

Pro-Islamic Neophytes Regarded as Existential “Failure” of Globalization Processes

Abstract

The article observes the modern ethno-political and religious situation formed in today's world. In the context of globalization and trans-cultural processes, the new unexplored forms of the ideology that influences social policies and procedures in the various regions of the world occurred. Primarily, these are quasi-Islamic marginalized group movements. In a pilot study, the author ponders the theme of the phenomenon of marginal quasi-religious entities.

Keywords: globalistics, multiculturalism, transculturation, quasi-confessionality, the ideology of a new terrorism.

In the Modern World, in the environment of the open and continuously widening informational space, marginalized streams emerge which transform the objects of their influence into the subjects with the deviant orientation of the ideology (world view). Such tendencies existed throughout the entire history in all the religious confessions. Most of these anomalous effects are described in literature quite thoroughly which frees us from the necessity of analyzing them scrupulously.

The problem of so called “Islamic terrorism” (it must be noted here by the way, that this term is fundamentally wrong) has always been the most important and under-investigated theme which became especially challenging and crucial nowadays. We suppose that in the basis of the problem lies the self-identification of those people who do not perceive themselves as Muslims in the traditional understanding of this term; those who either do not accept much out of the basic and normative tenets of the notion “Muslim” or do not profess any religion though identify themselves with the cultural traditions of Islam. (on the actual basis of their birth or of purely subjective reasons, which have nothing in common with the basic values of Islam).

The most general characteristics of the mentioned stratum of “non-Islamic” mode of life automatically show the essence that accepts the traditional Islam as a norm and all the rest - as deviation from this norm. In other words, those who do not follow the strict norms of the traditional Islam in their everyday life are simply excluded from the Islamic cultural discourse.

This group of people are perceived as “others” and not only in the traditional preaching houses - mosques but also in routine life.

At the same time manifestation of Islam, which penetrate existentialistic mindset of those people on the genetic and historical-cultural levels create quite specific difficulties to their sense of being. On the one hand, the life of those people passed through in endless trying “run away from the shadow of Islam” in order to adapt more easily with Western values, make re-estimation of social and cultural values and, as a result, become the subject of the really diverse community - “the open society”.

On the other hand they have to undergo explicit non-acceptance from the real followers of Islam who excommunicate them as “ the others” that hinders the process of their historical and cultural self-identification, all the more that from the viewpoint of “ the others” Islamic culture and politics significantly differ from the orientologic or any other approaches to the mentioned issues.

In “ the others” mind, Islam is first of all a historical-cultural phenomenon and as for the politics of Islam, it is a part of the system of political culture as a whole. This opinion is backed up by the fact that the majority of modern concepts “defending the Islamic culture” are based on such non-confessional features as ethnic belonging which gives us a reason to speak about Islam spreading out of its own religious boundaries.

We can agree with the opinion that among others, protection of Islam is the priority for the national movements though we do not think it possible to compare and all the more to mix nationalism with “Islamic terrorism”.

We can consider the events taking place in Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979 as an example of the mentioned misunderstanding and mixing of the notions. Those events were related to the activities of the Opposition of the Islamic republic of Iran, as a result of the violent persecution of the political figures and well known cultural luminaries, who did not share the clericalists’ views.

In the Islamic environment “the others” are noticed but ignored; heard but not considered, as they often are not even able to articulate and formulate in the terms of Islamic lexis their discourse of social and cultural diversities to which they belong.

In accordance with the norms of the religious piety anything that the Muslim people do during all their life should be considered in the context of the Muslim religion. The assertion: “If we take the way of Islam this way will be the way to Islam despite its end” has been widely spread over Muslim people. The political constituent of this categorical imperative may be interpreted as follows: only the Muslim part of East (not other historical, ethno-cultural and confessional areas of the world) conduct the search for diversities [exclusively] within the framework of the Islamic rules aiming the development of the cultural exclusiveness of their adherents. The statement about “Islam has no alternative in the East” sounds similarly unsubstantial and contradicts with the historical realm and real interrelations of religious confessions with their cohabitation.

In the occurred situation the issue of what is exactly going on with the non-Muslim people in the East while they are looking for their cultural self-identification within the frames

of Islam remain open. And what happens with the Muslim people born in non-Muslim environment?

Trying to answer these questions resulting from the “Islamic discourse” we inevitably enter the complicated overlapping of fields of the “diversity of Islamic law.”

Intellectual activity in such “lexical-terminological labyrinth” is extremely difficult as out of the overall non-coordinated spectrum of the conflicting interpretations of any event or fact taken to analyze, we are to choose “better Islam.” On this pass an investigator (or anyone with reflecting mind who simply looks for the answers) finds only a metaphoric set of definitions: “regressive Islam”, “progressive Islam”, “quasi-Islam” and “the true Islam” and the real meaning of such definitions are no subjects to the rational interpretation.

In the given situation the intellectual energy of the inquiring reduces to quotidian and meaningless announcements of the type “this explanation differs essentially from the others”; “this explanation enables to get surprising results;” and so on. Such approaches and judgments can be illustrated by the interpretation of the notion related to the quite worn-out cliché of “Islamic feminism” in which the interpretations are not authentic to the original as far as in the Koran in the form of verse, far more ideas are articulated about the gender equality than in the Islamic-feministic interpretations of the Islamic rules and laws.

For example, what - more equal rights for women, means? Why should the rights of women be based on the edicts which give no results, only slightly normal level of equality? What supports such guideline?

The verses speaking about restrictions for women are interpreted in accordance with the official tenets. But it is known that the semantics of any word contains several meanings. Does not it mean that with regard to liberalization of the canonic definitions for the “others” the very synonyms are always chosen which bear less restrictiveness than the authentic meaning?

The notes we spoke about here by no way negate the possibilities of changes in the Islamic laws. We do not negate either the probability that future generation will introduce necessary aberrations into the institutionalized Islamic law so that the law would reflect more authentically the real situations of the modern world.

But we address our objection to those of “the others” in Islam, who perceive the forthcoming truth only in denying the Islamic discourse as the single alternative of the existential and social life, as for them such bifurcation means splitting and losing the genetic and cultural-historical self-identification.

Actually belonging to the values based on the cultural-historical discourse of Islam, “the others” in Islam can search for the alternative to the traditional Islam only within Islam itself. However, “the others” are forced to approach the human rights and freedom only in Islamic interpretation as to the postulate without consideration of cultural relativity. By reference to the principle which is based on the assertion that “beyond the Islamic world, for sure, there the objections to our decisions can be found, nonetheless they respond to our way of life.” So called “the others” do not have any rights to object such assertions as far as the followers of the “true

Islam” are very suspicious to the attempts of re-interpretations of the canonic postulates of Islam, as to the precedents allowing manipulations with the basic Islamic values and they consider “the others” as renegades.

Liberal oriented researchers from the “non-Islamic world” should realize that “the others” in Islam have a longtime attempt to overcome the intellectual and ethic barriers and despite all the difficulties related with defending their own cultural-historical identification, adhere to the different, non-Western mindset and behavior model. However, the silent pluralism for the best case or insulting indulgency for the worst, deprives “the others” the chance to enter the discussion in the process of which they could assert their intellectual and ethic problems and reach constructive correction of their ideas.

The existing situation of intellectual vacuum provokes some kind of “cultural xenophobe” as the problems being (even unconsciously) ignored unilaterally usually tend to self-realization primary in the negative context. Maybe, such disregard of the existing problem which lays in overcoming visually nonlimited intellectual-ethic barriers is exactly the factor which provokes extreme forms of respond from the marginalized “ the others” when it seems that the intellectuals integrated in the Western society - “ the others” in Islam, commit irrational terrorist acts under egis of Islam to which such actions have nothing in common and moreover - interdict with its basic values.

The phenomenon of the modern terrorism as a social-psychological manifestation is not investigated so far either from criminal or from psychopathologic approaches. Nevertheless, there are sufficient arguments enabling to admit the factors of intellectual bifurcation and estrangement which affect the psychopathic stereotypes of potential and actual terrorists may occur not the last link in the cause-effect relations provoking the acts of aggression which cannot be motivated in rational way.

However, we admit that the situation can be far more complex than it seems from our interpretation.

“The others” on Islam do not lay their account for the imitations from the Western liberals about their participation in discussions on the issue of the place and the role of Islam on the parity conditions. Though they would not oppose to such polemic in the form of dialogue as in the process of such equitable dialog on the actual issues the characteristic supercilious condescension is not viewed as a productive method for stating the truth. At least, such dialog could be helpful in reaching patience for the opposing considerations.

Reality and effectiveness of presumable discussions are potentially guaranteed also by the fact that many of “the others” have much more in common with the representatives of the other countries, nations and religious confessions than with the citizens of the own countries. Though namely this situation creates the atmosphere of mutual suspiciousness and stable distrust.

This is the reason for which we think that the political and cultural barriers can be overcome only when the Islam defines and in articulated manner delivers its official credo

expressed in the terms and notions consistent with the categories understandable for non-Islamic science and politics.

Special attention should be paid to the correlation of the categories which stand relative to each other such as state institutions and religion. As inconsistency of their relations is the fact, nevertheless, the state institutions and religion often resort to mutual help when the full scaled crisis takes place in the society. But it is the society itself, the average citizens, who have to pay for the services, neither state institutions nor religion.

Another problem exists in constructing the space of contact for free sharing of opinions concerning the deeds of the authorities, without fear of being accused in treason. The same can be said about the right to be doubtful about any religious postulates, without the risk of being anathematized.

Any attempt of going beyond the Islamic discourse in the process of seeking the truth comes across the objection formulated in accordance with the thesis that "we have an Islamic society, within the framework of which we should seek our cultural identity". The argument can serve as the answer to this: criticizing the Islamic law it should be considered that "actually against the background of other factors (economic, historical, political and cultural) religion cannot serve as a standard measure and as a single criterion to define trueness of the estimations of a certain phenomenon.

In that case, using the language of post-modernist authors, the problematic field moves from the object towards its interpretation. But this requires introducing some admissions according to which Islam and its interpretations exist on the different taxonomy levels and horizons, not coinciding with each other.

But will the supporters of the "true Islam" agree with it?

This is exactly that space in which the main (and unsolved) contradiction concentrates occurring in the fact that those who don't identify themselves with the Islamic world inadequately understand conceptual and properly juridical limits for application of Islam. If the Islamic law is as much universal as it can solve all collisions in adequate manner which occur in the life of the society, thus it cannot be ignored only basing on the reason that there are many interpretations which don't always correspond with each other. Otherwise the definitions of the Islamic law, blurred and unclearly formed from the point of the non-Islamic discourse, would serve only very limited objectives of the analysis from the normative legislation systems not covered by the jurisdiction of the Islamic world.

It is notorious that there are quite a number of people in the Muslim world itself who are eager to make positive changes, understanding that only religion cannot carry the burden of responsibility for numerous social diseases and the injustice can be found everywhere beyond the Islamic law.

In the given situation we should proceed from the reality that it is necessary to struggle not for reforming obsolete Islamic regulations in the framework of the Islamic law, but to

conduct such reforms in accordance with the existing processes taking place in the realm of the widening world space.

Many people despite their religious confessions oppose all forms of oppression not only those which are rooted in Islam. But the Muslim people and their relatives are to be responsible for the fact that the protest against exploration and against violation of the human rights were not heard as decisive and persistent as needed.

It should also be acknowledged that today, the main opposing force impeding the social reforms is Islamic law formulation - where the law does not directly counteracts the attempts of modernization social-legislative systems, it limits them in favor of the regimes which it supports.

This is why, on the way of overcoming the normative-legislation ties, which impede obtaining the justice, democracy and civic freedoms, it is necessary also to overcome not only the absolute power usurped by the state but its main supporter - religion as the ideological essence of this power.

Surely we don't mean moratorium for applying the Islamic law and neither the strict isolation of the Islamic ideologists from the legislative and executive processes. We mean only that it is necessary to analyze the Islamic law without prejudices in its full spectrum, as the factor the limited treatment of which should be breached.

The democratic statutes should enhance consensus between the religious believers but if the defining characteristics of such consensus stand on the Islamite accents, it seems to become impossible to build liberal-democratic society on the mentioned basis.

Resume

The main conclusion driven from the presented research is the statement that in the conditions of ongoing globalization processes in the world with its dominant features of multiculturalism and transculturation, it is necessary to avoid illusions of "common egalitarianism," of "more freedom", and of unconditioned acceptance of vulgar perception of the gender equality, which serves as camouflage of feminism loyalty to the same gender marriage. All the mentioned is necessary in order to reach the aim of building of the free society.

The same can be said about the illusion that the Islamic law in its present status has enough instruments to deal with the all above mentioned issues as well as others, of the social or existentialistic character. Herewith, we should judge by the fact that the changes in many formulas do not mean simply recoding of the old law statements into the system of the terms of new regulatory laws; it means conceptual rethinking of the whole system which was originated from the obsolete corporative sense and autonomy of all the religions in the world.

Based on the given arguments we can conclude preliminarily that reaching the goals of the social equality, civilian rights and freedoms, gender equality and others, must be viewed beyond the limits of confessional law-normative legislation and especially, beyond their political interpretations.

This requirement is related with different religious confessions and ethnical-cultural groups. The future world of globalization has no alternative way but researching and cultivation of the mainstream in direction to the social structure for everybody without exception for all social cultural and confessional strata.

Anyway, unless the representatives of religious and sub-social groups armed with the political will conduct the full-scaled revision and reforms in order to make their mental and world-view paradigms consistent to the modern realms of global world.

European Charter and the Issue of Regional or Minority Languages in Georgia

Abstract

The policy of international relations within the country, conducted by modern Georgian State is based on rich historical traditions of our country and on the fundamental provisions of the two documents approved by the world international organizations – **“European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages”** and the **“Framework Convention on Human Rights for Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.”** Besides, the European documents give the prerogative to the authorities of concrete countries taking into consideration the democratic principles, to determine the criteria basing on which a certain language spoken in the territory of this or that country will be given the status of an independent language.”

It was natural that Russian occupation of Georgia had left its trace in every area of the social life in the country. The people of different nationalities living in Georgia always preferred their children to go to Russian schools which were widely spread all over the country and restrained the area of using the Georgian language. Additionally, it conditioned the low level of civil identification. This in its turn caused the situation in which the ethnic groups living in Georgia perceive themselves as the representatives of their historical homeland, and not as the members of the Georgian society. This is such situation which represents the main peculiarity of Georgia in comparison with Western civilized countries. If the mentioned situation is not taken into deliberate consideration, conducting the right policy of international relations within the country will not be successful.

After restoring the independence of Georgia, the motivation to learn the Georgian language has increased among the national minorities living in Georgia. The situation is improving slowly but steadily. **The State Language regains its due position which means that the linguistic situation in the country is returning to its natural position.**

One part of population of ethnic Armenians (in Javakheti) and Azerbaijanians (in Kvemo Kartli) on the ground of the wrong interpretation of the Charter and other related European documents have been insisting on announcing their native languages as the regional ones. It would be the great and unforgivable mistake, while, the Georgian State does everything to deepen the integration of non-Georgian population of these regions in linguistic, cultural, political or economical spheres.

Moreover, when the local non-Georgian population show great interest and try to replace the Russian language by Georgian, and when such politics has already shown positive results, introducing the status of regional languages in the mentioned territorial entities will decrease the

motivation of learning the Georgian language by non-Georgian population and will impede the ongoing process of integration.

On the base of analysis of the conflicts having happened recently, it is not difficult to predict the results of such politics: **introducing the status of regional languages will encourage the segmentation of Georgia, will support separatistic attitudes and all this will consequently bring new conflicts. The main sufferers from such situation will be the population of the regions themselves. Thus, instead of improving the situation, which by no doubt is the aim of the Charter, we will receive totally opposite results.**

Keywords: *European Charter, ethnic minority, Diaspora, regional languages.*

The culture of international relations of Georgian nation, its tolerant spirit with other people have been practiced for many centuries. Through all the ancient years of history of Georgia there are no facts of riots or other kinds of violence against Jewish or any other nationalities living in the country. The national minorities living in Georgia were always able to afford their own cultural development, keep their traditions and national identity, use their own language. The Georgian State always respected people with different religious confessions. The clear example of it is the existence of Orthodox Christian, Gregorian, Catholic Christian churches, also Islamic mosque and Jewish synagogue just on 200 square meters in the capital city of Georgia.

Georgian State policies of interrelations between different nations base on rich historical traditions of the country and on the fundamentals documented in the different conventions adopted by the international organizations.

On November 5, 1992 “**European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages**” was adopted in Strasbourg. On December 18, 1992 by the UN resolution #47/135, **the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities** was adopted in New York. Based on this declaration on November 1, 1995 the European Council adopted the “**Framework Convention on Protection of the Minorities**”. In 1995, “**The Recommendations on the Educational Rights of the National Minorities**” were developed in Hague. Three years later, the document on defending minority languages followed, known as “**Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of the Minorities**” (**February, 1998**), which in details describes the linguistic rights of the society belonging to the national minority in the given State.

According to the Charter, the ethnic minorities have rights to open kindergartens, schools and higher institutions in their native language (Article 8); the State is obliged, if requested, to conduct the court proceedings on criminal, civil or administrative cases in the native language of the minorities; the evidences whether written or oral should not be considered

unacceptable because they are formulated in the regional or minority language; the court also is obliged to produce, on request, documents connected with legal proceedings in the relevant regional or minority language, if necessary by the use of interpreters and translators involving when the documents are settled in the state language The Charter also obliges the States to accept appeals for hearing formulated in the minority language (Article 9); the local authorities should ensure that all kinds of applications and documentation are available in the regional or minority languages or are bilingual (Article 10)); States parties to the Charter should ensure at least one

radio and one television channel broadcast in regional or minority languages or envisage programmes in the broadcasting structure to be delivered in the regional or minority languages. The same regulations refer to newspapers. Besides, the States parties to the Charter should organize free radio or television broadcasting from the neighboring countries, in the language which is identical or similar to the language of the given minority (Article 11); the parties of the Charter undertake to facilitate and foster accessibility of the scientific or literary works written in the language of the minority using different means for this; the authorities are obliged to give a proper place to cultural works of minorities in the international cultural relations of the State (Article 12); the parties of the Charter are obliged to eliminate any provision from the legislation prohibiting or limiting without justified reasons using of the regional or minority languages in the documents related with the economic or social life; they are obliged to restrict the practice aimed against using the regional or minority languages in the economic or social activities; they should enable and promote trans-frontier cooperation between governmental or local authorities on the territories of which the same language is used in identical or similar form (Article 13) and so on.

But herewith neither the European Charter nor other above mentioned documents explain such ethnical-linguistic terms as: autochthonous population, language of a national minority, dialect and others.

