georgian State.

After the bloodshed 12 months war Russia managed with its abundant forces and relying on the Abkhazian Separatists to appropriate historical North-West Georgia - Abkhazia. On the captured territory the Russian - Separatist Alliance started to systematically uproot the elements of Georgian civilization, to methodically destroy the national existence of Georgians. It must be admitted, that the moral of the enemy was partially barbaric and in pursuing the anti-Georgian policy every methods were accepted for them. The genocide and total ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population is an obvious example, as well as ruin of the cultural monuments of Georgia and periodic waves of the ethnocide. As a result, the region split from Georgia, the Georgian gene was factually destroyed and the Georgian gene and culture are frozen in the anti-Georgian barbarism.

All this was done pruposefully, methodically, though preliminary planning of the imeprail policy and not spontaniously, as
a form of forceful reaction to the proverbial “Georgian Aggression”, as it is pumped by the Russian-Abkhazian propaganda.

The Russian-Georgian August war of the year of 2008, recognition of the “Independence” of Abkhazia by Russia, within the “Agreement of Friendship and Mutual Help” (2009) “legalizing” of the military bases in that ancient corner of Georgia, establishment of the direct control of the Kremlin and political protectorate on the occupational regime of Abkhazia within the frames of the “Alliance and Partnership” (2014.) Created qualitatively new geopolitical reality and situation. Geostategic configuration radically changed around Abkhazia. After the August war the threat of prolongation of the results of the war of 1992-1993 is real. Namely, the destructive occupational policy of Russia during the August war and after war period created the real threat, that the crisis resulted due to the war of 1992-1993 to turn into the long-term territorial-political order and even the more – to become legitimate through legitimating of the so-called proverbial “new reality”.

The analyses of the war of 1992-1993 and the participation of Russia in it will give us the inner impulse not to allow this suicidal prospect, not to permitt it penetrate into the cunningly shoved “act of regulation” or “compromised format.” Study of that process will enable us to turn a”new relatiy” into a political thruth and never recognize the territorial-political order established as a result of intervention of Russia.

The study of the problematic issues gives us the possibility of making the following occlusions:

1. 1992-1993. The war in Abkhazia is not only the Georgian-Abkhazian ethno conflict, but Russian-Georgian Military Conflict, International and Intrastate conflict with the signs of the regional conflict;

2. 1992-1993. The undeclared war against Georgia launched by Russia, from the typological aspect is the hybrid war. The special and differential research on the intervention of Russia in the war enables us to make the like conclusions.
Russia launched the multidirectional and multidimensional hybrid war - with the help of the regular army, irregular paramilitary formations, groups of special service, with the coordination of strategic and operative-tactic management and with the help of the military-technical, military-expert, financial-economic and ideological-propagandist Separatist regime, through the diplomatic and ideological pressure on the Georgian authorities;

3. 1992-1993. The purpose of Russia’s participation in the war was not only defense of the Abkhazians from the “Georgian aggression”, but exploiting of the Abkhazian separatist movement against Georgia for launching of the expansionistic war.

But the Kremlin had the specifically thought strategy and through the support of the illegitimate secession movement of the rebelled Abkhazians against the central power of Georgia covered that process under the false mask of “ethno conflict”. Thus, the anti-Georgian block of Russian imperialism and Abkhazian separatism in 1992-1993 wrote a story of the war, uniting the indirect intervention of Russia and military support of the Abkhazian secession movement. Outwardly, it seemed that the reversed part of the story was motivated by the halting of the “Georgian Aggression” directed towards the small ethnic group and aim of the mediatory mission in the current ethno conflict. The material given in the work totally destroys the informational-propagandist clichés.

4. The military intervention of Russia as a system factor became crucial during the defeat of Georgia in the war of 1992-1993 and temporary territorial disintegration. In spite of the chronic crisis existing in Georgia and ruin of the institutional system, namely in the field of the military construction, the armed forces of the country outnumbered the Abkhazian-Confederate formations, they rank above them in moral-fighting spirit, military-operative art and tactic thinking. The victory was deprived from Georgia by Russia, and namely that undeclared war frustrated ruin of Separatism.

5. The strategic researches conducted on the Russian-Geor-
gian relations based on the correlation analyses are erroneous; on the one hand, they reveal the correlation between the inner character of the Russian regime and the aggression towards Georgia on the other hand, it shows the correlation between the strategic principles of Russian policy and foreign orientation of Georgia. The formula of the first correlation develops a thesis, arising out of the false and axiomatic understanding of the liberal thinking, that democratic Russia or the Constitutional regime of the Kremlin defending the legitimate State and principles of the political pluralism won’t have tendencies for aggression towards Georgia. The second correlation formula relies on the thesis, that the aggressive policy of Russia is not only connected with the pro-Western orientation of Georgia, but is triggered by it and the desire of integrating into the anti-Russian global structures; Consequently, that policy will change in case of returning of our country to the Russia orbit or choosing the course of neutrality.

Videlicet, the discourse of the Abkhazian war enables us to in a well-argued manner neglect the like correlation ideas. Russia of the years of 1992-1993, or “Eltsin’s Russia” at the initial stage of its development was in the Post Soviet space the most democratic and somewhat liberal regime among those existing for the last centuries (with “Gaidar’s Reforms”, technocratism of Chubais, regional decentralization, distribution of power in the Supreme Council between President Eltsin and Khazbulatov). Anyway, it was the Russia, which did what it did in Abkhazia.

In 1992-1993 Georgia was at the initial stage of its development and was extremely proRussian. Besides, the influence of Russia had the institutional character and Shevardnadze appointed the heads of the government institutions and namely the ministers of the power structure block with the prompt or the Kremlin.

Thus, Russia is fighting with Georgia of any inner foreign orientation (in conditions of not participating in the imperial structure of Russia) within the a priori and strategical definiteness. This realistic opinion has been turned into the obvious truth by the war of 1992-1993.
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დამოუკიდებელი ჟურნალი

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