European Charter and other documents about the minority languages caused serious controversies in opinions in many of the European States.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia consider that the European Charter relates only to the autochthonous languages. To their opinion, the principles of the Charter cannot be spread over the ethnic groups, which were inhabited in the territories of the above mentioned countries only some decades ago with special political regards. Up today, the only official language of Estonia is Estonian, though in some municipality where the Russian speaking population represents the majority, the administration provides bilingual services for the local population in the different spheres of everyday life.

Ratification of the European Charter became the subject of violent discussions in Ukraine as well. Many experts in this country consider that the main goal of the Charter should be to defend not the languages of national minorities but those languages that are under the risk of disappearing.

On 7 May, 1999 signing the European Charter almost caused political confrontation in France. French Constitutional Court blocked ratification of the Charter. The Court considered that the principles of the Charter were controversial with the French Constitution, according to which the official language of the whole territory of the country and the state institutions is French. According to the evaluation given by the Constitutional Council to the requirement of the Charter about the specific rights of the certain linguistic groups is controversial with the integrity of the country, equality before the law and the idea of integrity of the French people. On 29 November 2002, by the resolution of the State Council the law was abrogated about bilingual teaching at schools, colleges and lyceums.

The State Council decided that it went beyond the frames of studying the regional language and accordingly decreased the function of French as a state language. By the regulation dated on 12 May, 2003, it was prohibited to teach any separate subject in any regional language without any exception.

Despite the above mentioned, the French Government acknowledges the rights of the regional and minority languages but only in the limited framework (without applying official status for them). The main agency of the French language was renamed into 'The main agency of the French language and the languages of France'. The term "the languages of France" was implemented though no other language except French has got the official status.

What is the reason of such cautious attitude of one part of European states in the matter of joining these documents?

The fact is that despite holding the wide discussion on the issue of national minorities and their languages, there is no settlement found and no shared position achieved so far among the member states of the European Union. That is why some European countries (Austria, Estonia, Germany, Luxemburg, Russia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Denmark, and Macedonia) made some comments and remarks conditioned by the specifics of their own country, or named definitely those minorities towards which they were going to apply the provisions of the Charter and of the Framework Convention.

Georgia joined the European Charter and the Framework Convention without any stipulation of conditions in 2000. On October 13, 2005 the Parliament of Georgia ratified the Framework Convention; as for the European Charter, its ratification is still suspended due to the increasing protest expressed by the Georgian society.

According to the documents by the European Union, the variation of the state language and the language of migrants should not be referred to as the minority languages. Namely, in the first paragraph, clause a, part II, and also in the 32nd explanation, it is clearly underlined: **"Regional/minority languages do not imply (do not include) the variations of the state language, dialects and the languages of migrants."**

It follows hereof that European states consider only aborigineous autochthonous minorities as national and linguistic minorities. For example, some millions of Turkish people born in Germany are not regarded as minorities of this country. Despite quite long history of existing Turkish diaspora in Germany, Turks are viewed there only as migrants. We have the same picture in France where the Algerians born in this country remain being migrants there; the same about England where the Hindu origin people also have the similar status and so on. Resulting from its specific conditions, only the USA represents an exception in this respect.

Sometimes the unusual interpretations made by the experts or the authorities can be seen towards this question; e.g. to the government of Poland the "national minority" is a nationality having its national state somewhere but living in Poland (for example, Germans in Poland) and the ethnic minority is an ethnic group of people not having its sovereign national State and live in Poland (for example the Gipsies). Some experts consider Armenians living in Poland as an autochthonous minority. And the strangest thing is that the ancient Armenian language which disappeared long ago is recognized as the language of that group.

The Charter does not provide the definition of the notion "linguistic minority". It doesn't either define **"under what circumstances a certain mode of expression may be considered as a separate language"**. It only provides its own vision about the general definition of the regional or minority language: **The adjective "regional" refers to the languages spoken in a limited part of the territory of a State, within which, moreover, they may be spoken by the majority**

of the citizens. The term "minority" refers to situations in which either the language is spoken by persons who are not concentrated on a specific part of the territory of the State or it is spoken by a group of persons, which, though concentrated on part of the territory of the State, is numerically smaller than the population in this region which speaks the majority language of the State.

“The Charter gives the prerogative to the authorities of the given country, taking into consideration the democratic principles, to determine the criteria basing on which a certain language spoken in the territory of this country will be given the status of an independent language” (the Explanations, 18).The European Charter clearly defines that the State should care first of all about those languages which are under the threat of extinction.

Are the languages of ethnic groups living in Georgia under such threat?

Languages of ethnic groups living in Georgia like Assyrian, Udi, Avar, Kurdish and Abkhazian are not protected outside the country. All other minorities have either State or some entity outside Georgia, and they care about preserving the languages of their ethnos. There is not and cannot be any development of such languages as Russian, Azerbaijani or Armenian and other languages like them which have full opportunities of development in their native countries and as for their Diasporas their role is to preserve their native languages and speak fluently and not develop them.

This is how the majority of European States perceives the European Charter that excludes giving the regional language status to the mentioned groups. Despite such situation in Georgia we face the wrong interpretation of above mentioned documents, not only by the ethnical or language minorities themselves but by the part of non-governmental organizations as well and even by the high authorities. For example, one part of the Armenians living in Georgia, in Javakheti region have been steadily pleading for years to announce Armenian a regional language in two regions of Georgia - Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, basing on the wrong interpretation of the European Charter. The former majority of the Georgian Parliament, being nihilistic to national problems, was close to satisfy this request. In his telegram dated on September 29, 2008 to Washington, the Ambassador of the USA John Taft considers the request of ethnic Armenians living in Georgia “legal”, namely, to declare Armenian the regional language in Georgia. In 2013 the deputies of Akhalkalaki municipal assembly put the question in the Parliament of Georgia to ratify the European Charter.

Unlike the European States, the level of civil society self-identification is very low. This causes that ethnic groups living in Georgia recognize themselves as representatives of their historical homeland and not as the members of the unified Georgian society. The existence of compact dwelling places of ethnical minorities very close to the borders of their historical Homeland also impedes the formation of their civic identity. The European Charter recognizes the right to education in the native language and during the long period of time we sincerely applauded ourselves for a large number of

non-Georgian schools in the country because we regarded this fact as a clear indication of defending the rights of minorities. But it has appeared that a large number of such schools seriously impedes learning of the State language among the groups of ethnic minorities. In fact

through non-Georgian schools the government prepares immigrants out of its citizens, as a result of which they do not have a chance of successful career within the country because all types of documentation, radio and television broadcasting are in the state language, great number of journals and newspapers are printed in the state language too, consequently the people who do not know Georgian or have a poor knowledge do not have a chance to realize their capabilities. Thus, the only way out of this situation is to migrate. The alternative is to form such a micro-space, where you can get along your way easily without the Georgian language. That is the real reason of the Armenian population in Javakheti who asks to give the Armenian language the regional language status from time to time.

The existing practice of giving education to people does not support forming a common civil space. We mean the practice when some people grow up and learn on the basis of the heritage of Shota Rustaveli and Ilia Chavchavadze (Georgians), on the epos of David Sasunts (Armenians), on the poetry by Pushkin and Lermontov (Russians) and the others on the basis of values given in the Koran or Shariat order (Azerbaijanians). The major educational space of the country should be based on the usage of the main ethnos of the state. This is the only way to reach the social-political unity of all the citizens of the state.

It should be noted that there are far larger compact places in Russia inhabited by ethnic Armenians (Rostov-on the -Donn, Moscow, Armavir and others); also in the USA (Los Angeles), in Argentina, France and other countries. Though the Armenians don't have schools in their native language in none of these countries. And that's not because the local government is against of it - the Armenians are free to open their schools in their compact dwelling places - but they do not want it because they clearly understand that without a good knowledge of the local state language they do not have any chance of success and prosperity.

Georgia is an exception from this point of view. This is a result of being a part first of the Tsarist Russia and then of the USSR. All over the territory of this vast state all kinds of official documents - the records management, law proceedings, and personal documentation - was kept in the Russian language and that's why all ethnic minorities living in Georgia were doing well without knowing the Georgian language. The good knowledge of the Russian language gave a priority to the Armenians in comparison of Georgians. because in offices and enterprises the priority was given to those who spoke Russian well. Today Georgia is an independent and sovereign country. Now the proceedings are taking place in Georgian throughout the country and consequently it requires from non-Georgian people to study the state language. National minorities living in Georgia understand this, but the old practice is persistent.

The situation is improving slowly but steadily. This is clear from the example of Akhaltsikhe district. In the Soviet period there were only two Georgian schools in Akhaltsikhe with about one thousand pupils in each. There also were two Russian schools with six hundred pupils in each and one Armenian school with eight hundred pupils.

Certainly, the children of Russian officers serving in the Soviet Army went to Russian schools but the great number of pupils were the children of ethnic Armenians from Akhaltsikhe. After restoring the independence of Georgia, the number of Russian contingent at schools substantially decreased - Russian officers with their families left the city (and the country); as for the Armenian pupils, one part of them was distributed to the Armenian school and the other to

Georgian schools. In 2000, the contingent of Akhaltsikhe Armenian school Number 3 went up to one thousand, and the number of pupils at Georgian schools also increased. Later, the number of pupils at Armenian school began to decrease. According to the data of the 2016-2017 Academic year the contingent of the Armenian school comprises 640 pupils. Nowadays not only the contingent of Georgian schools but the number of schools themselves grow significantly. Now there are three Georgian schools in the town: №1, №5, and №6 - with 932, 1391 and 284 pupils correspondingly. Today only one Russian school out of two is functioning. At the Russian sector of that school there are 152 pupils and at the Georgian - 155 pupils.¹

It is clear that the increase of the contingent of Georgian school pupils happened at the expense of pupils from Armenian and Russian schools. It should be said that this process is going on in Akhaltsikhe district without any violence and discrimination. Cooperation of the mixed Georgian-Armenian population in the Akhaltsikhe district has harmoniously developed for many decades and is a true example of international coexistence. Georgia is slowly but gradually returns to the practice practiced in Western civilized countries.

The motivation of non-Georgian population towards learning the Georgian language has been growing since restoring the independence of Georgia. The large part of national minorities tries to solve the problem of knowing the state language by sending their children to Georgian schools though they face the problems there as well. The parents do not know Georgian and cannot help their children to do the lessons even in the elementary school. Most non-Georgian children do not know the state language while starting school. Because of this, at the beginning they are behind the Georgian students in studying. They are self-esteemed also; Because of the low academic performance of non-Georgian children, the teacher is forced to weaken the requirements for them; In most cases teachers do not know the language of non-Georgian children, which makes it difficult to communicate between them and so on.

After restoring the independence of Georgia two ethnic conflicts burst in Georgia. Surely, the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had their political backgrounds but it should be said that ethnic and linguistic problems also blew up those conflicts.

Therefore, it is essential for the Georgian State to develop the long term strategy for the language politics, which will consider the specific measures to defend equally the status of State languages (Georgian and Abkhazian) and the languages of ethnic minorities.

Thus, considering the above mentioned, we think it is clear that Georgia should implement the requirements of the European documents (**“European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages”** and **“Framework Convention on Protection of the Minorities”**) only on the basis of deliberate consideration of the local specifics. Assigning the status of regional languages to the Armenian (in Javakheti district) and Azerbaijanian (in Kvemo Kartli), in the circumstances when the Georgian State do not spare the efforts to support integration of non-Georgian population of

¹. There was one Georgian residential school also functioning in the town but its contingent was represented by the pupils from all over the region.

². At so called “baggage station” district there is also one elementary school functioning with two sectors - Armenian and Georgian in which today only 28 pupils are enlisted.

the regions in the linguistic, cultural, political or economical spheres, when the local non-Georgian population show great interest and try to replace the Russian language by Georgian, and when such politics has already shown positive results, introducing the status of regional languages in the mentioned territorial entities will decrease the motivation of learning the Georgian language and will impede the ongoing process of integration. Based on the analysis of the recent conflicts it is easy to predict where such processes will lead to. Introducing of the status of regional languages will encourage the segmentation of Georgia, will support separatistic attitudes and all this consequently will bring new conflicts. The main sufferers from such situation will be the population of the regions themselves. Thus, instead of improving the situation, which by no doubt is the aim of the Charter, we will receive totally opposite results.

Some Iron Age and Medieval Sites in Göle District of Ardahan

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Abstract

In this paper, an evaluation of some Iron Age and Medieval sites in Göle district of Ardahan is contained. The results of the field surveys conducted by us in Ardahan in 2016 and 2017 are effective in this assessment. The archaeological sites forming the subject of the article are located between the villages of Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe in Göle. The archaeological sites in question are an Iron Age fortress and its settlement in Kuzupınarı, two Iron Age towers, an ancient pen and a Medieval church in Bellitepe and a Medieval archaeological site in Dedeşen.

Keywords: *Iron Age, Medieval, Ardahan, Fortress, Tower, Church, Fortification.*


Introduction

A large number of archaeological sites dating to the Bronze and Iron Ages and medieval period have been researched during the archaeological field surveys conducted by us in Ardahan between the years of 2013 and 2017.¹ In these researches, it was understood that the central district of Ardahan was an important region especially for the Bronze Age archaeology. The most important archaeological finds belonging to the Kura-Araxes culture have been observed on the hilltops around the villages of Değirmenli and Sulakyurt which are among the modern settlements of the central district. As a result of

¹ For the results of the field surveys in Ardahan in 2013 and 2017, see Patacı, 2014: 99-116.; Patacı, 2015a: 467-480.; Patacı, 2015b: 52-86.; Patacı, 2016a: 81-100.; Patacı, 2016b; Patacı *et al.*, 2017: 175-200.; Patacı and Küçük, 2015: 487-498.; Patacı and Lafli, 2015: 229-248.; Patacı and Lafli, 2016a: 191-210.; Patacı and Lafli, 2016b: 281-297.; Patacı and Lafli, 2017: 115-126.; Patacı and Oral Patacı, 2014: 260-263.; Patacı and Oral Patacı, 2016: 172-175.

our surveys we can claim that the Iron Age sites in the central district are in a minority comparing to the sites of the Bronze Age. It seems that the archaeological sites dating to the Iron Age are more intense in Göle, located to the south of Ardahan.

Specifically, our studies have focused on an important area between Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe in Göle (Kola) in 2017. This area consists of a fertile plain extending for at least 7 km in the east-west direction and hills having an altitude of about 2200 m in the west, north and south of the plain (map 1). Besides, a branch of the Kura River flows in the east-west direction on the north side of the plain. There are five modern settlements around the lowland. These villages are Uğurtaş (Dörtkilise), Kuzupınarı (Konk), Yeleçli (Samzalek) and Bellitepe (Urut) from west to east. The fifth village, Dedeşen (Gümüşparmak), is located in the southern center of the area (map 1). There are seven different archaeological sites around these villages. Two of them located in Bellitepe and Dedeşen are dated to the medieval period and the others located in Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe must be dated to the Iron Age. In addition, there are two more findspots in the south of the region. We detected plenty of Bronze and Iron Age ceramics in one of these ruins that were discovered in the vicinity of the village of Köprülü in the 2016 survey. Only two of the nine archaeological sites have not been extensively studied yet. These are the northern archaeological site of Bellitepe and the eastern archaeological site of Köprülü. We plan to continue the field survey in this area in 2018 again.



Map 1. Archaeological sites between Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe.

An Iron Age Fortress and Its Settlement in Kuzupınarı

Kuzupınarı is located 26.7 km northwest of the center of Göle. An archaeological site has been detected at the summit of a hill with 2170-2182 m in altitude, on the western border of this village (map 1). The fortress that dominates the lowland between Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe is situated on the east edge of the hill. At the center of the archaeological site there is a fortress with a rectangular plan, located in northwest-southeast direction (figs. 1-3). The structure was built with dry wall technique using polygonal, rectangular and square cut medium and large sized basalt stones. The eastern walls of the fortress rise over a rocky ground. There are nearly semi-circular bastions positioned at the corners of the structure (fig. 4). The same architectural feature is also observed in the western tower of Bellitepe which is located 4,7 km of the fortress of Kuzupınarı. However, the fortress of Kuzupınarı has one more bastion in the center of its western outer wall.




Fig. 1. Plan of the archaeological site at Kuzupınarı




Fig. 2. Plan of the fortress of Kuzupınarı



Fig. 3. Aerial photo of the fortress of Kuzupınarı.



Fig. 4. The Fortress of Kuzupınarı. View from the north.

The fortress of Kuzupınarı has the dimensions of about 30 x 16 m. Thickness of the walls varies from 2.20 m to 3.40 m. Maximum height of the preserved walls changes between 2.50 m and 3.00 m. There is an entrance on the northeastern edge of the fortress

(fig. 5). Width of the entrance is 1,14 m and height of it is about 1.00 m. The entrance corridor has the length of 3,47 m, width of 1,38 m and height of 1,10 m. The fortress has two rooms situated in the north-south direction. The northern room of the structure has the dimensions of 7.42 x 6.20 m and the southern room has the dimensions of 9.15 x 8.12 m. The pile of stones fallen from the fortress cover almost entire the structure and they are scattered around the land surrounding the fortress. The stones belonging to the bastions of the fortress are slightly larger than those on the other walls and the best preserved walls of the structure are also seen on the bastions (fig. 6). Measures of the bastions are as follows:

Southeastern bastion: width: 4.75 m; preserved height: 2.50 m.

Northeastern bastion: width: 4.00 m; preserved height: 2,57 m.

Northwestern bastion: width: 4.45 m; preserved height: 3.40 m.

Southwestern bastion: width: 4.00 m.

Central bastion on the western side of the structure: width: 3.90 m.



Fig. 5. The entrance of the fortress of Kuzupınarı.



Fig. 6. The northwestern bastion of the Fortress of Kuzupınarı.

A remains of another wall preserved on ground level and extending in the north-south direction can be observed throughout the west of the fortress of Kuzupınarı (figs. 2-3). There is a distance of 8-9 m between this badly preserved wall and the western wall of the fortress. This perimeter wall ends at the center of the southern wall of the fortress. Because the eastern edge of the fortress is bounded by the steep slope of the hill, there was no need an extra defensive wall at this point of the archaeological site.

Another group of ruins in the archaeological site suggests us that this area might have been used also as a seasonal highland settlement which was established for animal husbandry. There are two groups of architectural structures which were preserved in bad condition with ground level in the northern zone of the fortress (fig. 7). The first architectural ruins which consist of rooms with rectangular and square plan observed at a few meters from the north outer wall of the fortress and they extend about 30 m towards the north. The second group of architectural remains are 28 m northeast of the fortress. We think that there must be more than 20 rooms in the northern zone of the fortress. Additionally, there are a few remains of graves in the south area of the fortress, but they were destroyed because of the illicit excavations.

The last group of ruins in the archaeological site of Kuzupınarı is located on the western zone of the fortress and is observed about 30 m in the east-west direction. Unfortunately, it is not possible to develop an appropriate evaluation about the function of this area because of the lack of data. The total size of this archaeological site in Kuzupınarı is approximately 100 m in the north-south direction and 60 m in the east-west direction. Few pottery fragments documented around the fortress belong to the Iron Age; yet due to the lack of sufficient surface material, it is not possible to have a more precise dating (fig. 8). It is also observed a group of pottery fragments in the vicinity of the fortress, which exhibits the features of the medieval ceramics. However, there is no architectural evidence showing that this archaeological site is also used in medieval period.



Fig. 7. The northern area of the fortress of Kuzupınarı.



Fig. 8. Pottery finds from Kuzupınarı.

There is a modern pen about 170 m northwest of the fortress of Kuzupınarı. It has been observed by us that some locals of Kuzupınarı stayed here with their tents for the animal husbandry activities during the summer season. Essentially, the hill where the archaeological site is located must have been used for these kinds of activities for thousands of years.

Iron Age Towers in Bellitepe

There are two Iron Age towers in the vicinity of Bellitepe that is located 20 km north of the center of Göle in Ardahan. Our survey team discovered an Iron Age tower, on a hill with a low-altitude, which is 600/650 m west of the Bellitepe in the 2017 survey (map 1). This tower that has been named as the western tower of Bellitepe by us, is located just 160 m north of the modern road linking the villages of Yeleçli and Bellitepe.

The tower with a square plan and semicircular bastions at its corners, is like a smaller version of the fortress of Kuzupınarı (fig. 9-10). Because of their architectural features, the western tower of Bellitepe and the fortress of Kuzupınarı are among the unique defensive structures in Ardahan. In our opinion both structures must have been built in the same period. The fact that these two structures are located close to each other

at a distance of 4.7 km suggests that there may be a relationship between them. Apart from them, another tower to the east of Bellitepe was also discovered during the 2017 survey. Existence of the Kura River, high plateau settlements established for animal husbandry, a possible trade road and also the large lowland which is suitable for farming between Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe must have affected on the numbers of the defensive structures and their positioning (fig. 11). Besides, there must have been seasonal settlements especially established for animal husbandry in the highlands of this territory.



Fig. 9. Plan of the western tower of Bellitepe.

Fig. 10. Aerial photo of the western tower of Bellitepe.

The western tower of Bellitepe has the dimensions of 21.4 m in the north-south direction and 18.6 m in the east-west direction. Although it is defined as a tower by us, this structure is larger than the typical towers of Ardahan. It must have been used as a military outpost in Iron Age. It was built with dry wall technique using medium and large sized stones. Dimensions of some of the *in situ* stones belonging to the structure are 1.90 x 1.00 m, 1.30 x 0.60 m and 1.90 x 1.10 m. Thickness of the walls of the tower changes between 2.77 m and 2.90 m and the maximum height of its preserved walls varies between 1.50 m and 2.00 m (fig. 12). The entrance of the tower which has the width of 1.00 m, is located at the center of the south wall of the structure (fig. 13). The entrance corridor with its length of 3.40 m and width of 1.30 m shows similarity with the one in the fortress of Kuzupınarı (fig. 14). The tower has only one room, that has the dimensions of 10 x 9.40 m.



Fig. 11. The western tower of Bellitepe. View from the east.



Fig. 12. The west wall of the western tower of Bellitepe.



Fig. 13. The entrance of the western tower of Bellitepe.



Fig. 14. The entrance corridor of the western tower of Bellitepe.

Except the tower itself, there is also a perimeter wall surrounding the archaeological site but we couldn't detect a trace belonging to this wall on the east of the tower (fig. 9-10). A few meters to the east wall of the tower, there is a group of ruins that has been protected in ground level and consist of nine rooms with square plan. Another group of ruins consisting of 7-8 rooms, can be observed on the land situated in the south and southeast of the tower. The total size of the archaeological site is 60 m in the north-south direction and 70 m in the east-west direction (fig. 15). A few numbers of Iron Age and Medieval ceramics were detected around the western tower of Bellitepe in the 2017 field survey.

The eastern tower of Bellitepe which is heavily damaged over the years, was another tower discovered in the vicinity of Bellitepe in 2017. The tower, located about 2.2 km east of Bellitepe and 500 m north of the modern road was built on the southern slope of a hill with an altitude of 2129-2138 m (map 1). The structure is positioned in the north-south direction and has an almost rectangular plan with rounded corners except its southwestern corner (figs. 16). The tower has been built in accordance with the topographical features of the land, which it rises on (fig. 17). Medium and large sized

basalt stones were used building the structure which was constructed in dry wall technique. Dimensions of the tower is 14.30 x 10.50 m and thickness of its walls is around 2.30 m. Height of the walls of the tower is preserved at maximum 1-1.5 m on the north side of the structure.



Fig. 15. The west facade of the western tower of Bellitepe.




Fig. 16. Plan of the eastern tower of Bellitepe.

A few of ceramic fragments dating to the Iron Age and Medieval period were observed in the tower and its close surroundings. But amount of these small finds is not enough to date the archaeological site in detail. It doesn't seem to possible to claim that the tower was also used in Medieval Period when we evaluate its architectural condition; yet, its more appropriate to wait until an excavation is conducted in this archaeological site to make a better comment about the usage phases of the tower.



Fig. 17. Aerial photo of the eastern tower of Bellitepe.



Fig. 18. The eastern tower of Bellitepe. View from the north.

The tower is situated in a location where the whole lowland in its eastern, southern and western directions can be easily observed (fig. 18). The most important reason to build a military outpost such as the western and the eastern towers of Bellitepe must be a desire of controlling the stream which is a branch of the Kura flowing 700 m south of this tower.

Ancient Pen of Bellitepe

There is another ancient archaeological site we define as a pen (fold) which must have been built for animal husbandry on the top of the hill where the eastern tower of Bellitepe is located. Today, this area continues to be used as a pen. There is a short distance of 185 m between this site with the altitude of 2200 m and the eastern tower (map 1). A modern wall with the maximum height of 1 m is built in dry wall technique by the locals using the collapsing stones of the pen. The stone stacks are scattered all over the boundaries of the structure in width of 2-3 m. Unfortunately no pottery or other type of small finds were found in the archaeological site.

Medieval Church of Bellitepe (Urut)

Bellitepe is one of the villages of the Township of Çayırbaşı in Göle. The area where this village is located was one of the Armenian settlements at the beginning of the 20th century. This area which is the subject of the article is also important in terms of Medieval archaeology. There is a Medieval church 4 km east of Bellitepe (map 1). This well known church has been studied several times in previous surveys by different researchers. The church is situated 150 m north of the modern road and 215 m north of the Kura River, on a slope of a hill with the altitude of 2010 m (fig. 19).



Fig. 19. The church of Bellitepe. View from the northeast.

The church with the dimensions of 10 x 6.80 m was built in infill wall technique. There is an adjacent annex to the north of the structure probably used as a *pastophorion* with the dimensions of 5,40 x 2,50 m. The total dimension of the land covered by the church, increases to 10 x 9.15 m with this additional room. The wall thickness of the church is approximately 80 cm and the preserved height of its wall is maximum 4.60 m. The entrance of the church is on the western edge but there is a great destruction on the walls of the structure including this entrance. Unfortunately, all the cut stones on the surface of the walls were taken by the locals of the area over the years. There is also a pit of a recent illegal excavation 10 m south of the church and a Medieval grave destroyed by the treasure hunters.

Medieval Archaeological Site in Dedeşen

Dedeşen is one of the important archaeological sites dating to the Middle Ages in Ardahan. This village is in the south center of the plain between Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe and 4.5 km east of Kuzupınarı (map 1). Archaeological site of Dedeşen is located on a hill which is just on the north of the village. This site was defined as a fortress in a book published as a result of a former research² but the function of this Medieval ruins is not clear yet. Artvin and Ardahan which are parts of the historical region of Tao-Klarjeti have very important religious places in their boundaries; but many of the cultural assets dating between the 10th and 13th centuries has been preserved in bad condition in Ardahan. One of these was the Basilica in Erusheti where a bishopric was established during the reign of Vakhtang I in the 5th century.³ In our opinion, this Medieval site which rises on a *höyük* (mound) in Dedeşen was a major fortified religious center (fig. 20).

The *höyük* in Dedeşen with the altitudes of 2020-2050 covers an area of 420 m in the east-west direction and 230 m in the north-south direction. The ruins on the *höyük* site can be observed through 330 m in the east-west direction. Two fortification walls preserved in several meters length draw the attention on the southwest edge of the mound (fig. 21). This point must be the entrance of the site. Unfortunately, the fortification walls of the site have been almost completely destroyed. Nevertheless, if an archaeological excavation is conducted, at least the foundations of the walls can be uncovered in the limits of the *höyük*.



Fig. 20. The *höyük* site in Dedeşen. View from the north.



Fig. 21. The fortification wall of the *höyük* site in Dedeşen.

² Gündoğdu, 2000: 66-71.

³ Kartlis Tskhovreba, 2014: 165; Thomson, 1996: 217

A Medieval church with the dimensions of 14.4 x 9.9 m is located in the eastern side of the *höyük* site (map 1). This church, which is one of the rare religious buildings in Ardahan with its length of more than 10 m, has been heavily damaged. The northern wall of the structure built in infill wall technique has been preserved at a maximum height of 3.30 m. Other walls of the building have been protected in foundation level in general and the wall thicknesses are about 70 cm. There is an additional room that must have been used as a *pastophorion* on the northern edge of the church (fig. 22). There must be another symmetrical room at the southeast side of the church but the existence of a collapsed wall on the land hasn't allowed us understand this possible room in detail.



Fig. 22. Aerial photo of the church in Dedeşen.



Fig. 23. The cemetery of the *höyük* site in Dedeşen.

The area just west of the church is a Medieval cemetery and a great number of gravestones can be easily observed in this area (fig. 23). Besides of the gravestones, some architectural remains in foundation level were noticed in the west of the cemetery in the 2017 survey. But it is not possible to define them without an excavation. In Dedeşen, A small number of pottery finds dated to the Medieval period was studied by our research team. We plan to publish some detailed articles of Bronze and Iron Ages and Medieval potteries that we detected during our field surveys between 2013 and 2017.

Conclusion

The main reason of the existence of the fortress of Kuzupınarı which has a function as a medium sized military base is that, secure the large plain on its eastern side, the Kura River that extends in the east-west direction and the settlements around the lowland and the river (fig. 24). The Fortress of Kuzupınarı and the towers in Bellitepe are similar to the Urartian fortresses and towers in terms of their positioning features. Urartian fortresses have also been built over a rocky ground on the summit of the hills that dominate the large lowlands where the agricultural activities were organized.⁴ Security of the trade roads, water resources and the cities were provided in this way. In addition, agricultural

⁴ Çilingiroğlu, 1997: 48.

products collected from the settlements which were in the vicinity of the defensive structures were saved in the storages of the fortresses. The Urartian Kingdom, which is a very important Iron Age civilization for the history of the eastern Anatolia, northwestern Iran and Armenia, had an necessarily influence on the local cultures in its close vicinity. However, we would like to emphasize that we have no intention to claim that the archaeological sites between Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe located in Göle were used by the Urartians. The absence of Urartian evidences in our surveys made us to think that Ardahan had an isolated and local position during the period of Urartians. Due to the small amount of archaeological data one can assume that Ardahan was meaning a tribute and pillaging zone, rather than a residential area for the Urartian Kingdom.



Fig. 24. A Panaromic view of the lowland from the fortress of Kuzupınarı.

The field surveys we have conducted in Dedeşen and Bellitepe have shown us once again that the cultural assets of Ardahan dated to the Medieval period are more damaged in recent years than we thought. For this reason, along with archaeological studies, restoration and conservation activities are needed at the same time. It is absolutely necessary to conduct such studies especially in Dedeşen. In this respect, maybe the most important Medieval Church is the Church of Yalnızçam (Sindiskom) with its complicated plan and dimensions of 18.50 x 18.30 m in the central district of Ardahan. However, apart from the church, the other ruins such as some unidentified architectural units which are observed on the ground level, the fortification wall and the cemetery are quite striking in Dedeşen. Most probably, Dedeşen will become the first place where important and interesting datas can be obtained in the name of the medieval archaeology of Göle (Kola) if an comprehensive project is started.

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Figure Captions

Map 1. Archaeological sites between Kuzupınarı and Bellitepe.

Fig. 1. Plan of the archaeological site in Kuzupınarı.

Fig. 2. Plan of the fortress of Kuzupınarı.

Fig. 3. Aerial photo of the fortress of Kuzupınarı.

Fig. 4. The Fortress of Kuzupınarı. View from the north.

Fig. 5. The entrance of the fortress of Kuzupınarı.

Fig. 6. The northwestern bastion of the Fortress of Kuzupınarı.

Fig. 7. The northern area of the fortress of Kuzupınarı.

fig. 8. Pottery finds from Kuzupınarı.

Fig. 9. Plan of the western tower of Bellitepe.

- Fig. 10. Aerial photo of the western tower of Bellitepe.
Fig. 11. The western tower of Bellitepe. View from the east.
Fig. 12. The west wall of the western tower of Bellitepe.
Fig. 13. The entrance of the western tower of Bellitepe.
Fig. 14. The entrance corridor of the western tower of Bellitepe.
Fig. 15. The west facade of the western tower of Bellitepe.
Fig. 16. Plan of the eastern tower of Bellitepe.
Fig. 17. Aerial photo of the eastern tower of Bellitepe.
Fig. 18. The eastern tower of Bellitepe. View from the north.
Fig. 19. The church of Bellitepe. View from the northeast.
Fig. 20. The höyük site in Dedeşen. View from the north.
Fig. 21. The fortification wall of the höyük site in Dedeşen.
Fig. 22. Aerial photo of the church in Dedeşen.
Fig. 23. The cemetery of the höyük site in Dedeşen.
Fig. 24. A Panaromic view of the lowland from the fortress of Kuzupınarı.

The processes taking place in the USA and Republic of Georgia (October-March, 1990-1991)

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Abstract

The represented work aims to determine the character of attitude of the USA Government and official circles towards the authorities of newly declared Republic of Georgia. The countries of the Western World which recognized the USSR, avoided settling the relations with newly declared former Soviet Republics and especially Georgia among others.

Despite this fact the leader state of the West – the USA tried to show their interest in indirect ways towards the national and democratic processes taking place in Georgia. The USA Government greeted the multi-partial elections which brought the communist era to the end.

The so called “parallel tactics” announced by the USA was an important initiative in that period of time. It was an important fact that on the day when Referendum was taking place in Georgia the results of which showed that great majority of the population voted for the Independence, ex-president Richard Nixon visited Tbilisi. In its turn, the new government of Georgia was trying to express their support to the USA and other democratic countries of the world in their actions against Iraq.

Key words: *democracy, independence, west, USA, USSR*

As a result of the multi-party elections carried out in Georgia, October 28, 1990, the communist party dictatorship came to its end. The new national government declared Georgia Independent Republic of Georgia. The administration of Zviad Gamsakhurdia was trying to set diplomatic interrelations with the United States of America. Our work aims to research the facts and the character of those diplomatic ties in the period between the end of the year 1990 and March 1991. This episode of the Georgian history has never been specially studied in the Georgian historiography. There are some important works on the Georgian history in which the authors touch this question but the mentioned period is only briefly observed, such as: Ucha Bluashvili (“The political history of Georgia 1987-2003”; the publishing house “Universali”; Tbilisi, 2015); Steven Jones (“Georgia – Political History after announcing independence”; the centre of social sciences; Tbilisi, 2012); Dimitri Shvelidze (“Political infighting and overthrowing of the Government in Georgia in 1987-1992”; the publishing house “Universali”; Tbilisi, 2008).

The new government of Georgia was trying to express their attitude, as the State, towards the most important historical events all over the world. In those days the main events of such kind were unfolding in the Middle East. The Government of the Republic of Georgia rightly thought that in this way Georgia could announce its political course and orientation in general, thus preparing the ground for political ties with the Western world.

In August 1990, Kuwait underwent occupation and annexation by Iraq military forces. The head of the Kuwait government, Sheikh Jabar escaped to Saudi Arabia. The marionette government of Hussein Ali came to power and Kuwait was announced the Republic. Soon it was annexed by Iraq and announced its 19th province.

The Western Powers sharply reacted to the Iraq ambitions. The Security Council of the United Nations adopted the resolution and appealed to Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. The USA, France and Great Britain froze Iraq’s financial assets. George Bush (senior) made a decision to send his troops to the Middle East. The situation of being at the wedge of the full scale war emerged in the Middle East. In such circumstances, the new government of Georgia decided to declare their position. On

December 10, 1990, the Address was sent “to the UN, to the parliaments of the States worldwide, and to other international organizations” on behalf of the media centre of the Supreme Council of Georgia. In this address Georgia univocally blamed Kuwait’s occupation by Iraq and declared solidarity to the “oppressed small nation.” In the Address, Georgian government tried to underline similarities in the situations of Kuwait and Georgia. It was pointed in the document that the only difference between these two countries laid in the fact that Kuwait had undergone occupation only some four months earlier and Georgia had been occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union during 70 years up to then and it was under the real threat of losing its territories even at that time. In the end, this declaration expressed great hope that “the whole civilized world” would support “all nations being under similar circumstances as Kuwait, due to the historical injustices of the Last Empire.” Surely, the Soviet Union was meant in the term “last empire,” but this was not announced due to the diplomatic ethics.(1).

This document was notable. The government of Georgia tried to start foreign policy as an independent political body. Simultaneously, the new government assumed that it sees its positions alongside with the Western countries, first of all, the USA. There existed also the third factor – Georgian government did not oppose the Soviet Union either. The Soviet Union also blamed occupation of Kuwait and Iraq’s aggression. Thus, that was the international context at that time.

Generally, Zviad Gamsakhurdia supposed that if the conflict took place in the Middle East it would initiate rapprochement process between the USSR and the Western Powers. This could result in forcing the Soviet Union central government to weaken suppress on the former republics, namely on Georgia. Besides all, this could become possible because of imminent rapprochement of the positions between the USA and the Soviet Union as a result of the mentioned conflict. The two powers could really find common interests: disarmament, stopping nuclear weapon racing and other global issues. Such problems needed shared interests and decisions of the Great Powers of the World. The new leader of Georgia was right in the general setting of the issue and in viewing the way of its solving.

It is well-known that the United Nations adopted the resolution №678. This resolution obliged Iraq to withdraw the troops from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein’s administration did not abide the resolution. On January 17, 1991 the coalition forces of the USA and its allies invaded Kuwait aiming to expel Iraq troops from the territory. They started military actions to free this country. Military troops of about 40 countries participated in the military operation. Some countries participated in the actions only symbolically, for

example, Denmark and Greece were represented only with one frigate each but such symbolic participation underlined the fact that many countries from all over the world united and countered against invasion of a small country by a large and strong country. In such situation the national government of Georgia expressed solidarity to the USA, its allies and “the whole world society”. On January 17, 1991 the Foreign Ministry of Georgia circulated an address deploring that Iraq government did not implement the resolution of the United Nations and “the whole world’s society now has nothing to do but to use force and on this ground, the republic of Georgia, its Foreign Ministry “fully supports the military actions of the allied forces in Persian Gulf.”

The address highlighted the fact that military actions were used to restore justice. Those actions were directed against “trampling the legitimate rights of people” and thus, they stood with “the interests of all the civilized nations, whole international society struggling to establish new world order.” Thus, Georgia clearly and univocally announced its position in line with the “world community”.

This address was sent to the Secretary General of the UN Peres de Cuellar; to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; to the embassies of the USA, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, France, Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Consulate of Israel. The leader state of the Western world, the USA had earlier responded to the multi-party elections in Georgia on a expedited basis, expressing their attitude to this event. Their position sounded through the radio station “The Voice of America.” The editor’s letter was titled „The American Government’s View of Georgia”. This all happened in November 10, 1990.

The USA greeted the elections in Georgia, which were the first multi-party elections in the country after 1920-ies. The US Government especially supported the statement of Zviad Gamsakhurdia about the two-year transition period after which Georgia would be able to withdraw from the Soviet Union. American Government especially underlined the thesis about “peaceful withdrawal of the former Soviet Republics through peaceful dialogue and democratic processes.” The State Secretary James baker hoped that the processes taking place in the Soviet Union, leading to the changes of the “political system and economic decentralization could overcome possible chaos and collapse.” Despite the fact that in Georgia the official position of the American government could seem as muted response it had to be taken into consideration by the new Georgian government. Georgian media, namely newspaper “The opinion” wrote that the elections took place in the Soviet Georgia and this was a progress on “the way to democratization of the processes in the Soviet Union.” The US government greeted Georgia’s striving to independence but they noted that this was only the wish and the goal of the party which won the elections – “the

Round Table”. Thus, the American government sent messages in two directions: on one hand they called upon the central government to avoid chaos and on the other they advised the Soviet republics not to hurry yet, thus the position of Georgia which declared the two year transition period suited the American scenario.(2)

As we have noted above, the leaders of the Western Powers did not make any comment about new government having come to Georgia or maybe, they refrained from doing so in order not to irritate Moscow. But it is hard to imagine that they did not ever give any assessment to the processes. During the briefing held on December 14, 1990, the official representative of the State Department of the USA, M. Tathwhyler was asked by a correspondent about annulment of the autonomic region status for South Ossetia, the Department representative, according the media (“Republic of Georgia”), answered: “our position used to be that we recognized integrity of the USSR within the borders designated in 1917, or maybe in 1922 or 1927 – I don’t remember it now, but our position is that we recognize their sovereign territorial integrity...” The mentioned newspaper incorrectly commented on this position and criticized the representative of the State Department for not knowing that the USA recognized the Soviet Union only in 1933. „We suppose it is a pity that Washington’s position is not to express their official position towards the processes taking place in the Republics of the Soviet Union, in such form that could somehow cast and weaken President Gorbachov’s position.”(7).

Unfortunately, such was the reality. Anyway, the State Department of the US fixed the position of the government and sent a message to the new government of Georgia that as far as the US recognized territorial integrity of the USSR, they would not interfere the inner affairs, would not support Georgia’s strive to reach full independence from Moscow. It was interesting what would be the answer from Georgia’s government and what policy would they choose towards the political course of the US. Would their course remain the same as it was when the political association “Round Table-Free Georgia” began their political way participating in the elections? Their ideological platform implied not to interfere and not to be the point of crossing their interests. At that moment, the new government of Georgia was adequately estimating the interrelations with the West. In December 1990, Zviad Gamsakhurdia announced the political view of the Government and himself: there is the discussion going on in the Western world about the position towards the Soviet republics, first of all, this can be said in relation with the leader country of the West – the USA. The opposition of that country blames their president for taking the side of the “oppressor” – the government of the USSR. That was the position of moral character but as for the official position of the USA, it was pragmatic. From the

above mentioned, Gamsakhurdia concluded: “if that moment of moral position which dominated in the times of President Ronald Reagan, wins in the politics of the USA and the Western World, then it would become possible that the balance weigh down in our benefit; for the time now there is no sign of it.”(5).

The USA position to Georgia and other Soviet republics was distinct. At that time other republics could not even about direct official relations with the US. The perspective was unreal. But nevertheless some weak countries had to begin those relations. And Georgia made its first steps. In the second half of the February of the year 1991, official delegation of Georgia visited United States of America. The members of the delegation were: the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia Akaki Asatiani, the head of the Parliament’s commission of foreign affairs Tedo Paatashvili, his deputy Merab Uridia and academician Tamaz Gamkrelidze. The officials of the US government did not meet the delegation at the airport. Thus this visit could not be assumed as official, though the members of the delegation all were high rank officials. Only the members of the Georgian society and jewish society of Georgian origin met them at the airport. But as the head of the delegation, Akaki Asatiani said, the visit aimed to settle friendship contacts and he hoped that this could be achieved on higher level. Similar declaration was made by Tedo Paatashvili adding that it was desirable to set the ties in the sphere of economics too as far as it was possible.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia was not so optimistic. With his team, he accessed the situation adequately. During the press-conference, when a representative of one of the information agencies, Vakhtang Bakhtadze asked him what results he expected from the visit, Gamsakhurdia answered that they had not received any important information so far. “Our delegation may have an audience with the vice president Dan Quayle but we are not sure about it. The situation is precarious because of the Iraq war.” (9).

Despite such situation the delegation continued their visit. They wanted to know what steps the US government was going to take for supporting Georgia and when it could be possible. During the press-conference in Georgia, held on March 9, Gamsakhurdia was asked about the results of delegation which was still in the US. Gamsakhurdia answered that the delegation had not met the representatives of the White house yet, but they met the representatives of the congress, had a meeting with the president Reagan, other officials. “They all are friendly to us and as for official declaration of support, this has not been declared yet even to the Baltic States” – replied Gamsakhurdia. He supposed it was possible that a delegation of American congressmen and other officials could visit Georgia.

On March 16 the President summed the visit up though the delegation did not get any clear answer from the first rank officials of the US government. Finally, the work of the delegation was summed up as the first step on the way towards closer relations with America. The visit cannot be called futile. First time contacts were settled on the way to closer ties between Georgian government and Senate and Congress of the USA. It was important. One more important step was made by the US government not namely towards Georgia support but generally to relations with all the Soviet republics. This step was noted by the Georgian delegation and they mentioned it as they returned to the country. This importance was expressed in the decision of the US government to settle “parallel interrelations” which implied establishing cooperative relations with the Centre and with the republics as well. This was an important fact. Despite the careful position of the US government towards the so called disobedient republics, they still expressed their loyalty though in a composed manner. In the middle of March, when visiting the Soviet Union, the State Secretary James Baker met with the representatives of the Soviet republics in Moscow, in the US embassy. John Methlock, the ambassador, hosted this meeting. Among other representatives, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the country attended the meeting.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia delivered a ten-minute speech in which he mentioned that there were no reforms at all carried out in the USSR, and instead, turning back to totalitarianism was expected which was clear when observing the repressions taken against the rebelled republics. The Centre in Moscow was trying to create a new federation of the States which would again be subjugated to Moscow and called “federation of the Sovereign States”. Gamsakhurdia underlined that the position of the West was the most important – as the Western Powers did not believe the claims of Saddam Hussein about forming Kuwait as an independent state, just the same approach would be used to Gorbachov’s claims about formation the new independent states which soon would unite in the so called “Federation of the Sovereign States.”

Thus the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia accented the designation of the USA which was expected: “to help to free the subjugated countries and to aid to their freedom just as the USA helped to free Kuwait.” Gamsakhurdia explained plainly and clearly what should have been the role of the US and other Western Powers towards the Soviet Union. Gamsakhurdia noted, among other things, that in the same hall, on May 29 of 1988, he met President Reagan at the meeting of the similar character and he then heard there the guarantees that “sooner or later, the nations, annexed by the Soviet Union will become free and the USA’s role in this historical event will be great.”

The media reported that James Baker listened to the speech of Gamsakhurdia “silently and did not make any controversial remark.” That could only mean that he principally agreed with Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s arguments but the reality demanded from him to be diplomatically flexible and to take into consideration that the Soviet Union still existed at that time. The State Secretary did not say a word about this but he diplomatically noted that still and all the reforms had already taken place in the USSR otherwise such meeting could never take place. Besides, the Secretary of State asked a question to Zviad Gamsakhurdia, through which he gave a cue that the processes would go on in direction of democratization of the Soviet Union. For example, it could be really a great reform if they could reach consent on exploring and developing the law of quitting the Soviet Union by the republics. Zviad Gamsakhurdia and other participants of the meeting agreed to this scenario. Thus the Secretary of State hinted that the USA could not act in the same way against the Soviet Union as they acted in the case of Kuwait, starting the war against Iraq.

It should be noted that there was a short personal talk between Baker and Gamsakhurdia after the official meeting. The newspaper “Republic of Georgia” (March 19, 1990) wrote that the Secretary of State expressed his great interest to Georgia: “I am fascinated by Georgia, though I have never been to your country: - said he. Surely, this meeting and short talk between Gamsakhurdia and Baker represented the most important episode in the American-Georgian relations, taking into consideration the circumstances of those times. Georgian government could make useful conclusions. It was obvious out of James Baker’s talk that the USA will not support the Soviet republics in their open struggle, except the Baltic States. At that time it was how the international conjuncture stood.

Nevertheless, the important progress was obvious. In the same period, during Baker’s visit in Moscow, the “parallel approach” tactics was developed towards the Soviet Republics. It was decided to study the situation in Georgia and observe the referendum process. Senator Robert Dowly and Congressman Dana Rohrabacher initiated this course. They introduced draft project to the congress. This draft implied financial support to those republics of the USSR and Yugoslavia which were on the way to implement the democratic reforms.

Some time passed and as the referendum on the independence of Georgia (31 March, 1991) was approaching, attention from the West towards the country increased. From this viewpoint, the visit of the US former president Richard Nixon held on 30-31 March, was an especially important episode for the Georgian-American relations. This visit was not official but it confirmed increasing interest of the West towards the processes taking place

in Georgia. The visit implied that America supported the position of Georgia implied in this referendum. When meeting with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, President Richard Nixon noted that he arrived under the instruction of the President George Bush.

Other Western Powers also got interested in Georgia's referendum of the 31 of March. Some days earlier to it the Sweden Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Carl Otto Erjan Berner and his wife arrived to Georgia.(3)

The date of the visit and the situation showed that Sweden tried to support the processes taking place in Georgia. Moscow could not interfere in these processes and in referendum particularly. It was impossible to interdict in the voyage of the Sweden Ambassador as he and his wife were travelling within still the Soviet territory, to one of "its republics". But it was clear that Sweden sympathized to the "disobedient" republic and to the process of disintegration of the USSR.

The press conference on the results of the referendum about restoring the independence of Georgia was held on April 1, in the hotel "Metekhi," in Tbilisi. At this press conference the deputy head of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia Akaki Asatiani, head of the election commission Archil Chirakadze and his deputy Vakhtang Khmaladze met mass media representatives from almost all over the world including Georgia itself and the USSR.

Akaki Asatiani held a speech. He noted that Georgia made an important step towards its independence and if any military intervention did not take place nothing would be able to interrupt people's will. Asatiani cited President Richard Nixon who was in Tbilisi on the referendum day: "They can occupy your land but they cannot tame your spirit. I hope, I will live till I come Georgia again and to see it as free and independent country."(8).

Citing those words Asatiani in such way showed opposition between the the strongest country of the Western democracy and metropolitan Soviet Union.

The foreign mass media published first news about the independence referendum in Georgia. According the television company ABC 3 million people participated in the referendum and 80% of them voted for the independence. Washington Post announced the same number. The ABC emphasized that the referendum did not refer only to being independent but it also implied stopping the system under leadership of the communist party. French television commented that it was clear even earlier that most of the participants in referendum would vote for independence and quitting the Soviet Union.(10).

Observers were invited to attend the 31 March referendum from the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, from the cities Moscow and Leningrad. As confirmation of their solidarity and support, the deputy to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia and its Human Rights League President, Ants Pine, also the Belgian professor and lawyer Andre Serve planted silver spruce trees in the garden of the Tbilisi youth palace garden.

During the same days, the Head of the Supreme Council of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia met with the British Ambassador Bright. It was an unofficial meeting. Gamsakhurdia represented the provisional results of the referendum. He told that support of the Great Britain was especially important for Georgia. On his part, the guest noted that it was the position of his country to support all the people in the world in their struggle for freedom and independence within the norms of the international justice. The ambassador underlined also the fact that all the Western World is somehow misinformed about the processes taking place in Georgia. It was necessary to break information blockade discussing this problem on the governmental level. As we noted earlier, in the historiography preface of our work, we do not deal in details with the relations between Georgia and the Soviet Union of that time. We consider that relations with Russia which then still represented a true metropolia, played the most decisive role for Georgia. That's why we always underlined the need to study Russia-Georgian relations as a separate issue and we deliberately avoided discussing the relations with Russia and decided to make relations with other foreign countries. Almost nobody has so far addressed in any monograph study to this issue.

But such situation did not exclude concerning occasional ties between Georgia and the Soviet Union (then with Russia), in our research work, as a topical question. The Soviet Union showed special irritation signs when Georgia was attempting to communicate with influential Western Powers and have economical and political ties with them. One of such attempts took place when the delegation of the Georgian Government visited Italy. This visit was not covered by press. The interesting fact was that members of the Georgian delegation got some intoxication and besides that, some unidentified individuals damaged one of the cars of the delegation. Zviad Gamsakhurdia commented on this fact. He reserved judgment about the fault of the USSR for no availability of facts but he said that Moscow propagandistic machine daily spread false information about Georgia in western countries and Soviet secret agents impeded all attempts from Georgian side to establish contacts with the western world.(6).

All visits which were conducted by the new government of Georgia during November-December of 1990 and at the beginning of 1991, bear more or less importance and aimed

to have closer ties with West, that could of course, bring the results. We will consider and assess those visits in the future but among them there were some which at this time we can only consider as strange exception. On December 6, 1990 the Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Republic of Mali to the Soviet Union, Abdulai Amadu Si with ambadress, Madam Kh. D. Si. It was a short visit and the guests returned to Moscow on the next day. There was a talk between Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ambassador the content of which was not discussed in the press, there are not any archive documents about it either. Maybe this was not of any importance. It can be concluded that the visit was planned earlier and implied visit in Georgia as one of the Soviet republics. Though the visit was held at the time when Georgia was striving to full independence, it cannot be considered as an episode of the official interrelations between Georgia and Republic of Mali.(4).

We conclude at the end of our research work that the national government headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia was trying to set diplomatic ties with the United States of America. Georgian government underlined its wish in some official documents related with the international activities of the USA (such as the military operations in Kuwait and others). In its turn, the American Government which at that time still recognized the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union restrained from the open diplomatic interrelations with Georgia. They were trying to express their interest and support to the Republic of Georgia in unofficial, informal ways.

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Foreign policy and orientation of the administration of independent Georgia (April-August 1991)

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Abstract

This article examines the foreign policy orientation of the Independent Georgian government in April-August 1991. It analyses the relations Georgia had on international arena in that period. Georgia apparently had the most intensive relations with the existing and the former Republics of the USSR. It is worth mentioning that the best and most intensive were the relations with the Baltic Republics. The contacts with neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan were also comparatively close. Georgia signed some treaties of political and economical character with them.

The interrelations mutual solidarity were continued with the East European countries of so called “Socialist countries” which had already become the independent countries (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and others). Those countries could not at that time recognize Georgia’s independence but they tried as far as was possible, to express moral support; the economical-cultural relations were accented to develop.

The National Government of the independent Georgia aimed to have interrelations with other countries of the world as well, which was difficult to realize because of the serious obstacles. The fact that Georgia’s independence was not recognized at that time represented the main barrier for the relations. The countries of the Western democracies avoided such official ties and the relations were limited to the humanitarian sphere.

Despite this fact, the tendency of growing interest towards Georgia was obvious. Till the August 1991, Georgia’s new government also tries also to fix pro-western orientation. But the processes could not develop in positive way. The international political attitude to the former Soviet republic which had announced their independence, unfortunately changed in unfavorable way. Georgia appeared to be in political isolation. That was conditioned by the demands of the so called mainstream policy and global interests of the USA and USSR. The

interests of Georgia were temporarily sacrificed to agreement between the Soviet Union and the USA on reduction of the strategic armament.

It was also a mistake made by the Georgian Government which took a hard-line position towards the USA administration thus aiding to the process of international isolation of Georgia.

Key words: *Foreign Policy, Independence, relationships, Soviet Union, Georgia, West, Referendum, Isolation.*

After announcing the Independence of Georgia, the recognition and acknowledgement of the country by the foreign countries became the main objective of the Georgian Government. Our research work is aiming to study the activities of Zviad Gamsakhurdia Government during April-August in 1991, in order to reach this aim; our goal also is to find out which ties were established or which ones could not be reached to establish; what subjective and objective causes played role in blocking the full size interrelations of Georgia with other countries in the given period.

This episode of the Georgian history has never been specially studied in the Georgian historiography. There are some important works on the Georgian history in which the authors touch this question but the mentioned period is only briefly observed, such as: Ucha Bluashvili (“The political history of Georgia 1987-2003”; the publishing house “Universali”; Tbilisi, 2015); Steven Jones (“Georgia – Political History after announcing independence”; the centre of social sciences; Tbilisi, 2012); Dimitri Shvelidze (“Political infighting and overthrowing of the Government in Georgia in 1987-1992”; the publishing house “Universali”; Tbilisi, 2008).

On March 31, 1991 the referendum on Independence conducted and Georgia declared an independent country, the international relations of Georgia continued to be the same way as they were in the previous months. The foreign countries showed vivid interest to Georgia, though such tendency was hindered by the fact of existence of the Soviet Union.

One of the first document in which Z. Gamsakhurdia spelled out his views on the issues of the foreign policy as a program, was his political platform for elections, as of the presidential candidate. Naturally, the first and the most serious goal was recognition of

Georgia as independent country. According the “Program,” this task included three paragraphs implying three goals:

1. Georgia to be recognized as independent country and consequently, its status as a sovereign state restored; 2. Restore and broaden Georgia’s diplomatic and consular relations with the foreign countries; 3. Georgia becoming the member state of the United Nations Organization and other international organizations playing full role in their activities. The special attention in the “Program” was paid to the necessity of establishing the economical ties with the European countries first of all. Though such possibilities were limited, the permanent missions of the Chamber of trade of Georgia in Austria, Morocco, Turkey, Israel, and USA were doing this work.

Hope was expressed in this document about the possibility that the visits of the Georgian government representatives to the USA, France, Austria, Italy, Turkey and Spain could make the “preparatory phase” which would be followed by establishing the Georgian diplomatic missions in the countries and establishing the centers of those countries in Georgia.

Inclusion in the international projects and establishing ties with several foreign countries aimed to break international isolation. In June 1991 the President of Georgia sent the address to the Heads of the countries interested in solving the problems of the Black Sea. Georgian president offered them cooperation and besides, his own initiative, concerning establishing a special intergovernmental protective organization working on the problems of the Black Sea ecology. The former soviet republic offered the interested countries respective conditions for work on this problem, taking an active role in settling the headquarters of the organization in Georgia. This was very interesting and useful offer which supposedly could awake real interest among the interested counties.

Georgian government showed increased interest in foreign politics. They were trying to get the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs more intensive and productive. In August 1991 the club of the specialists of the international relations was established at the Foreign Ministry. It was not a non-governmental organization; it was an official organization on a cost accounting basis, with the legal body status. The experts of the field would serve the Foreign Ministry and fulfill the advisor functions. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia would be supplied by appropriate information, competent analysis and recommendations.

Naturally, the large-scale international forums were closed for non-recognized independent State, but there were some small exceptions. June 21-23, 1991, in the town Crans- Montana the International inter-government forum was held with participation of the government representatives of the European countries and the USSR. This forum was interesting because of the fact that government members of some “disobedient” countries, among them Georgia,

were also invited. The head of the government and the foreign minister of Georgia attended the forum.

The visit of the governmental delegation of Georgia to Strasburg, by invitation of the European Parliament, was the most important event at that time. The delegation was headed by the Prime Minister of Georgia, Tengiz Sigua. Within the visit frames, the delegation was hosted by the President of the European Parliament Enrique Baron Crespo. He and other high ranking officials got familiar with the social-political situation in Georgia and the Europeans got good impressions from the talk. They expressed the will to support and assist. The most important was that in the situation where the press and other means of information of the USSR, spread false information about Georgia and the European politicians expressed their will to come to Georgia and get familiar with the situation.(5)

In the period of April-august 1991, friendly relationships were established between Georgia and some countries on different levels. Turkey showed special interest to its neighbor country. On May 2, 1991, the representatives of Turkey and Georgia had a meeting in Moscow. The parties were introduced to each other by the counselor of the Turkish ambassador in the Soviet Union, Halil Akinji and the counselor of the Georgian ministry of foreign affairs Victor Chikaidze. The meeting was held at the Turkish embassy as the meeting was initiated by Turkey. Diverse subject were discussed at the meeting. As Moscow was spreading false information about Georgia, Turkish representatives expressed the wish to have the information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia directly to Ankara, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Turkish representatives showed desire also for Georgia somehow to participate in the activities of the Black Sea Economic Union. The Turkish advisor expressed his deep concern for the unstable situation in Georgia that interfered in the process of Georgia's recognition. The advisor meant hard situations in Abkhazia and Shida Kartli region (so called South Ossetia). Turkish representative was anxious about the fact that according the information available for him, Georgian tourists coming to Turkey often appeal to the population of Georgian origin to unite with the historical homeland. He mentioned also that on some map printed in Georgia the part of the Turkish territory was marked as part of Georgia, and so on. The issues of the so called Turkish Meskhetians and the perspective of returning those people to Georgia were also discussed at this meeting. It could be concluded from this meeting that the Turkish representatives tried to set preconditions for normalized relations between Turkey and Georgia. Generally speaking, the aim of this meeting was to prepare another, larger meeting - the visit of the Turkish ambassador to Georgia. The ambassador expressed the wish to settle direct contacts with Georgia.(3)

Two weeks later, on May 15-16 the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Turkey to the USSR, Volkan Vural met with all the high rank officials of Georgia. Unfortunately, there is no information reserved in the archive documents about that visit. Supposedly, the talks mainly dealt with economical-cultural relations and the issues mentioned above.

Besides that, the parties concerned the possibility of opening Georgian Consulate in Turkey.(9)

The relations with Turkey, as the neighbor country became more intensive. On May 24, the Head of the government of Georgia, Tengiz Sigua met with the delegation from Turkey, city of Artvin. The head of the delegation, the Governor of the city, Aslan Eldimir was Georgian by origin. The members of the delegation were the representatives of the business sphere. The talks were going about tourism development, road building along the Black Sea cost, mutual export and import capabilities and others.

Germany was among those countries which refrained from having the direct ties with “disobedient” republics, especially with Georgia, though there were some individual instances of the economical relations which continued even after Georgia had gained the independence. For example, in April of that year, Guttman – the head of one of the German agricultural firms, paid his visit and had negotiations with high rank officials on agricultural and stock-raising issues. Namely in the sphere of technologies these issues implied providing population with the agricultural products. The negotiations had serious results. The agreement involved the visit of the Georgian ministers of the corresponding branches to Germany and meetings with German colleagues, on order to sign the agreements.

The visit of the Canadian delegation was similar to the German one. This delegation was headed by Horst Schmidt, the minister of tourism and foreign trade of the Alberta state of Canada. The negotiations concerned the perspectives of tourism development in Georgia; for this aim, Canadians suggested their help in preparing proper material-technical base, modern communications, and also modern technologies to provide help in producing oil.

Some more countries can be named which had some relations with non-recognized republic of Georgia. At the end of June 1991, the trade mission of Georgia was opened in Tel-Aviv. The presentation took place in the hotel “Charlton.” The head of the trade and business chamber of Georgia, Guram Akhvlediani and other members of delegation participated in this presentation. Director General of the federation of trade and industry chambers of Israel, Tsvi Amir attended the meeting. Establishing such structure aimed to settle and further develop the direct trade and economical relations between Georgia and Israel. Here could also be noted that previously to that fact, Georgia had opened the similar representative office in Morocco

The interest of the Western and generally foreign countries to the processes going on in Georgia was growing whenever some momentous event was taking place. One of such events was the multi-party elections in Georgia, in October 1990; then the referendum on March 31, 1991 and especially – declaration of Georgia’s independence on April 9, 1991. The fact of restoring its independence by Georgia was praised highly by the leader Western country – the USA. The State Department expressed their wish about peaceful and democratic settling of the problems emerged between Russia and Georgia.

It is known that during the period of elections of 1991, ex-president of the USA, Richard Nixon visited Georgia. His visit added more importance to the results of the elections especially at that time, after declaring independence by Georgia and increased the interest to this country. The sitting president of the USA, George Bush-junior met with Richard Nixon. Nixon spoke in details about his visit in the USSR and in Georgia. Then Washington Post published the article by the famous analyst Dmitri Simes. This article showed clearly, that in Nixon's opinion, the processes taking place in the USSR were chaotic. According this article, President Nixon met with "a man of strong will" Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Simes emphasized that the president of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev "again opposed the President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia." President Nixon supposed that "Gamsakhurdia guessed and recognized the wisdom of gradual approach." President Nixon meant the transition period of 2-3 years about which Georgian government had announced and after which independence of the country would become the reality. But that project failed.(10)

As early as before declaring independence, President Gamsakhurdia clearly expressed his view of pro-western orientation, at the press-conference. He sent a telegram to President George Bush, senior. In this telegram he wrote about Russia's aggression in so called South Ossetia. When a correspondent asked him about that telegram, President Gamsakhurdia answered: "We have good news. I have telegraphed Mr. Bush, warning that there were some signs of armed forces intervention in Georgian territory being prepared, as they are rudely interfering in our domestic affairs. And there are signs of reaction to this telegram, judging from the declaration of the State Department. Western world is our only hope. Only democracy can defend us."(7)

Then Gamsakhurdia explained his position more clearly: recognition of the defence of Georgia's independence depended from one hand on Kremlin – would it reconcile with this or not and on the other hand – on support of the West. If the Western countries pay more attention to Georgia as it was done by the State Department of the USA, then "there could be more guarantees for us to get full independence and withdrawal of Russian occupation forces"

After the visit of the President Nixon to Georgia, especially after the referendum of March 31, and declaration of restoration of independence on April 9, growing interest from the USA towards the processes in Georgia became obvious. An example of this was the 94th resolution of the first session of the US Congress adopted on April 9, 1991, i.e. just the same day of declaration of restoring the independence of Georgia.

This is the citation from the resolution text, which reflects the content of the resolution and the existed circumstances: "The resolution is dedicated to the second anniversary of the punitive operation in Georgia, Tbilisi, conducted by the Soviet armed forces units on April 9, 1989 and it demands from the Soviet Union to recognize the will of the Georgian people and confirm the legitimacy of the referendum of March 1991. Mr. Hales delivered the

resolution to the Senate and it was handed to Foreign affairs commission.” Then, on April 24, the full text of the resolution was published in the “Republic of Georgia”:

“We dedicate this resolution to the second anniversary of the punitive operation by the Soviet armed forces in Tbilisi, Georgia, and we demand from the Soviet Union to recognize the will of the Georgian people and confirm the legitimacy of the Referendum held in Georgia on March 31, 1991.

Proceeding from the fact that on April 9, 1989 the soldiers of the Soviet Red Army rudely attacked unarmed and peaceful demonstrate on the Lenin Square (now the Freedom Square) in Tbilisi, they used rockets, also sharpened sapper spades and toxic gas. Twenty people were killed, hundreds injured.

Proceeding from the fact that despite the attempts from the Soviet leaders side to suppress evidences, the world got information and some humanitarian leaders such as Mother Theresa, also the group of West Germany medics specialized on such matters, arrived to Tbilisi to render support to injured people.

Proceeding from the fact that the brutality of the Soviet Army on April 9 in Georgia resulted in changing the political forces balance in Georgia and finally, on October 28, 1990 the communist governing in Georgia ended as the result of the elections.

Proceeding from the fact that Georgia refused to participate in the referendum on March 17, held by the Central Soviet Government and in reply decided to hold referendum in Ggeorgia, on March 31, 1991, in which the 98,9% of the participants voted for restoration of the national independence which once again confirmed that the Georgian nation is one of the oldest, unique and individual nation which has its old history beginning from the era of the Christ’s birth

Proceeding from the fact that today is the day of the second anniversary of the April 9 tragic day in Tbilisi, we conclude that the Senate:

1. Confirms support to Georgian people in reaching their will to restore their national and territorial independence through peaceful demonstrations.
2. Confirms support to the request of Georgian people concerning national self-determination by reference to the final act signed at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which the USSR is also a member.
3. Confirms support to Georgian people’s wish to benefit from the human rights which the God’s gift.
4. Expresses respect to the victims of the people’s demonstration in Tbilisi, on April 9, 1989, as they were the peaceful protestors and died for freedom and independence.
5. And we demand from the Soviet Government to acknowledge the will of the Georgian people and to recognize the legitimacy of the referendum of March 31, 1991 (6)

On May 16, the delegation of the representatives of the political and business circles of the USA arrived to Georgia. During the meeting with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, among other issues, the talk concerned the necessity of opening the mission of Georgia in Washington. The mission would promote rendering objective information about the processes going on in Georgia. It was mentioned that in the nearest future the Institute of Georgia would be open in Washington and would carry the work of the Mission of Georgia. This information was given to the participants of the talks by Merab Uridia. After being elected the President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia spread some reassuring information. One of them concerned his probable meeting with the president of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev. Gamsakhurdia announced at the conference, that on May 20 he received the message from the Government of the USSR in which Gorbachev asked him to arrive to Moscow on May 24, but he failed to turn up in time. Then Gamsakhurdia added that in his opinion there were some forces which interfered in this case because the press centre of Gorbachev then announced that there never was any talk about such meeting

The second information was more interesting. At the press conference the same year, at the end of May, Z. Gamsakhurdia announced that he was in the process of preparing his visit to the USA was being preparing “I am now setting contacts and preparing my meetings with the President Bush, first of all. The date of the meeting will soon settle.”(8)

On the 30th of May, in his interview to the editor of the Turkish newspaper “Turkey,” Bilal Qochak, Zviad Gamsakhurdia repeated his statement about the probable visit to the USA. “Just now the talks about my visit and talk with the President George Bush are going on; so the position of the American administration about our issue will clear. To my mind the attitude of the American congress is very friendly, they often concern our theme. We are waiting for the visit of the American congressmen visit to us soon”

Some short time later more serious step was made towards American-Georgian interrelations. In the middle of June the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of Georgia Giorgi Khoshtaria visited the USA. At his return he said that the only goal for which he visited America was to prepare meeting of President Gamsakhurdia with President Bush. The details of this visit were not talked about but everybody was sure that the visit became real to happen. Such precedent took place later in 1991, when the President of Armenia Ter-Petrosian visited America. On the same days the new President of Russia Boris Eltsin also visited the country, on June 18-21, 1991.

While waiting for the visit to the USA, Zviad Gamsakhurdia sent the letter of congratulation to President Bush, on the Day of Independence. He expressed his hope in the letter that with the support of the United States of America and personally president George Bush, Georgia could reach real Independence.

Factually, the Senate's document confirmed the increased interest towards Georgia and its independence. This very important document was published in American press: "The members of the Senate of America congratulate the people of the republic of Georgia and the Parliament on the occasion that on April 9, 1991, the majority of people voted univocally to their independence from the USSR. We conclude that the copy of the given Resolution will be sent to President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.(4)

At the beginning of July, 1991 there still were some expectations about the visit of the President of Georgia to the USA. There were positive messages again coming from America. In his interview of the July 3, 1998, President Gamsakhurdia said that he received the letter from five senators: Wilson, Mitchell and others, announcing that they recognize the Independence of Georgia. Gamsakhurdia announced that they were waiting for the visit of American delegation with 35 congressmen leading by De Consilar, who was the head of the "Helsinki group" existing at the Congress.

In August the same year, Georgia again was waiting for the governmental delegation to visit the USA and the optimistic views about the relations with this country existed. At the end of July, during the visit of the President Bush to the USSR, President Bush and President Gorbachev signed the agreement about reduction of strategic armament by 30 per cent. Besides that, President Bush agreed with the wish of President Gorbachev about signing the new treaty on alliance by the republics. When in Kiev, President Bush appealed to Ukrainian people to sign the new treaty. This news was received negatively in Georgia but there was no official comment on it.

But from this very moment the relations between the high officials of Georgia and the USA began going worse. The President of America George Bush, senior, in fact categorized the Soviet Republics into two groups. He positively praised the republics which showed respect to the democratic values, protected the rights of the national minorities. President typed those republics, which he thought followed the course of nationalism as the second group. He referred Ukraine, Russia, Armenia and Baltic Republics to the first group. He did not name Georgia as the republic belonging to either of those groups but he alluded that in the second group he meant those republics which were "struggling for independence trying to replace imposed tyranny by local despotism." And supposedly, he meant Georgia here.

Despite the above mentioned, at the beginning of August the issue of the probable visit of Georgia's President to the USA was still actual, as it is seen from the existing official information. At the beginning of August the M of Georgia, Giorgi Khoshtaria met with the press-secretary of the White House, M. Fitzwater. "During our talk the positive attitude towards the future visit of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia to the USA was obvious." This information was spread by the press-office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.

At last, the long talks ended positively. The congressman Dana Rohrabacher arrived to Georgia on August 7. He delivered the official invitation of the Congress to the President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. This surely was very important fact. Of course, if Zviad Gamsakhurdia had received the invitation from the President Bush himself, this invitation would have been of higher level and higher status but at this starting stage, invitation of the president of non-recognized country to the USA was important and revealed America's support to Georgia.

Inviting the president of the "disobedient" country was an open warning to official Moscow. Thus, official Washington made an important step towards supporting Georgia.

This reassuring information was published on August 8. One day later the event took place which gave absolutely opposite direction to the next political events and the foreign policy course of Georgia. The opponents anyway accused President Gamsakhurdia and his administration for not providing pro-western political course properly. Primarily, those accusations were not quite justified but the Government information issued on August 9 was of the different character. In fact, this informative declaration of the Georgian government blamed the political course of the West in general and its leader country, towards the former Soviet Republics, struggling for their independence.

We agree with the view expressed in Georgian historiography which says that till the August of 1991, President Gamsakhurdia did not pursue the policy of isolation. Isolation policy towards Georgia started first from the West. „Isolation of Georgia was conditioned by much more serious international and geopolitical factors, than such minor causes as for example, a political image of President Gamsakhurdia or the anti-West attitudes of some less important people in his Government.”(2)

We share the opinion that the interests of the so-called "disobedient" republics became a victim to the treaty between the USA and USSR on reducing the strategic armament. It was normal, but the government of Georgia expressed their discontent in tough wording and even took the anti-western position in the "governmental declaration". This was a rude mistake of Gamsakhurdia's government even though it was not made by name of the President of Georgia or his administration

The Government of Georgia strongly criticized "position of the Western governmental senior circles, namely, those of the USA" for their supporting position about maintaining the USSR as the united state. „The visit of Mr. George Bush to Moscow and Kiev was above the worst expectations. The President of America – successor of the presidents Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and others, arrives to the Russian Empire and agitates for the all-union treaty, calls for all the former republics to voluntarily put their heads into the loop of the Empire, sign the treaty of slavery and deny their freedom.” “Mr. Bush calls the struggle for Freedom “the evidences of nationalism” – was said further in the governmental declaration – “and this contradicts to the Helsinki Act principles.” The declaration ended

with these words: “We wish the President and Government of the USA supported not tyranny, communism and false reforms, but the true democracy, freedom and independence of all nations. Only this is the way by which America could stay faithful to its historic mission.”(1)

This “declaration of the Georgian Government” cannot be justified and speaking lightly, it was a big mistake. A small republic, struggling its way to independence, opposing the USSR, through that declaration was opposing with its own ally –the Western World and the leader country of this world – the USA. Thus, the government of Georgia put its country in an unfavorable position and that was its dead-end policy which unintentionally caused international isolation of the country.

Concluding from our research work we can say that Zviad Gamsakhurdia Government was trying to obtain new political ties to recognize Georgia as the new Independent Republic. We have searched out that in that period Georgia had interrelations with the countries we can be divided into three groups:

1. Former or existed Soviet Republics.
2. Former Eastern Europe Socialist countries.
3. The states of the West Europe and Commonwealth countries.

The full scale interrelations were established only with the countries of the first group; The absolute majority of the states of the Commonwealth refrained from acknowledging the independence of Georgia and from having the full scale political and diplomatic relations with the country. The relations of Georgia with those countries were only partial, having the economical and cultural character.

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Qaqutsa Cholokashvili's Ties with the North Caucasus (1923, June-November)

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Abstaract

The represented work refers to the armed resistance which took place in August-September 1922, one year after the occupation of Georgian Democratic Republic by the Soviet Russia (1918-1921). The resistance movement took place in Dusheti administrative region and mountainous region of Pshav-Khevsureti. It was led by Georgian Democratic Republic Army cavalry Division 1st company commander, colonel Qaikhosro (Qaqutsa) Cholokashvili who was brought up in Sighnaghi administrative region (now Akhmeta region) village Matani. Beginning from March 12, 1922, with his fellow warriors and friends, who were known by the name “shefitsulebi” – sworn men, or “those who fought under the oath,” was camped in the forest. Unfortunately, the resistance was defeated.

This work deals with the ties between Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and his combatants with the North Caucasus from June 1923 till November 1923, through the comparatively large and full investigation. This issue is thoroughly investigated using the source documents, emigrant literature and new archive documents which were considered from the new viewpoint, critically and objectively.

The main result of the investigation is that when studying and analyzing the resistance movement in Georgia in 1921-1923, which was aimed to restore independence of Georgia, besides the early known documents, large number of the archive materials being unknown and unpublished till our days, have been now investigated, studied and used to analyze the mentioned important period of time in the Georgian historiography. Those materials mainly refer to the ties between the Georgian movement leader Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and the North Caucasus leaders.

In relation with the situation formed nowadays in the North Caucasus, the scientific work has its practical as well as theoretical importance.

Key words: *Qaqutsa Cholokashvili, Ali Mitaev, Atabai Umaev, Aleksander Sul Khanishvili.*

Introduction

Unfortunately, for various reasons, it was not able till nowadays to perform thorough scientific studies of these important historical issue of the modern history of Georgia. The political climate existing for many years in the Soviet Union, it was impossible to carry on real historical scientific researches concerning the important events taking place in the period from 1921 till 1989 in the Soviet Republics. The negative influence of the Soviet ideology was especially sharp upon the comprehension of the modern epoch historical events. This fault mostly influenced the modern history of Georgia. It was taught using one methodology, one standard – Soviet principles of “creating standardized history” of the Soviet Republics really resembled the process of creating false myths. The “fairy tales” were written containing false facts; everything was studied under the dictate of the false ideology called “the only true ideology in the world.” The Soviet historiography was false, it was written on the basis and in the light of the governing communist party ideological theses, the „wise and historically important conclusions and provisions of the Communist Party Central Committee; history was being written according the principles of “socialist realism” –desired conditions were told as reality. All those processes were aimed to show that the social progress in Georgia was led by Bolshevism and by the Soviet power under which the renaissance of Georgia, its history, culture and further development, its historical dreams about better future became the reality. Alongside with this propaganda, everything was strongly based on the immoral foundation for class struggle generalization. Naturally, altogether, the results of such approach were pitiful. Till the modern time, the vast amount of the archive documents were unknown for Soviet researchers. Many of them were classified, tabooed and practically out of reach, so that nobody could reject or doubt “the great deeds of the communist party in Georgia”. The strict classification of the documents was necessary to convince people that communist party was the leader and organizer of the great success of Georgia and the “savior” of the country. The falsification of history, bringing the false data into the scientific works was used to strengthen influence of the communist party, to portrait the deeds of the communist leaders as great

merits to the Country, to attract people's attention and deserve trusting from the large number of population. In such circumstances the researchers of historical events were not able to study the events taking place in Georgia in 1921-1924, to show them as the sanguinary events, the crimes against the nation. The works of the Georgian historians of those times could not escape pressing from the communist government and they were not able to protect their professional ethics. The history researchers of the time tried to avoid not even thorough investigation of the mentioned period and that was the best they could do, but they did not ever speak about those times at all. Otherwise they would be arrested and even murdered for telling the truth about the beginning years of the Soviet power in Georgia. The other did discuss the mentioned period but this was a tendentious interpretation (L. Ghoghoberidze, Georgian emigration and the activities of the anti-soviet parties, Tiflis, 1927; K. Sulakvelidze – who organized the rebellion and how, 1927; P. Lomashvili, From the history of Georgian emigration, Tb. 1965). The mentioned period of time is reflected in the “Outline of Georgian History”, vol. VII in which the issue of struggling for national independence was not discussed fully and appropriately. The most part of the historical studies dedicated to the victory of Soviet power in Georgia aimed to prove that there were subjective and objective preconditions for the victory of the socialist revolution and “popular uprising” took place against the Democratic Republic government (1918-1921). The soviet Georgian historians called the process of resurrection of the national identity as “bourgeois nationalism” and the anti-Bolshevik movement of 1921-1924 including the uprising of August 1924 – as “Menshevik adventure.”

Only after publicity and democratism was restored it became possible to ruin Soviet stereotypes and objective appraisal to the past. After decomposition of the Soviet Union and restoring independence of Georgia (1991) it became possible to discuss the XX century history of Georgia objectively.

Today the interest towards history is globally increasing. Within the conditions of strengthening the democratic principles and national freedom, the importance of right and real understanding and using the history facts are also increased. The political system does not anymore hinder this process, the stereotypes are broken down and every nation can assess its history objectively and fully, basing on the principles of morality. In the given conditions we, the historians of Georgia, are obliged to investigate our history. Our historiography should depict every event - the visible or invisible (inner peripetia of our history, our national identity, cultural and traditions). It is essential that new generations get familiar with the history of their country in its real, unbiased way free of cliché. Many important and interesting works and monographs are published concerning the interesting period of the

Georgian history (1921-1924) (for example: Sh. Vadachkoria - The Notion of the National State in the Georgian political thinking (1921-1923), Tb. 1999; L. Toidze- Political History of Georgia (1921-1923); Tb. 1999); R. Kverenchkhiladze - Way of Torture, Execution, Exiling, Persecution. (Book 1, Tb. 1999); N. Kirtadze – Armed Uprising in Georgia, 1924, (Kutaisi 1996); N. Kirtadze -the Europe and Independent Georgia (1919-1923), Tb. 1997; G. Tskhovrebadze - Georgian Political Emigration and the Issue of Independence of Georgia in 1921-1925, Tb. 1996) and others...

After the independence of Georgia had been restored the interest towards the newest history of Georgia grew up. This was conditioned by two factors. 1. Having discarded communist ideological clichés made it possible to have objective knowledge about past; 2. In the recent years several classified documents saved in the archives and other material of the Soviet era became available. Memoirs of Georgian emigrants, scientific works of the emigrant Georgian historians and the periodicals (Georgian emigrant press is relatively free from the censorship influence) which gave a possibility to think in the other way and regard our real history, to break down the Soviet stereotypes, to view the historical events in different way. Today the worldview principles are radically different, the historical research methodology and methodology have changed during the years of the communist ideology, social and class affiliations and alongside with this, all the facts were changed and shown only in the light of the communist ideology. Everything was assessed only from the Soviet historiography positions. Nowadays the national ideology dominates and the leading position is held by national ideology. In historiography national and general humanitarian principles dominate. The scientific criteria are not dictated by the interests of leading class but only by general humanistic morality principles, for which the dominant meaning goes not to one or another class and its governing position, but to national interests.

Analyzing the events of 1921-1924 on the basis of the works, articles and memories, searching through the Soviet historiography, European scientists and Georgian emigrants, we found ourselves against a complex dilemma. Here the decisive word about this matter is to the today's generation of the researchers who are free of any kind of censorship influences and human prejudices. This generation can reach the deep and scientifically based results of the analysis.

The initial sources for such investigations are the works of the historians about the Soviet period in Georgia. Special interest should be paid to the documents from the archives of the State Security Committee former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (in Russian abbreviation *КГБ*), studied and published by professor Nestan Kirtadze ("Where is your brother, Cain?...") (Bloodstained pages of the Georgian history (1921-1930); Tb. 1998).

The novelty and the first sources for the represented paper are the following archive documents (labeled as “**secret**,” “**top secret**” and “**for perpetual storage**”): from the archives of the Ministry of the internal affairs of the Georgian Soviet-Socialist Republic; the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Georgian Soviet-Socialist Republic (Archives of the Party); the archives of the former People’s Commissariat of the Internal Affairs (then Ministry of the Internal Affairs) of Georgian Soviet-Socialist Republic; and) the archives of the former Extraordinary Commission of Georgia(Russian abbreviation “**ЧК**“-„**Чрезвычайная Комиссия**“), then the archives of the State Committee of the National Security of Georgia (Georgian abbrev. *საგ* - Russian - *КГБ*), so called “security archives.”

There is also one more first source’ it is very important material from the central state archives of the modern history of Georgia: the archives of the former people’s commissariat (then the ministry of the internal affairs) of Georgia and the former “Extraordinary commission” of Georgia (all labeled as “**secret**,” “**top secret**” and “**for perpetual storage**”); fund #285 (correspondence between people’s Commissariat “ and “the Extraordinary Commission of Georgia(Russian „**ЧК**“-„**Чрезвычайная Комиссия**“) on combating banditry”: “On combating Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and others whose activities are observed in Telavi, Borchalo and other regions of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia”: direct call between the head of the “Extraordinary commission”, Kvantaliani and the head of the Department of combating banditry, Khumarov from one side, and the head of the same department in Telavi, Mchedlidze, on other side; August 3, 1923; time 5. 00 in the evening”; also other documents such as: „a post telegram **absolutely secret**; Tbilisi, from the “Extraordinary Commission” of Trans-Caucasus to the department of combating banditry; a copy of this sent to Caucasian special army intelligence service and another copy to the People’s Commissariat of the internal affairs, personally from the extraordinary commission on “combating banditry”: a)operative intelligence survey on May 14 and 15, 1923, #77, about the bandit groups , on 15 may, about 16 o’clock. b) Operative intelligence survey on 6 and 7 of September 1923 #132, about 16. 00, 7th of September; c) operative intelligence survey on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 1923, # 137; and on September 21, at 16, 00. 3. „Post telegram, top secret,Tbilisi, the Transcaucasus Extraordinary Commission, the combating banditry department, a copy to the Extraordinary Army Intelligence Department and another copy to the Caucasus Army Intelligence People’s Commissariat, from the combating banditry department of the Georgian Extraordinary Commission; from the 2nd Division of the Counter-Intelligence Department of the Extraordinary Commission. Operational Intelligence Survey #142 (exceptional), on the bands activities, 25 October, 1923) and Fund #600 (The Council of

the People's Commissars (Council of ministers of the Georgian SSR), the years 1922 - 1995. „Records of Investigations, 1923, 3 May, Telavi).

The memoirs about “sworn brothers” and their struggle, by the former combatant of Qaikhosro (Gaqutsa) Cholokashvili, Alexander Sulkhaniashvili, a representative of the Georgian emigration abroad, are considered the prime sources for the given issue. (Sulkhaniashvili A.I., My Memories, San-Francisco, USA, 1981).

Research Methods and Discussion

To study the presented issue the modern research methodology was used: comparative-historical, analytical and synthetical methods. Great number of the new documents were put forth to the scientific investigation; such as published or unpublished documents, memoirs, which belong to the primary sources. All those documents were critically studied and analyzed using new methodology. The political and social-economical environment of second half of the XIX century and first twenties of the XX century, create subjective and objective preconditions for deconstruction of the Russian Empire. This brought national freedom to the people who were under the Russian power. Those circumstances promoted Georgia's independence and forming Georgian Democratic Republic which existed during 1918-1921.

Announcing the independence of Georgia on May 26, 1918 and forming the Democratic Republic had epochal importance in the History of Georgian nation. This act of history realized the supreme goal of Georgian national movement - reconstruction of the statehood of Georgia after 117 years of being Russian colony.

Being an independent country for only 3 years – it is really a very short time for the country's history, but in the history of Georgia's existence as a country and its struggle for independence, the years 1918-1921 were called “a short golden era” not only politically but as a perspective for heroic struggle, courage, fighting capacity striving for freedom and seeing better perspectives.

After the events of February-March 1921, the Soviet Russia, according own imperialistic and ideological interests, terminated the existence of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1921) having violated the peaceful alliance agreement of May 7, 1920 between Russia and Georgia and aggressively occupied the country which had earlier been recognized. Then this act was followed by annexation and the members of the Democratic Government and some military men emigrated from the country.

The Soviet Russia, through its annexation and occupation, physically destroyed the independent republic of Georgia which at that time was on its way to democracy and development. It was the second time that Russia put the burden of subjugation under the power of the Soviet Empire.

The mentioned events conditioned the liberation movement aiming to restore independence of the country. This movement expressed the wishes of the majority of the Georgian nation. Among other important historical events, the liberation movement of 1921-1924 has always had its important place and influence in the history despite the official Soviet government of that time announced those three years of the heroic struggle as “political banditry.”

Three years later since the fact of occupation of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1921) by the Soviet Russia in 1922, there a peaceful people protests and peaceful demonstrations against the Bolshevik power took place. In August-September of the same 1922 year, the armed uprising exploded in Dusheti district and Pshav-Khevsureti mountainous region of Georgia. This uprising was led by Georgian Democratic Republic Army cavalry Division 1st company commander, colonel Qaikhosro (Qaqtusa) Cholokashvili who was brought up in Signaghi region (now Akhmeta) village Matani. Cholokashvili had moved to the forest with his combatants since March 12, 1922. In practice, the armed revolt was coordinated by inter-partial union settled in May 1922, named as “Joined Committee for Georgian Independence” and the Military Centre associated with this committee. Unfortunately, this revolt was defeated. .

In spring 1923, Qaqtusa Cholokashvili began preparations for the intended new uprising (Kirtadze, 1998:324). Pankisi gorge was selected as the place for collecting the armed formations. According the order by Qaqtusa Cholokashvili of April 27, 1923 according the documents of the Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285:129, there are the names of some of them (Qaqtusa Cholokashvili, Giorgi Gverdtsiteli, Ioseb Kakhashvili, Aleksandre Sul Khanishvili, Sergo Maisuradze, Malakia Maisuradze, Mikha Khelashvili and others (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia 600: 29), Taras Chkhetiani, Vano Kharangosishvili, Luka Kvaliashvili, Vaso Kandelaki and others (Sul Khanishvili, 1981;100). five combatants from Qizikhi, nine ethnically Qists (Datiko [pareulidze]- E.N.). and many others. All combatants were divided into five groups. The first group, four men: Giorgi Gverdtsiteli, Gabo Oziashvili, Lelo Chiqovani and Giorgi Bidzinashvili were sent to Dusheti in order to help twelve-man group led by Kakhiasvili to go to the Pankisi gorge. The second group led by Misha Natsvlishvili (Malakia Maisuradze, Alexandre Badurashvili and others) was sent to Qizikhi through Jimiti forest, to help the group led by Molashvili to reach

Pankisi. Three men (Aleksandre Sul Khanishvili, Sergo Maisuradze and Mikha Khelashvili) were sent to Gombori region village Ashroshani, to help Dimitri Tsiskarauli nearby to the village Eniseli (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285:129) and finally to pass to Pankisi gorge too (E.N.). The fourth group (four men) - Roman Kanchaveli and three Qist combatants had to wait for others in Pankisi, at the place of meeting. The fifth group (eight men) under the command of Qaqutsa Cholokashvili (Soso Losaberidze, Ioseb Kakhashvili, the two brothers – Chesalo and Makhman, Makhmed Imedashvili, Qosa from Omalo village (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia 285: 129), Cholokashvili's assistant Staff Captain Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgian Republic. Archives of the Party, 14a:16) Shaliko (E.N.) Kandelaki – were sent from Pankisi to Telavu district village Sabue in order to have some negotiations with Lek people (Daghestan) so that they would be ready for the time Qaqutsa Cholokashvili would lead the cavalry unit of Chechens through the region (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia 285: 129) .

Georgian Bolshevik government fought against their people, against the freedom and independence of the country. They came to power with help of the other country's forces. As soon as the rebels moved to forests the government announced them “bandits” and “robbers,” “agents” of the foreign intelligence and the “criminals.” The government then began opposing to the revolted forces by all the means including unlawful measures aiming to discredit the rebellions. They worked hard to pursue the population that Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and his sworn combatants, struggling for independence, were simply robbers and bandits. The communists killed their fellow members who were not desirable for them, they robbed the population of the villages and they accused the members of Cholokashvili's troops; many agents were sent to the units of revolted men. They were obliged to try to kill Cholokashvili, to rob the local population, to mislead the combatants into mousetraps, to pursue the local population to kill or betray the warriors, or to revolt against them but despite the intensive terror, the great majority of people did not betray the patriots; people believed in the ideals of Cholokashvili's forces. This can be exemplified by memories about Dimitri Tsiskarauli, the best liaison person living in Ashroshani, Telavi (now Akhmeta) region. Though there were also instances of betrayal and served for the communist intelligence service (“chekist”) commands.

In order to guarantee the aim of their rebellion movement, Qaqutsa Cholokashvili decided to establish ties with Chechnya and Daghestan to assure their support with manpower. Cholokashvili began negotiations with Atabai Umaev, Chechen by nationalit, and reached positive results. In a short while, Umaev informed Cholokashvili that there was

already gathered a large group of Chechen warriors ready to move to Georgia's region Kakheti but he would not be successful in this because the small groups of Tushi population (in the Georgian region Tusheti) did not allow the Chechens to make way through their region because they did not trust them and were afraid of disturbances. A little later at the end of June, 1923 Cholokashvili sent Aleksandre Sul Khanishvili to Atabai Umaev with same request (N. Kirtadze, 1998; 324). Sul Khanishvili was accompanied by a man whose name was Rostom (Qavtara) Bekuraidze, from Alvani village, Tusheti. This man could speak Chechen. Cholokashvili had preparatory discussions about what to talk with Chechens. He wrote a short letter to Umaev saying he was sending his assistant to him and asked for help in making talks with influential people not only with the groups of Chechens habituating in mountains or in valleys but as many other habitants of the regions as it was possible. The Georgian rebels were looking for gaining the ties with the people of the North Caucasus which was possible only with help of Chechens.

Sul Khanishvili delivered the letter written by Cholokashvili to Atabai Umaev. Umaev turned to be quite educated and a good orator. So that Sul Khanishvili was asked only a few questions about what they should do for the Georgian rebellions. (Sul Khanishvili, 1981: 106-107, 112, 114-115).

Atabai Umaev and Sul Khanishvili were walking in all the villages of the Itumkal region during two weeks and called meetings at which they were explaining to Chechen people why it was not only desirable for Georgians but also good for them to help Georgian people in their struggle. But because of keen opposition in face of real bandits as were Imedashvili and Andalashvili who presented at the meeting, the process of agitation failed. Sul Khanishvili and Umaev continued the attempts to find support from the Chechens. Atabai Umaev gave a special letter to Rostom Bakuraidze and sent him as a delegate to population of Tusheti to start new talks about letting the Chechen armed groups go towards Kakheti through Tusheti territory, to help Georgian rebellions. (Kirtadze, 1998: 324).

Sul Khanishvili got acquainted with Shamil Iqaidze, who was from Tusheti region and at that moment was in Chechnia having announced that he wanted to become a member of Georgian armed units of rebellions, who were known as "sworn men". Sul Khanishvili sent a letter to Cholokashvili with Shamil Iqaidze writing that the measures that he and Umaev were taking became gradually more intensive and fruitful and he was going to Urismartan to meet there with Sheikh Ali Mataev. before Shamil returned from Georgia, Atabai Umaev sent a amn to Ali Miatev saying that a driend and representative of Qaqutsa Cholokashvili wanted to meet with him. Ali Mitaev agreed and thus, Sul Khanishvili and Mitaev went to Chechnia's valley region. (Sul Khanishvili, 1981: 118).

At the night 4/5 May, 1923, one communist killed the assistant officer of Qaqutsa Cholokashvili in Telavi, staffs-captain Shaliko Kandelaki. After that, Vano Karangozishvili was appointed as assistant officer (Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgian Republic; archives of the party 14 a: 16). According the note of the “special three men” or so called “troika” (in Russ.) who were combating against national movement which they called “banditry”, Vano Karangozishvili and Luka Kvaliashvili were killed on August 14, in Tusheti (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285:233).

Answering the letter dated by June 20, according the direction of the central committee of the National-Democratic Party, in the letter sent on July 7, Giorgi Tsinamdzgvrishvili wrote to Cholokashvili and Karangozishvili (the letter was headed as “to the leaders of partisans):

„...1) the information you have sent is not sufficient. We need more precise data about your relations with the population of the mountainous regions, with whom do you have ties among Dagestanis, Chechens and Qists; approximately what amount of manpower they can put forward, what about weaponry and horses. Deliver us this information with Qaqutsa, before you return from Qisteteti region.

2) we inform you that we are having negotiations with Azerbaijan and Mountain republic about revolting, and with Turkey as well. We inform you also that these negotiations are going on successfully and we may expect the activities quite soon. You are obliged to keep this information secret. All that concern the number of partisans, negotiations with Dagestan people and all the information delivered by us are secret. Only you personally ought to know. We repeat: nobody should know anything about military preparations.... The military centre will send you our military plan at the due time but you should now send someone who is responsible to get the wanted information from you and to take the necessary information from us Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgian Republic. Archives of the Party, 14a, description 1, fund 14a.:16).

This letter was with the courier sent by Tsinamdzgvrishvili to Cholokashvili, whose surname was Petriashvili. He was arrested by the Extraordinary Coomission (“Cheka”). (Kirtadze, 1998: 324).

At the end of July or the beginning of August 1923, Cholokashvili sent a letter too Tsinamdzgvrishvili with the courier, who was obliged to tell Georgian national-democrats that Cholokashvili suggested that it was already high time to begin the uprising in the mountainous region with the help of the Ingush and Dagestani troops. Tsinamdzgvrishvili answered with the letter saying that neither Cholokashvili nor Ingush or Daghestani armed men could decide the precise time of beginning the uprising for the reason that this uprising

could only be of additional help in case the relations between Russia and Europe would face difficulties (Kirtadze, 1998,:324).

What were the preconditions or the key for Georgia, to combat and to gain victory in the 20-ies of the XX century? The following conditions show on what circumstances it depended whether Georgia could win or lose:

Full national-political unity of the Georgian people on the ground of restoring national independence, using the united efforts of all the political parties, establishing unified coordinating political authority and unifying all the political forces of Georgia, moral and practical support from the world's society, especially West Europe, support from the different governments and non-governmental forces, inner changes in political and social fields, inner democratic innovations, founding democratic freedoms and values, coming the democratic forces to power; besides that, app the factora of the foreign policy would have influenced Soviet Russia; world peaceful and democratic forces' efforts in order Bolshevik Russia would have to withdraw its troops from Georgia , possible intervention of the European countries military forces into Russia and free not only Georgia but other trans-Caucasian and North Caucasian national countries through the participation of their forces in the united armed uprising against the imperial Russia and the colonial policy in the Caucasus – these were the keys to the independence.

Georgia could not oppose Russia without the help of other Gaugasian nations. Even in case of consolidation all the Georgian resources, armed opposition against Russia was a lost battle from the beginning.

the potential allies of Georgia in its hard struggle against Russian occupation could be European countries and the immediate neighbor countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia and North Caucasus republics. Besides, even to test its position and nothing more, in respect with its neutral position, it was very important for the Georgian centre of rebellion against Russia to have talks with Turkey. Thus, three preconditions for Georgian rebellions to achieve success were the following: consolidation with the neighbor countries of Caucasus; financial, diplomatic and active combat support from the West European countries; being sure about neutral position of Turkey.

Ali Mitaev hosted Aleksandre Sul Khanishvili and Atabai Umaev very friendly. The talks first were led by Atabai Umaev in their native language. Then Sul Khanishvili addressed Ali Mitaev with the following words: „...you know it quite well that Russia always had benefit out of minor or more serious conflicts and hostilities between Caucasian nations. Russia always promoted aggravations of relations between the neighbors... Today the political mistakes of our ancestors and our generation became clear for us and we know that these

mistakes proved costly. When Shamil was struggling against Russia, unfortunately, though a little part, but nevertheless, a part of Georgians were on the Russian side. All the Caucasian nations should have been united against Russia. But you can remember what were the relations between Dagestan and Georgia: when Georgia fought against any enemy, Dagestan men always stabbed us in the back; they captured Georgian women and men and children. Alongside with the Russian propaganda, this fact was also one of the reasons that Georgia did not support the movement of Shamil. Please, do not think that I am justifying this fact, just the opposite. I am very sorry that our ancestors were not able to foresee that Russia was our common enemy and their mistakes became hard burden for us. Caucasian nations are very much alike each other by our traditions, our respect to honest and brave people, our ideals. The only difference is our religion. South Caucasus population is Christians and North Caucasus – Muslims. But this is not a reason to hinder our friendship and serving our own country or common interests? We have Muslim Georgians too among our native population and this is not a negative factor for our integrity. Today I have come to you as I am sent by my leader who is trying to continue the traditions of struggling begun by our ancestors and by Shamil, I want to ask you as a very influential man in the North Caucasus, to deliver our message expressing our wishes and strive: let us end with past oppositions and hostilities; as they do not match with our ideals and hinder liberation of our countries” (Sul Khanishvili, 1981:119-122, 125).

It turned out that Ali Mitaev thought the same way. He took establishing ties with neighboring people upon himself;

As soon as he returned from Dagestan Sul Khanishvili wrote a letter to Qaqutsa Cholokashvili describing in details the negotiations with Ali Mitaev and other noble men of North Caucasus.

On 26 of July, 1923 Alexandre Sul Khanishvili went out from Chechnia with 500-700 Chechens, aiming to move to Georgia, Kakheti region.

He requested from Tushi population to let him pass through the checkpoint promising that Chechens would do no harm to them, neither concerning their cattle nor other property. He explained that he was accompanied by Chechens and was going to Kakheti region to combat against the Soviet power. Inhabitants of Tusheti didn't hinder him and Sul Khanishvili, accompanied by Chechens went through Tuxhareti passing to Omalo village heights and to Pankisi gorge where they planned to join Cholokashvili's troops and would begin military activities in Kakheti. The route by which Sul Khanishvili was planning to go was as follows: from one direction – through Velisi ridge and from the other – Naqerala ridge, meeting at Didi Zgverdi height, crossing the river Ortskali, go to the mountain Shamfuris tsveri, then

through the villages Lanshturia, Parta, Drevi, Chkoni until reaching Karigo pass(central archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285: 82). But when Tushi population knew that Chechens would pass their territories they became negatively affected. They were afraid that Chechens would rob their cattle. In the middle of August Cholokashvili was informed that Chechens could not come to Kakheti through Tusheti region again, it was then the second turn. Chechens returned to their homes. (Kirtadze, 1998: 324).

In August, Qakhosro Cholokashvili went to Chechnia accompanied with five “sworn” combatants. Two days later Qaqutsa, Atabai and Sul Khanishvili went to meet Ali Mitaev. After this meeting they went to Grozno, where they met with three local noble men and decided to begin uprising. At that meeting the decision was made about signing an official agreement. For this purpose Giorgi Tsinamdzgvrishvili was to arrive from Tbilisi. Besides, it was decided that qualified military officers, as many as possible, should have been sent from Georgia as there were only a few number of the local professional military men. The plan of the campaign should have been laid out in Tbilisi and then submitted to the Caucasian commanders (Sul Khanishvili, 1981;127, 129).

Qakhosro Cholokashvili contacted with Atabai Umaev and with his help, to the influential imam of Daghestan Naadjimudin Gatsinski whose official influence spread over Andy region of Daghestan and the centre for his agitation was the living place of Atabai Umaev, village Tumsoi (Chechnia). In the same month of August, Cholokashvili went to Gatsinski with his 7 or 8 combatants. Gatsinski helped him in agitation among the Chechen population (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia 285:289).

In one of his letters sent in August 1923, Cholokashvili wrote to Tsinamdzgvrishvili that it was wrong not to try to have contacts with North Caucasus the population of which could have a huge influence if they served this idea. He also mentioned in this letter that he used to be in Chechnya himself and had a talk with one of the most influential men Sheikh Ali Mitaev who promised his help in struggle of the Georgian patriots against Russian occupation and in realizing the plans of the rebellion. Cholokashvili advised Tsinamdzgvrishvili to have close contacts with Mitaev and sent him his address and the “code word” (Kirtadze, 1998:323).

In September 1923, Tsinamdzgvrishvili addressed the presidium of the central committee of the National-Democratic party (Shalva Amiredjibi, Iason Djavakhishvili and Mikheil Ishkneli) saying: „As early as tomorrow, we are going to Ali Mitaev”. They agreed. The departure was confirmed by the “Military commission” affiliated to “parity committee”. Almost the same time, Konstantine Karangozishvili went the same direction. At that time he was a trusted man of Tsinamdzgvrishvili. Tsinamdzgvrishvili left him there and returned back in about ten days. He reported about his “voyage” at the meeting of the central committee of

the National-Democratic party. Tsinamdzgvrishvili said that he had met Ali Mitaev, studied the situation in Chechnya and warranted that this man was a holy person and had unlimited influence over Chechens and the Chechen in mass were “good material” for the armed rebellion, needing only a good command. Ali Mitaev himself agreed to have contacts with the “parity committee” in order to begin armed rebel. He promised to activate a number of military troops only asking for about 50 officers sent from Georgia as the instructors for Chechen forces. When having talks, Tsinamdzgvrilshi and Ali Mitaev touched the question of working with Dagestanis and Kazaks. Tsinamdzgvrishvili found out that there was a kind of rival between Mitaev and Dagestani Imam Nadjimudin Gatsinski because of the areas of influences. He asked Mitaev to forget about rival and Mitaev wrote a letter to Gatsinski telling about the aim of their consolidation and the perspectives of the rebellion.

Tsinamdzgvrishvili reported the results of his voyage to the Minister of agriculture in the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Noe Khomeriki, a member of the Social-Democratic party of Georgia who had arrived from Paris illegally (Kirtadze, 1998:323) Khomeriki informed the head of the “Parity Committee” (Kirtadze, 1998, 323) a member of the Social-Democratic party Konstantine Andronikashvili. Thus, the presidium of the “Parity Committee” knew about the activities and they decided not to cut the contacts with the North Caucasus but for that time to refrain from sending 50 officers to Caucasus because of lack of finances. After a while, a messenger from Chechnya, from Ali Mitaev arrived to Giorgi Tsinamdzgvrishvili and brought a letter from Konstantine Karangozishvili. Among other things, there was a request to speed up the issue about sending 50 Georgian officers (Kirtadze, 1998; 323).

In September 1923, Cholokashvili moved to Daghestan through the Sabue forest and Gombori Passover, accompanied with the friends and sworn combatants: Giorgi Gverdtsiteli, Malaqia Maisuradze, Misha Natsvlishvili, Soso Losaberidze, Aleksander Badurashvili and Roman Kanchaveli. He came to Antsa Katsaev, had negotiations there, with someone, under the surname Rajhudin who was well known person in Caucasus. The other combatants – Longo Tsikhistavi, Alex Feiqrishvili, Ioseb Qimbarishvili, Giorgi (“Kurdghela”) Bidzinashvili and Sasha Chiabrishvili were at that time in Dusheti region, in Akhatani (Choporti district). On September 11 Aleksandre Badurashvili and Roman Kanchaveli returned from Cholokashvili, through Akhmeta to Omalostavi village, They intended to move on to Dusheti district to deliver the messages to Longo Tsikhistavi and his group that things were going on well. After 14 of September about 35 of the “sworn men” returned to Georgia in some small groups. Only Alexandre Sul Khanishvili rested in Chechnya, in the Tumsoi village, with Atabai Umaev (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285: 265).

In the beginning of October Cholokashvili moved from Daghestan to Atabai Umaev, whom he left on October 8 and returned to Telavi region. Aleksandre Sulhanishvili returned from Chechnya to Georgia with him. The ties between Cholokashvili and Gatsinski were interrupted since the 15th of October because of the unfavorable weather conditions (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285:289).

Results. Qaqutsa Cholokashvili; relations with the North Caucasus (May 1923-November 1923) is one of the outstanding facts in the centuries history of the Georgian national movement and its important period of time, the years of 1921-1924.

In the today's situation, guaranteed state and national security is logically related to the thorough study and generalization of our history, where the important place belongs to the events of 1921-1924. It becomes obvious if we attentively revise the historical events. we can see that many issues of the political events of our days can be matched with the past. based on the above said we can conclude that the nearest past and modern geopolitical events and situations can be compared and many common problems can be found: Russian-Georgian armed conflicts, "informational war", occupation of Georgian territories - Apkhazeti and Samachablo, participatating of the armed troops from the North Caucasus, so called "boeviks: against Georgia, worsening of interrelations between Georgia and North Caucasus, and many other factors, such as no circumstances to allow to have peaceful "diplomatic" talks, to explain that Russia is our common enemy and the inspirator of all conflicts, violator of the fundamental juridical norms and principles – such situation can be used in order to make useful propaganda of the historical events which we have discussed here – Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and his combatants and to show the historical past in connection with modern problems. In our opinion, the armed combating against Russian occupation, the attempts to have ties with Caucasian people – Chechens, Ingush, Dagestan people, Kazaks living on the banks of the river Tergi, underlying that they had the attempts to join with Georgian troops and to fight with them – all the events we have discussed in this work of course should be talked about and should be assessed positively.

During many centuries, the only guarantee for the independence of Georgia always was, is and will be only conciousness of the Georgian people as the pillar on which the idea of freedom can be rest is the perception of freedom and independence which is what the Georgian people never lack in general and this is confirmed by gratitude from the next generations towards the heroes of the national movement of 1921-1924.

Today we are on the hard way to full political independence of Georgia and our nation pays due attention and respect to the heroic past, namely the national movement and uprising of

1921-1924 against occupation under the leadership of Qaqutsa Cholokashvili who made a sacrifice of his life for the ideals of independence of Georgia

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Investigate the World because of the Empirical Sensation of Reality in All Its Universal Completeness and Manifestyle

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ABSTRACT

In this article the overview of turbulent processes, in which complex configurations of different ethnocultural discourses is discussed. Dramatic situation is not in parity and absence of actor's consensus of this process, which summons painful reaction of the participants of these contacts.

Keywords: Ethnocultural discourse, globalization processes, multiculturalism, information space, turbulence, integration, implementation.

Динамика изменений глоболизирующего пространства в контексте мультикультурализма

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АННОТАЦИЯ

В статье осуществляется попытка рассмотрения турбулентных процессов, в которых происходят сложные конфигурации различных этнокультурных дискурсов. Драматизм ситуации состоит в непаритетности и отсутствии консенсуса акторов этого процесса, вызывающих болезненную реакцию участников контактов.

Ключевые слова: этнокультурный дискурс, глобализационные процессы, мультикультурализм, информационное пространство, турбулентность, интеграция, имплементация.

Вынося на суд читателя тезисы анонсированного исследования, я сознательно нарушаю категорический императив парижских рестораторов, гласящий: «Клиентов на кухню не пускать». Ну, а если всерьез, моя попытка предстать перед читателем в «домашнем халате» и «в тапочках» продиктована желанием привлечь к проблеме молодую генерацию казахстанских ученых. Мне представляется не просто

интересным, но крайне важным видеть в своих молодых коллегах стремление видеть за пределами нормативных знаний. И если мое предложение к творческому сотрудничеству найдет отклик, то буду считать, что не зря посвятил свою жизнь исследованию того, что есть окружающий меня мир и кто я в этом постоянно меняющемся мире.

I. Системы европейских ценностей как референтных (?!) ценностей в дискурсе глобализирующейся культуры предполагает выведение некоего алгоритма, определяющего шкалу предпочтений и отрицаний расширившегося за последний век мирового культурного пространства. И эти усилия, по образному выражению Марселя Пруста, выступают неким «поиском утраченного времени», несущего в своем контенте внутренне противоречивый конгломерат идеалов прошлого (как традиции) и настоящего (как модерна, отрицающего все, что было в прошлом), поскольку время всегда протяженно и необратимо и, в отличие от статуарности пространства, представлено в восприятии отдельного индивидуума и социума различными измерениями и величинами.

К первоочередным причинам масштабных корреляций при контактах различных историко-культурных моделей и процессов, в первую очередь, можно отнести определенные нормативные отношения и оценки историко-культурных традиций, наблюдатели которых, находясь внутри данных историко-культурных локаций и временных измерений (хронотопов – термин М. Бахтина), воспринимают и расценивают значимые события в своей жизни по-разному.

Сказанное относится и к смене социокультурного дискурса и социокультурного ландшафта, необратимо расширяющихся в условиях глобализации и её составляющей – транскультурных процессов, связанных со все увеличивающейся массовой миграцией этнокультурных групп на территории, более благоприятные для их полноценной жизнедеятельности. А в последние годы – для безопасности, которые мигранты и беженцы утратили на своих этнических родинах вследствие разорительных и разрушительных военных конфликтов с многочисленными человеческими жертвами.

Именно эти (и многие другие, побочные) обстоятельства смущали поколения исследователей, когда они пытались интерпретировать то или иное событие или артефакт, выходя за пределы своего этнокультурного ареала и его аксеологической системы, поскольку их оценки, критерии и выводы отнюдь не всегда совпадали с самооценками представителей культур-реципиентов. Более того, порой они имели диаметрально противоположные аксиологические маркеры.

Что касается понятийной реконструкции историко-культурной эволюции как основной составляющей в нашем понимании исторического процесса, то она, уже по факту своего «места прописки», имела «родовые признаки», сформировавшиеся в условиях жизнесуществования традиционных этнокультур, значительно отличающихся и не совпадающих с их экстраполяцией исследованиями представителей чужой для них культуры.

С другой стороны, получившие образование в научных и культурных центрах Европы и Северной Америки представители стран-аутсайдеров так называемого «третьего мира» испытывают значительные затруднения при попытках интерпретации и артикуляции в терминах и понятиях «референтных культур», научных школ и культурных традиций стран своего обучения.

Иллюстрацией этому состоянию может служить признание первого Премьер-министра получившей независимость Индии Джавахарлала Неру о том, что он «изучал Индию как просвещенный европеец». Хотя этим признанием не исчерпывается весь сложный спектр мнений и самооценок, которые приобрели устойчивую популярность в художественных исследованиях.

Достаточно ознакомиться с публикациями одного из теоретиков движения «Негритюд» алжирца Франса Фанона или лауреата Нобелевской премии в области литературы, нигерийского писателя Воле Шоинки с его резонансным романом «Интерпретаторы», в котором европейские либерально-демократические ценности с традиционными ценностями, имплементируемые ими в социально-политическую жизнь своих обществ, живущих в условиях политического и социально-экономического транзита, оказывались несовместимыми, а сами инициаторы-культуртрегеры подвергались у себя на родине политическим и уголовным преследованиям.

Противоположные примеры, когда европейцы устремлялись в Азию (Индия и Тибет), чтобы постичь содержание традиционных восточных религий и философских концепций, особенно в 60-70-х гг. прошлого столетия (суб-культура хиппи и пр.), также достаточны, чтобы обратить внимание на сохраняющую свою актуальность, проблему взаимопонимания цивилизационных дискурсов.

II. Но проблемы взаимопонимания представителями различных цивилизаций друг друга, при всем их драматизме, лишь одно, хотя и типическое, но далеко не последнее, затруднение, с которым сталкивается всякий исследователь, погружаясь, по образному выражению Томаса Манна, в «колодец времени».

Перед ним – распростертый океан различных, рядоположенных, но не имеющих между собой очевидной смысловой связи, фактов и сведений, подлинный смысл которых может быть истолкован самыми различными и даже противоположными принципами и системами оценок.

И, со всей неизбежностью, возникает вопрос: какими методами и средствами интерпретировать этот бессистемный набор эмпирических сведений?...

С этого момента исторические артефакты уступают место идеологии и подвергаются перекодированию с «нужным» и легитимным пониманием прошлого как причины настоящего.

На тему субстанциональных признаков этнокультурных артефактов, аккумулированных в прошлом и дающим возможность провозгласить их «подлинной» историей, Эрнест Кассирер рассуждал следующим образом: «Масса исторического материала стала лишь тогда членимой, а историческое сознание – доступным, когда отдельное стало связанным с всеобщими над индивидуальными ценностями < > Между понятием стиля (возможно, Э. К. обозначал термином «стиль» понятие идеологемы – выделение мое – Р. Ж.) и понятием ценности имеется существенное различие. То, что представляет собой понятие стиля, есть не должествование, а чистое «бытие», хотя в этом бытии речь идет не о физических вещах, а об устойчивости формы» [1].

Мысль немецкого философа-неокантианца подтверждается различными версиями и сценариями одних и тех же событий прошлого, которыми изобиловала историческая наука во все времена своего статуса «летописного свидетеля».

Это явление получило у специалистов-культурологов определение синдром «Ворот Расёмон» (по одноименной повести Рюноске Акутагавы), когда участники одного и того же события рассказывают свою версию происшедшего, порой, принципиально по-разному.

Исходя из приведенных замечаний, нужно признать, что одна лишь логическая интерпретация культурного феномена не способна охватить все разнообразие признаков и характеристик культурного артефакта как части социокультурного со-Бытия. По этим причинам перед исследователем возникает настоятельная необходимость расширить арсенал исследовательских подходов и практик. В частности, привести их в некое целостное образование посредством новых принципов и методологий подхода.

III. Понятие метода, каким видит его цитируемый выше Эрнест Кассирер, образует в каждой исследовательской системе центр, от которого радиусы ведут к проблемам

различных локаций. На методе, в конечном счете, основано все операционное единство мыслительного процесса, которым обладает данная система. Метод не может быть выражен в отдельном понятии или в отдельном положении. Он обладает свойством постоянно раскрываться во всей полноте отдельных проблем и продуктивных мотивов в качестве мета-системы, позволяющей объединить в целостное понятие пространственно-временной континуум [2]. Таким образом главным затруднением, тормозящим адекватное рассмотрение и понимание исторического нарратива, выступает отсутствие универсального метода, при котором различные историко-культурные традиции и их оценки могут рассматриваться в духе и в направлении компаративизма и на паритетных принципах и условиях, удовлетворяющих все стороны межкультурного диалога.

Соблюдение этого императивного требования к «чистоте» и «аутентичности» оценок того или иного культурно-исторического артефакта или события никто из серьезных исследователей не отрицает. Но, одновременно, и не принимает как методологию своего исследования, оставляя его за пределами своего видения в качестве комплиментарной фигуры речи, с пожеланием относиться к иной стороне диалога с позиций гуманизма и равенства в самых общих чертах этого понятия.

Именно по причине сознательной (или бессознательной) ограниченности видения проблемы, осознания мультикультурной целостности современного мира как гомогенного, полноценного, гармоничного и динамично развивающегося процесса, возникает понятийная лакуна, в которую устремились различные квази-идеологемы, претендующие на свой доминирующий конституционный статус в качестве единственно правдивой генеральной версии современного Бытия в его современных проявлениях, характеристиках и оценках.

IV. Столкнувшись с таким развитием событий на рубеже второго и третьего тысячелетия христианства, Западный мир пересматривает и переоценивает свой культурный багаж – римское право, принципы аврамической этики, легшие в основу иудаизма и христианства, которые столетиями составляли метафизику и жизненную практику европейской модели жизнестроения общества и его культуры, определяя базовые принципы неотъемлемых прав человека в качестве «коллективного договора».

Однако на вопросы о том, каким образом можно актуализировать и максимально распространить их на все сферы жизни современных западных социумов и как вернуть безусловную веру людей в абсолютную истинность христианской традиции, удовлетворительных ответов нет...

Хуже того, на Западе необратимо усиливается алармическое восприятие своего образа мышления, образа жизни и ее исторических перспектив, отразившееся в реактуализации резонансных научных прогнозов о кризисе западной модели цивилизации («Закат Европы» Освальда Шпенглера и «Конец истории» Френсиса Фукуямы и пр.) и ряда художественных произведений современных европейских литераторов и публицистов, наиболее обостренно воспринимающих реалии современного мира, в которых описывается коллапс европейской модели цивилизации во всем многообразии ее проявлений.

Сегодняшний мир под влиянием ускорения глобализационных процессов, беспрецедентного расширения информационного пространства и культурных контактов вступил в фазу турбулентности, в которой прежние формы модернизации всех жизненных реалий и сознания перестали соответствовать требованиям адекватного понимания происходящих перемен на всех стратификационных уровнях современных обществ. На смену ему все настойчивее приходит постмодерн, претендующий стать доминирующей теорией и методологией современного, динамично развивающегося мира.

V. Считается, что дефиниция «постмодерн» ввел французский культуролог Жан-Франсуа Лиотар в своей книге «Состояние постмодерна» (1979 г.). Он определяет состояние постмодерна как «недоверие к мета-нарративам». В его редакции, мета-нарратив – это широкомасштабное и связное объяснение крупных феноменов. Религии и прочие тотализирующие идеологии являются мета-нарративами с того момента, когда пытаются объяснить смысл жизни или все пороки общества. Лиотар ратовал за то, чтобы заменить их «мини-нарративами» (фрагментировать) и стремиться к постижению менее масштабных и более личных (персонифицированных) «истин». Под таким ракурсом он рассматривал не только христианство или марксизм, но и фундаментальную науку и культуру [3].

В качестве рабочего определения, можно говорить, что постмодернизм представляет собой художественное, философское, социологическое, культурологическое и политологическое течение, зародившееся во Франции в 1960-е гг. XX-го в. и подарившее миру экстравагантное искусство и еще более экстравагантную художественную концепцию. Характерные для постмодернистов ирреальность действительности и принципиальное неприятие цельного и гармоничного индивидуума, были заимствованы из арсенала художественных средств авангардного и сюрреалистического искусства, а также из предшествующих философских школ конца XIX-го – начала XX-го вв.

Также, можно говорить о том, что это направление художественного познания стало реакцией сопротивления либеральному гуманизму художественных и интеллектуальных течений модернизма: апологеты постмодернизма упрекали модернистов в наивной универсализации опыта западной культуры. В особенности, культуры среднего класса – основного носителя социальных и экзистенциальных ценностей европейской цивилизации и образа жизни.

Возможно, что утверждение о приходе постмодерна в качестве доминирующей теории современного мира может показаться избыточно и неоправданно смелым или даже гиперболой, но в реальности совокупность субстанциональных признаков и ценностей постмодернизма давно уже преодолела границы собственно художественной и академической интерпретации и приобрела в современной культуре Запада достаточно сильное влияние.

К слову, если рассматривать постмодерн в формате художественной практики, то это направление иллюстрирует рядоположенность событий, выстроенных вопреки хронологической последовательности и какой-либо субординации, демонстрирует тотальность современного мира. В этом смысле (но только в качестве художественной практики как наиболее тонкого индикатора социальных и экзистенциальных процессов, происходящих в жизни социума) можно говорить о позитивном и экспериментальном характере и значении постмодернизма для художественной практики, побудившей современную литературу и искусство к созданию произведений с привлечением новых выразительных средств и нового формата их презентации. Хотя постмодерн можно (и следует) упрекнуть в отсутствии историко-культурной преемственности и отрицании эволюционной составляющей культурного процесса.

Что же касается постмодерна как нового формата и методологии социологических и культурологических концепций, то он привносит в них определенный стилистический кич (эkleктику и маргинальность), основанные на идеях *second hand* – «вторые руки» – тексты и сюжеты, построенные на вовлечении в их формат аллюзий из более чем отдаленных и несопоставимых мыслеформ.

Характерные признаки постмодернизма нетрудно распознать и предать критическому анализу. Однако этос, лежащий в его основе, еще недостаточно исследован и не поддается адекватному анализу традиционными методами и инструментариями. Причина этого состоит, с одной стороны, в том, что сами идеологи постмодерна, как правило, изъясняются невнятно, а с другой – в том, что противоречивость и

непоследовательность, имманентные их образу мышления, отрицающего существование стабильной реальности и достоверного знания, не дают возможность определить критерии истины, без которых всякая дискуссия утрачивает какой-либо смысл.

Традиционные ценности – мораль, здравый смысл и ясность, равно как и семиотика, структурализм, марксизм и экзистенциализм отвергались модернистами по тем же причинам.

Постмодернисты так же скептически относились к научному познанию с целью обретения объективного знания о реальности, существующей независимо от человеческого восприятия: наука была для идеологов и апологетов постмодернизма не более чем формой сконструированной идеологии и аксеологии, в которых доминируют буржуазные предпосылки. По своему месту в ряду партийных идеологов постмодернизм, несомненно, представляет левое течение, располагая одновременно нигилистическим и революционным этосом, что резонирует с послевоенным пост-империалистическим настроением времени, превалирующим среди представителей общественности на Западе. Говоря проще, постмодерн строит свой этос «по ту сторону добра и зла» (Ф.Ницше) – традиционно сложившуюся в обществе систему морально-этических норм и отношений, создавая новый анти-сциентистский Эгрегор, в котором трансцендентность мира и человеческого сознания остаются за пределами эмпирических интересов.

А между тем, именно вера в над-эмпирическую трансцендентную реальность мира сохранила моральные ценности у первых ссыльных из Европы поселенцев Австралии и Новой Зеландии, социальный состав которых был представлен, по преимуществу, уголовниками, женщинами с пониженным порогом социальной ответственности – в просторечии, проститутками – и прочими асоциальными элементами.

Первое, что строили эти люди на территории своих поселений, были церковные приходы – затраты, с точки зрения экономической целесообразности, необоснованные.

Но сегодня, по прошествии относительно короткого отрезка времени, Австралия и Новая Зеландия находятся в числе аутсайдеров по уровню преступности, а университеты этих стран – на высших позициях в рейтингах уровня качества образования, далеко обогнав многие традиционные образовательные центры и университеты Европы.

VI. Сегодня трудно прогнозировать, как отреагирует постмодернизм на масштабные изменения демографического ландшафта Европы, вносящие в ее социальную и культурную жизнь масштабные перемены. Теперь становится все труднее игнорировать новый социокультурный дискурс в условиях массового исхода мусульман Ближнего

Востока и Северной Африки в Европу, аксиология которых существенно отражается в общественных и межличностных отношениях между различными этническими, социальными и конфессиональными стратами, радикально изменяющими социально-психологическую атмосферу общества, его аксиологическую систему, психоматику и поведенческие стереотипы межличностных отношений, которые пока еще удовлетворяют формату постмодернизма как открытого информационного и культурного пространства – «глобальной деревне».

Но состояние неупорядоченности и некоей интроверсийности внутри постмодернистской концепции не может продолжаться бесконечно долго, поскольку стремительно меняющемуся по своему демографическому и этнокультурному облику обществу и его субъектам необходимы достоверные знания о самом себе, как в широком социальном, так и в экзистенциальном измерении, служащие ему неким надежным навигатором для ориентации в выборе оптимальной модели своего *modus vivendi* (способа существования) в этом безумном мире «глобальной деревни».

Далеко не в последнюю очередь индивиду и этнической группе, находящимся в инокультурной среде, присуща потребность сохранения своей этнокультурной идентичности и эксклюзивности своего видения окружающего мира. И хотя это стремление сопряжено с серьезными и труднопреодолимыми трудностями, связанными с различными, конкурирующими между собой подходами, оно пытается отстоять свою независимость и право оставаться собой.

Последнее обстоятельство создает множество проблем бытового свойства, побуждая мигрантов создавать моноэтнические анклавов, Изолированные от окружающего их социального пространства, эти анклавов европейских мегаполисов вносят в их жизненный ритм и культурный ландшафт специфические характеристики. По этой причине жизнь в социальных образованиях проходит в режиме реального апартеида без продуктивных контактов между различными этническими сообществами.

Обитателей этих анклавов – «новых европейцев» – почти ничто не объединяет с коренным населением стран их местопребывания. Порой они даже не владеют и не стремятся владеть государственным языком страны проживания, поскольку большая часть их жизни протекает внутри замкнутого пространства их этнического анклава, а вмешательство муниципальных властей в их жизнь воспринимают как нарушение их прав.

Сохранить свою этническую идентичность они пытаются посредством традиционной религиозной конфессии – ислама. Однако условия их жизни и характер

деятельности создают определенные проблемы для ритуальных обязательных отправлений, предписываемых нормативами шариата.

В сложившейся ситуации потребности проведения ритуальных отправлений естественным образом расширился рынок «специалистов» в области религиозных канонов, среди которых нередко встречаются персоны с неадекватной психосоматикой и политическими ориентациями, имеющие с традиционным исламом весьма условную связь.

Тема современных форм квази-ислама в его политизированном выражении выходит за пределы настоящей статьи, что предполагает вынести ее в отдельное исследование.

Хотя...

VII. По мнению швейцарского психоаналитика К. Г. Юнга, сегодняшняя европейская цивилизация оказалась в ситуации, которую невозможно разрешить исключительно с помощью рациональных или моральных аргументов, но, в большей мере, при посредстве высвобождения эмоциональных сил и идей, порожденных духом времени. А эти последние отнюдь не всегда зависят от рациональных размышлений и еще в меньшей мере – от призывов к соблюдению нравственности [4].

Многие исследователи пришли к пониманию того, что в данном случае противоядием должна стать не менее сильная вера другого, нематериалистического типа, и что основанная на ней религиозная позиция будет единственной надежной защитой от опасности психического токсикоза. Исходя из этого тезиса, представляется необходимым рассмотреть феномен института мировых религий как «реальность более высокого порядка» (Гегель), с позиций мифологической системы над эмпирического языка метафор бытовых верований и религиозных постулатов, представляющих альтернативу беспрецедентному потоку сведений, ретранслируемых мульти-информационными сетями Интернета.

Современный человек может оперативно получить любую информацию об окружающем его мире, нажав на клавишу персонального компьютера. Но эти сведения зачастую входят в противоречие с его индивидуальной «жизненной философией и практикой» – жизненным инстинктом. Неосознанная тревога человека в изменившемся мире проистекает по причине утраты им инстинкта самосохранения как индивидуума. Чем больше человек подчиняет себе природу, тем глубже его рациональные знания об устройстве мира, тем глубже становится его пренебрежение и потребительское

отношение к экологии как неотъемлемой части его самосознания и физического существования.

Но рациональные эмпирические сведения отнюдь не всегда совпадают с живущими внутри конкретного человека истинами и принципами и безотносительны по отношению к ним. Именно поэтому понимание внутренних механизмов психики человека без учета его внутреннего мира в его неотъемлемой связи с окружающим миром, в основе которых лежит коллективное бессознательное – архетип – система, состоящая из переплетения эмпирических и изотерических связей, представляется неполным. А значит и неадекватным.

В нашем случае в качестве «модельного объекта» могут выступить так называемые группы смертников-шахидов, или «голубых китов», призывающих подростков к суициду. Как представляется, для перекодировки их психоматики используются манипуляционные технологии, суть которых состоит в переориентации сознания из внешнего, рационального восприятия во внутреннее состояние иррационального восприятия действительности. В результате этих определенных манипуляций сознание социально неблагополучных людей, отчаявшихся найти себя в реальном и жестоком для них мире, переключают в зону подсознательного, в которой приоритетами выступают идеи лучшего, более справедливого мира, находящегося за пределами мира реальности. Для «правильного» перехода в этот манящий своими гармоническими условиями мир надо совершить решительный шаг – уничтожить существующее в этом несправедливом мире зло, оплатив свой поступок своей физической жизнью...

Остается заметить, что говоря о мире коллективного бессознательного, Карл Юнг назвал его двумя именами – миром Бога и миром Демона одновременно.

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